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REPORT SUMMARY 
Introduction 
In 1978, the General Assembly passed Act 608, the 
"Sunset Act" (§1-20-10 et seq. of the South Carolina Code of 
Laws, as amended). This Act abolishes specific boards and 
commissions on predetermined dates unless these agencies 
demonstrate a public need to justify their continued 
existence. In passing the law, the Legislature's greatest 
concern was whether the regulation provided by these 
agencies was needed to protect the public interest and, if 
so, how well the boards and commissions were performing this 
function. 
The Sunset Act requires the Legislative Audit Council 
to evaluate the performance of the agencies scheduled for 
termination. This report contains the reviews of seven 
boards scheduled to terminate on June 30, 1988: 
Board of Examiners in Optometry 
Board of Examiners in Opticianry 
Board of Physical Therapy Examiners 
Board of Occupational Therapy 
Board of Podiatry Examiners 
Board of Examiners in Psychology_ 
Board of Examiners in Speech Pathology and Audiology 
The Act requires that the Audit Council, at a minimum, 
address the following eight issues: 
{1) The amount of the increase or reduction of costs of 
goods and services caused by the administering of the 
programs or functions of the agency under review1 
(2) The economic, fiscal and other impacts that would occur 
in the absence of the administering of the programs or 
functions of the agency under review1 
(3) The overall cost, including manpower, of the agency 
under review: 
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(4) The efficiency of the administration of the programs or 
functions of the agency under review; 
(5) The extent to which the agency under review has 
encouraged the participation of the public and, if 
applicable, the industry it regulates; 
(6) The extent to which the agency duplicates the services, 
functions and programs administered by any other state, 
federal or other agency or entity; 
(7) The efficiency with which formal public complaints, 
filed with the agency concerning persons or industries 
subject to the regulation and administration of the 
agency under review, have been processed; and, 
(8) The extent to which the agency under review has 
complied with all applicable state, federal and local 
statutes and regulations. 
The review indicates that the seven boards fulfill a 
public need and meet the Sunset Act's criteria to justify 
their continued existence. The Audit Council, therefore, 
recommends that the General Assembly reauthorize these 
boards. However, the Council also recommends that a single 
board regulate physical therapy and occupational therapy. 
The Audit Council also found that state laws restrict 
the types of business arrangements through which 
professional services can be offered to the public. While 
some professional services are being provided contrary to 
state law, changes are needed in these laws to provide more 
innovative forms of service, increased competition, and 
lower consumer prices. Furthermore, the boards reviewed in 
this report collectively would better serve the public and 
the professions they regulate if they shared office space 
and staff and renewed licenses biennially. Also, boards 
which regulate health-related professionals would better 
protect the public if their licensees were required to 
report to their respective boards all malpractice awards 
made against them. 
This report is the first step in the Sunset process. 
The Audit Council asked the boards to respond in writing to 
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their audit reports and their comments are found in the 
appendix of each audit. In addition, each agency may 
testify in public hearings held by the State Reorganization 
Commission. Following this process, the General Assembly 
will decide whether to reauthorize these boards. 
Legality of Innovations in Professional Practices 
State law restricts the types of business arrangements 
through which professional services· can be offered to the 
general public. By law, licensed professionals cannot be 
employed by corporations for the purpose of providing 
services to the general public. Professionals are allowed 
to gain some of the benefits of incorporation by forming 
professional associations (PAs). A PA is an unincorporated 
association organized to render one professional service 
such as medicine, physical therapy or psychology. 1 However, 
professionals who form PAs cannot provide more than one 
service. 
The laws upon which these restrictions are based have 
not kept pace with innovations in business arrangements for 
professional practices. While it is illegal, some 
professionals are working for corporations and providing 
services to the general public, and some medical 
professional associations are offering more than one health 
care service. 
Professionals Working for Corporations 
Under state law, professionals cannot work for 
corporations for the purpose of providing services to the 
1section 33-51-20 defines professional service as 
" ••• any type of professional service which may be legally 
performed only pursuant to a license from a State Examining 
Board pursuant to the provisions of Title 40 •••• " All 
licensees of the seven boards examined in this report are 
licensed pursuant to the requirements of Title 40. 
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general public. 2 The reasoning for this is that when a 
corporation employs licensed professionals to provide 
services to the public, the corporation is itself practicing 
a learned profession. This practice would violate the 
statutes which allow only an individual to be licensed to 
practice a profession. A 1982 Attorney General's opinion, 
regarding occupational therapists working for a corporation 
and providing services to the general public, stated: 
••• the corporation ••• is incapable of 
being licensed itself; neither may it 
employ licensed occupational therapists 
in order to practice occupational 
therapy in South Carolina. 
However, contrary to state law, professionals working 
for corporations are providing services to the general 
public. Members of the Boards of Pharmacy, Speech Pathology 
and Audiology, and Opticianry stated that pharmacists, 
speech pathologists, audiologists, and opticians are working 
for corporations and providing services to the general 
public. Furthermore, corporations, which own for-profit 
hospitals in South Carolina, employ on a salaried basis, 
doctors, pharmacists, physical therapists and occupational 
therapists. 
By disallowing corporations from hiring professionals 
to provide services to the general pu~lic, the law may be 
raising costs to consumers without increasing the quality of 
care. Attorneys with the Federal Trade Commission, 
commenting on corporate practice restrictions on 
occupational therapists, stated the restrictions " ••• may 
also generate significant anticompetitive effects and 
2
charitable and public hospitals are exempted from this 
restriction and can hire licensed professionals to provide 
services to the general public. 
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increase costs to consumers." 3 Further, no evidence was 
found that licensed professionals working for corporations 
or for-profit hospitals provide inferior service, compared 
to these professionals working for organizations as allowed 
by state law. 
Professional Associations Can Provide Only One Service 
Professional Associations are prohibited by South 
Carolina law from providing more than one professional 
service. 4 However, consumers might pay lower prices for 
health care if state law concerning PAs were less 
restrictive. 
Section 33-51-30 of the South Carolina Code of Laws 
states: 
.•• no professional association .•• shall 
render professional service in more than 
one type of professional service. 
Section 33-51-50 also clearly prohibits PAs from offering 
more than one type of service. 
The restriction on PAs providing multiple services is 
anti-competitive and may raise prices without providing an 
off-setting increase in the quality of care. The Bureaus of 
Competition, Consumer Protection, and Economics of the 
Federal Trade Commission, commenting on a proposed Nevada 
regulation that would provide employment restrictions 
similar to South Carolina's for physical therapists and 
physicians, stated: 
••• the proposed rule would deny 
consumers the benefits of the full range 
of service, price, and quality options 
that a competitive market would provide. 
3see page 134 for the April 1987 Federal Trade 
Commission letter to the Audit Council. 
4However, §33-51-60 allows PAs to provide nursing 
services in addition to the professional service for which 
they were organized. 
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The proposed employment restrictions 
would hinder the development of more 
efficient practices that reduce costs 
through economies of scale or scope. In 
addition, providers would be limited in 
offering allied services at a single 
location, which may provide greater 
convenience and lower costs to consumers 
who would otherwise have to go to 
different locations to obtain these 
services. 
By limiting PAs to providing only one service, the law 
prohibits innovative forms of service delivery which might 
be more cost efficient. For example, it is illegal for one 
PA to offer the services of physicians, physical therapists, 
occupational therapists, and pharmacists. Instead, a 
professional association of medical doctors must refer their 
patients to independent therapists and pharmacists. 
Professionals with independent practices may charge higher 
prices than PAs offering multiple services due to their 
inability to benefit from economies of scale. 
In California, physicians are allowed to own other 
medically-related services, such as physical therapy or 
occupational therapy services. 5 They are required, however, 
to clearly inform their patients, when making referrals, 
that they own these services. The California Medical 
Association has stated that by allowing physicians to own 
other medically-related services, costs to consumers can be 
decreased. 
Additionally, in South Carolina, hospitals are taking 
advantage of the economies arising from offering multiple 
medical services. Many hospitals have their own pharmacists 
and salaried physicians, and many provide physical therapy 
and occupational therapy services. 
5
california does not allow physicians to own a 
pharmacy. 
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Furthermore, PAs in South Carolina are offering 
multiple services contrary to state law. For example, some 
physicians' PAs employ, on a salaried basis, both physical 
and occupational therapists, and a psychiatric association 
employs both physicians and psychologists. 
Summary 
State law now restricts the forms of practice through 
which professional services can be offe~ed. Some 
professionals are providing services to the public which are 
contrary to state law, but which can result in increased 
competition and lower consumer prices. If the practice 
restrictions were removed, the public would benefit from the 
decreased costs of professional services with no decrease in 
quality. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
THE GENEPAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD CONSIDER 
AMENDING TITLE 33 OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA 
CODE OF LAWS TO ALLOW PROFESSIONALS TO 
WORK FOR CORPORATIONS TO PROVIDE 
SERVICES TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC. 
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD.CONSIDER 
REPEALING THE PROVISIONS IN TITLE 33, 
CHAPTER 51 OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA CODE OF 
LAWS WHICH PROHIBIT PROFESSIONAL 
ASSOCIATIONS FROM OFFERING MORE THAN ONE 
PROFESSIONAL SERVICE. 
Central Administrative Office Reeded 
The seven medically-related boards reviewed in this 
report collectively would better serve the public and the 
professions they regulate if they shared office space and 
staff. Access to the boards by their licensees and the 
public is limited, and in some cases, response time for 
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correspondence and complaints is long. Further, records of 
five boards must be kept in individuals' homes or private 
offices. These boards' administrative duties have become 
more than can be expected of a board member or part-time 
secretary. 
Six of the boards have part-time employees to handle 
administrative duties. The remaining board has no 
state-authorized positions. None of the boards have 
investigators for handling complaints. All of the boards 
rely on Board members to donate their time and often their 
personal resources to get the work done. 
The boards are responsible for handling applieations, 
examinations, licenses, license renewals, complaints and 
information requests. Specific administrative requirements 
of the state must also be fulfilled. These responsibilities 
have increased, and it is reasonable to expect that they 
will continue to do so. 
The boards, primarily composed of professionals, often 
have little knowledge of state laws and procedures. In some 
instances, boards have taken actions contrary to state laws 
and procedures because they lack staff with experience in 
state requirements. 
Also, public participation in the boards' activities is 
limited. Five of the boards have no 9ffice, and four do not 
have listed telephone numbers. This makes it difficult for 
members of the public to contact the boards for information 
or to file complaints. 
In order for regulatory boards to protect the public, 
it is necessary for them to be accessible to the public, 
professionals and other state agencies. Individually, six 
of the seven boards are too small to generate the resources 
needed, without raising fees, for each to support an office 
and staff. In FY 85-86, the average number of licensees 
handled by the boards was 363 and the smallest board, 
Podiatry, had 55 licensees. The Physical Therapy Board, 
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with 769 licensees, is able to support an office and a staff 
person working 32 hours a week. 
The State Reorganization Commission, the Governor's 
Productivity Council, and the organization for the state's 
Professional Occupational Licensing Agencies have all 
recommended that these and other small licensing boards 
share office space and staff. Also, other southeastern 
states allow their small regulatory boards to share offices 
and staff. Florida, Georgia, Kentucky and Tennessee have 
from two to 35 boards sharing offices and staff. Virginia's 
ten small medically-related boards share an office and other 
administrative costs. 
A centrally-located office with shared administrative 
staff would benefit both the public and the professions 
regulated by the seven boards. It would allow these small 
boards to maintain a full-time office for processing 
licenses, handling complaints, transmitting information and 
fulfilling state requirements. Further, an office in the 
state capitol area would give the public and the 
professionals greater access to the boards. 
A review of the boards' available resources indicates 
sharing an office and staff would be possible without 
significantly increasing individual boards' costs. In 
FY 85-86, the boards' revenues to the_state General Fund 
exceeded their expenditures by more than $28,000. Also, the 
Physical Therapy Board has an office for which it pays 
$1,300 annually. Further, savings in staff time would 
result if six of the boards implement biennial licensure 
(see p. 10). 
Members of four boards stated that they want to share 
an office and staff with other small boards. A member of 
the fifth board said that it was a good idea on the surface, 
but may result in a loss of control for the board. Members 
from the remaining two boards were in favor only of sharing 
investigators. 
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RECOMMENDATION 
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD CONSIDER 
ALLOWING THE BOARDS OF OCCUPATIONAL 
THERAPY, OPTICIANRY, OPTOMETRY, PHYSICAL 
THERAPY, PODIATRY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND 
SPEECH PATHOLOGY AND AUDIOLOGY TO SHARE 
STAFF AND AN OFFICE IN THE STATE CAPITOL 
AREA. THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD ALSO 
CONSIDER INCLUDING OTHER SMALL LICENSING 
BOARDS WHICH WOULD BENEFIT FROM SHARING 
STAFF AND OFFICE SPACE WITH THESE SEVEN 
BOARDS. 
Biennial Licensure 
State law requires annual renewal of licenses for six 
of the seven boards reviewed in this report. The Boards of 
Occupational Therapy, Opticianry, Optometry, Physical 
Therapy, Podiatry, and Speech Pathology and Audiology would 
increase revenue from the interest earned on license fees 
and would save some operating costs if their licenses were 
renewed every two years. The Psychology Board already has 
biennial licensure. 
The six boards spend a total of 739 hours, or 98 days, 
a year renewing licenses. This amount of staff time would 
be reduced by half with staggered biennial licensure, 
thereby freeing staff to work on other tasks, including 
complaint investigations and correspondence. Since the 
Audit Council is recommending that the seven boards share 
office space and staff (see p. 7), biennial licensure would 
help reduce any additional staff costs that may be incurred 
from such an administrative merger. 
Furthermore, biennial licensure would create a gain to 
the state in interest earned on license fees and would 
result in a small savings to the boards. The two largest 
boards, Optometry and Physical Therapy, would earn 
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approximately $1,200 and $1,150 more a year in interest, 
respectively. 
RECOMMENDATION 
THE.GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD CONSIDER 
AMENDING STATE LAW SO THAT THE BOARDS OF 
OCCUPATIONAL THERAPY, OPTICIANRY, 
OPTOMETRY, PHYSICAL THERAPY, PODIATRY, 
AND SPEECH PATHOLOGY AND AUDIOLOGY RENEW 
LICENSES BIENNIALLY ON A STAGGERED 
BASIS. 
Reporting of Malpractice Awards 
The state boards which regulate health-related 
professionals could better protect the public if their 
licensees were required to report to their 
all malpractice awards made against them. 
the state's 13 health-related boards have 
respective boards 
Currently, 11 of 
no formal 
mechanism for being advised of malpractice awards involving 
their licensees. 
The state's licensing boards were created to protect 
the public from incompetent practitioners. Receiving 
information concerning malpractice awards would allow the 
licensing boards to better track licepsees for recurring 
problems involving their competence. Members of 10 of the 
13 boards which regulate health professionals stated that 
their boards should be informed of all malpractice awards 
involving their licensees. 6 Members of all 13 boards stated 
6The president, chairman or secretary of the Boards of 
Medical Examiners, Nursing, Pharmacy, Veterinary Medical 
Examiners, Chiropractic Examiners, Psychology, Occupational 
Therapy, Physical Therapy, Opticianry, and Speech Pathology 
and Audiology stated that their boards should receive such 
information. The president or chairman of the Boards of 
Dentistry, Optometry, and Podiatry stated they did not 
{Footnote Continued) 
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their boards should investigate a licensee with a pattern of 
malpractice awards. 
The Federation of s.tate Hedical Boards recommends in 
its model medical practice act that: 
Malpractice insurance carriers and 
affected licensees should be required to 
file with the Board a report of each 
final judgement, settlement, or award 
against •.• licensees •••• Upon receiving 
reports concerning a licensee ••• , the 
Board should be permitted to investigate 
any evidence which appears to show a 
licensee is or may be medically 
incompetent, guilty of unprofessional 
conduct, or mentally or physically 
unable to engage safely in the practice 
of medicine. 
Twenty-seven states have laws mandating insurance companies 
to report malpractice awards involving physicians to their 
state medical boards. Furthermore, the Federal Omnibus 
Health Act (Public Law 99-660) mandates liability companies 
to report malpractice awards involving physicians, dentists 
with hospital privileges, and osteopaths by 1989. Awards 
will be reported to a repository to be designated by the 
United States Secretary of Health and Human Services and to 
the state medical boards. Companies which fail to report 
awards face civil penalties up to $10,000 per occurrence. 
In South Carolina, physicians are required to report on 
their license renewal forms any malpractice awards or 
judgments made against them in the previous year. 
Furthermore, occupational therapists are required to report 
on their license renewal forms a:qy .. professional liability 
suits filed against them. 
(Footnote Continued) 
believe it was necessary for this information to be reported 
to them. 
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RECOMMENDATION 
THE GENERAL ASSENEI.Y SHOULD CONSIDER 
REQUIRING ALL LICENSED MEDICAL 
PROFESSIONALS AND THEIR INSURANCE 
COMPANIES TO PROMPTLY REPORT TO THE 
RESPECTIVE REGULATORY BOARDS ALL 
MALPPACTICE AWARDS MADE AGAINST THEM. 
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INTRODUCTION 
After reviewing its laws and operations, the 
Legislative Audit Council concludes that there is a public 
need for the regulation of optometry, and that the Optometry 
Board should be continued. In most areas, the Board has 
operated efficiently and effectively. However, the Audit 
Council has identified several laws and regulations which 
unnecessarily limit competition and may increase prices, 
while providing questionable protection of the public•s 
health and welfare. 
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BACKGROUND 
The South Carolina Board of Examiners in Optometry was 
created as an independent body by the General Assembly in 
1978 to regulate the profession. Prior to 1978, this Board 
was combined with the Board of Examiners in Opticianry. 
Nationwide, all 50 states regulate optometry through 
licensure. 
Optometrists are one of three types of professionals 
who provide eye care. They examine eyes for vision defects 
and diseases, and prescribe and dispense corrective lenses. 
Ophthalmologists are physicians who diagnose and treat 
vision defects and diseases, perform surgery, and prescribe 
and dispense corrective lenses. Opticians produce and 
dispense corrective lenses from the prescriptions of 
optometrists and ophthalmologists. The Optometry Board 
regulates optometrists only. 
The Optometry Board is composed of five licensed 
optometrists and two public members having no connection 
with an optical profession. The Governor appoints the 
optometrist members upon nomination by all licensed 
optometrists in the state. He also appoints the public 
members who can be nominated by any individual or group. 
Board members may serve no more than two consecutive 
four-year terms. 
The Optometry Board examines applicants for licensure, 
investigates complaints, and investigates and prosecutes 
violations of South Carolina optometry law. The Board also 
promulgates regulations governing the practice of optometry. 
In December 1986, there were 457 licensed optometrists, 188 
of whom lived out-of-state. All licenses must be renewed 
annually by October 1. 
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SUNSET ISSUES AND FINDINGS 
(1) DETERMINE THE AMOUNT OF THE INCREASE OR REDUCTION OF COSTS 
OF GOODS AND SERVICES CAUSED BY THE ADMINISTERING OF THE 
PROGRAMS OR FUNCTIONS OF THE AGENCY UNDER REVIEW. 
The Optometry Board has no direct control over the 
prices charged by optometrists for their services. The 
Board does impose regulation costs on optometrists through 
examination fees, license fees, and continuing education 
requirements. However, it is not likely that these costs 
significantly affect the price of optometric services. 
Consumer prices may be affected by some state laws and 
regulations administered by the Board. These are discussed 
below. 
Limits on Competition 
The Audit Council identified eight state laws and 
regulations which limit competition while providing 
questionable benefit to the public's health and welfare. 
The laws and regulations in question were identified with 
the assistance of the Bureaus of Consumer Protection, 
Competition and Economics of the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) upon the request of the Audit Cquncil. 1 Laws which 
limit competition can result in higher consumer prices. 
Price Discounts 
Section 40-37-190 of the South Carolina Code of Laws 
states: 
It shall be unlawful for any person to 
offer eye examinations at a discount 
1see page 33 for February 1987 FTC letter to the Audit 
Council, which includes several issues not addressed in this 
report. 
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price or as a premium, the object of 
which is to induce the sale of 
ophthalmic services or materials. 
This lav1 does not prohibit an optometrist from 
discounting, or giving free of charge, services to the 
public. Nor does it prohibit the advertising of individual 
prices for services. The law only prohibits optometrists 
from advertising to the public which prices are discount 
prices. It is questionable, however, as to how the public 
can be harmed or deceived by the advertising of discount 
prices. FTC analysts found " ••• no consumer benefit from 
such restrictions." 
Office Location 
State Regulation 95-l(n) states: 
No licensed optometrist shall practice 
his profession in a space leased or 
rented in a business establishment such 
as a jewelry, department or other store: 
Provided, it is not unlawful to share a 
joint waiting room with a practitioner 
of another recognized profession. 
Provided, further, that this shall not 
be construed to prevent an optometrist 
now practicing optometry in a store 
owned and operated by himself from 
continuing to so operate. 
It is questionable, however, as to how the public can 
be harmed or deceived solely because a licensed optometrist 
is practicing in space leased or rented within another 
store. An FTC study concludes that restrictions such as 
these" ••• harm consumers by increasing prices without 
providing any quality-related benefits." 
Qualification Claims and Professional Affiliations 
State Regulation 95-l(e) states: 
No licensed optometrist shall hold 
himself forth in such way as to carry 
the slightest intimation of having 
superior qualifications or being 
superior to o'ther optometrists. 
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State Regulation 95-l(f) states: 
No licensed optometrist holding an 
official position in any optometric 
organization shall use such position for 
advertising purposes or 
self-aggrandizement. 
By prohibiting all ads with the "slightest intimation" 
of superior qualifications, state regulation limits 
competition by preventing optometrists from informing their 
customers of pertinent education and experience 
qualifications. In addition, FTC analysts note that, while 
it is possible for professional affiliations to " .•. be 
communicated in a deceptive manner, the mere po~sibility of 
deception does not justify a total ban." Advertising would 
be more informative to consumers if regulation prohibited 
only those claims of qualifications and professional 
affiliations which are deceptive. 
Solicitors 
Section 40-37-220(15) of the South Carolina Code of 
Laws permits the Board to discipline optometrists when 
" .•• the holder of a license has been guilty of using a 
solicitor, peddlers, cappers or steerers to obtain 
patronage." This statute could be used to prohibit 
optometrists from using third parties.to assist in marketing 
their services and products in any manner. FTC analysts 
suggest only prohibiting third-party solicitation which 
involves: 
••• uninvited, in-person solicitation of 
persons who, because of their particular 
circumstances, may be vulnerable to 
undue influence. 
Third-party solicitation which is truthful, nondeceptive, 
and noncoercive could provide beneficial information to 
consumers on the qualifications and services of 
optometrists. 
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Visual Displays 
State Regulation 95-l(d) states: 
No licensed optometrist shall display 
his license, diplomas, or certificates 
in such manner as to be seen and read 
from outside his office. 
Regulation 95-l(h) states: 
No licensed optometrist shall display 
eyeglass signs or painted or 
decalcomania eyes anywhere. 
Regulation 95-l(k) states: 
No licensed optometrist shall display 
any lenses, spectacle frames or 
mountings, or any other ophthalmic 
material or advertising of any kind in 
the windows or in any room in his office 
for the purpose of inducing patronage. 
It is questionable as to how the public can be harmed 
or deceived by the advertising displays prohibited by these 
regulations. FTC analysts found these restrictions 
" ••• provide no apparent consumer benefit." 
Summary 
When the truthful, nondeceptive advertising of 
optometric services is unnecessarily restricted, competition 
is reduced, and price and quality comparison becomes more 
time-consuming and inconvenient for consumers. Reduced 
competition often results in higher prices. Further, when 
optometrists are prohibited from locating in other stores, 
some will incur higher operating costs because a separate 
office must be maintained. These costs may be passed on to 
consumers. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD CONSIDER 
REPEALING THE PROHIBITION ON ADVERTISING 
OF DISCOUNTS ON EYE EXAMINATIONS 
CONTAINED IN §40-37-190 OF THE SOUTH 
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CAROLINA CODE OF LAWS. THE GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY SHOULD CONSIDER AMENDING 
§40-37-220(15) TO ALLOW TRUTHFUL, 
NONDECEPTIVE, NONCOERCIVE THIRD-PARTY 
SOLICITATION. 
THE OPTOMETRY BOARD SHOULD REPEAL STATE 
REGULATIONS 95-l(D), (H), AND (K) vlliiCH 
RESTRICT ADVERTISING DISPLAYS, AND 
REGULATION 95-l(N) WHICH RESTRICTS THE 
OFFICE LOCATION OF OPTOMETRISTS. THE 
BOARD SHOULD ALSO AMEND ·REGULATIONS 
95-l(E) AND (F) TO ALLOW TRUTHFUL, 
NONDECEPTIVE CLAIMS OF QUALIFICATIONS 
AND PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS. 
( 2) DETERMINE THE ECONOMIC, FISCAL AND OTHER IMPACTS THAT WOULD 
OCCUR IN THE ABSENCE OF THE ADMINISTERING OF THE PROGRAMS OR 
FUNCTIONS OF THE AGENCY UNDER REVIEW. 
The complete deregulation of optometry would remove 
state laws and regulations which help ensure the quality of 
eye care optometrists provide to the public. Deregulation 
would eliminate entry requirements, including education and 
examination, which help ensure that optometrists are 
qualified to provide eye care. It would also eliminate a 
mechanism for suspending or revoking an unqualified 
optometrist's license. 
As a result of deregulation, the number of unqualified 
optometrists might increase. Unqualified optometrists may 
issue inaccurate prescriptions and misdiagnose eye symptoms 
requiring medical attention. Although the price of eye care 
could decrease due to increased competition among 
optometrists, the public may be exposed to more untrained 
and potentially harmful practitioners, thus affecting public 
health, safety and welfare. Therefore, the Audit Council 
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recommends that the Board and regulation of the profession 
be continued. 
( 3) DETERMINE THE OVERALL COSTS, INCLUDING MANPOWER, OF THE 
AGENCY UNDER REVIEW. 
To support its administrative costs, the Optometry 
Board collects revenue through examination and license fees 
(seep. 32). From FY 81-82 through FY 85-86, the Board's 
expenditures increased from $24,821 to $30,799, while 
revenues increased from $29,075 to $39,955 (see Table 1). 
In FY 85-86, expenditures were equal to 77% of the revenue 
collected. The remaining 23% was retained in the state 
General Fund. 
A private firm performs the Board's administrative and 
clerical functions for a contracted fee of $9,600 per year 
(FY 86-87). The Board also pays one of its members $3,765 
per year for part-time administrative duties. 
'l'ABLB 1 
SOU'l'B CAROLDIA BOAJID OF EXAMINERS IN OP'!'OME'l'RY 
SOURCE OF REVEliUBS AND EXPEMDI'l'URES 
Revenues to General Fund FY 81-82 FY 82-83 FY 83-84 FY 84-85 FY 85-86 
License & Examination Fees $ 29,075 $ 32,928 $ 39,080 $ 40,809 $ 39,955 
TOTAL Revenues $ 29,075 $ 32,928 $ 39,080 $ 40,809 $ 39,955 
Expenditures 
Personal Service $ 8,152 $ 8,408 $ 9,600 $ a, 112 $ 8,455 
Other Operating Expenses 16,187 13,320 19,252 17,010 21,704 
Employee Benefits 482 564 611 523 640 
Nonrecurring Appropriation 4,848 
TOTAL Expenditures $ 24,821 $ 22,292 $ 29,463 $ 30,493 $ 30,799 
Source: South Carolina Budget and Control Board Budget Documents, FY 83-84 through FY 87-88. 
Board EmElo;y:ee 
Since July 1, 1984, the Secretary-Treasurer of the 
Optometry Board has been a part-time employee of the Board. 
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This Board member has been paid $3,765 per year but has no 
written job description. The member stated that this salary 
was in return for performing part-time administrative 
functions. Without a written job description, however, the 
public does not know which services have been purchased with 
its funds. 
RECOMMENDATION 
THE OPTOMETRY BOARD SHOULD ENSURE THAT 
ALL EMPLOYEES HAVE WRITTEN JOB 
DESCRIPTIONS. 
( 4) EVALUATE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE 
PROGRAMS OR FUNCTIONS OF THE AGENCY UNDER REVIEW. 
Since the Audit Council's 1981 review, the Optometry 
Board has made efforts to conduct its operations more 
efficiently. The Board has contracted with a private firm 
since 1985 to perform its administrative functions, and 
records reviewed by the Audit Council were well organized. 
However, the Board does not have written administrative 
procedures, and the laws regarding licensure of out-of-state 
optometrists need to be clarified. 
Written Administrative Procedures 
Although the Board is governed by state l~ws and 
regulations, they have not been implemented t:hr'd~gh written 
administrative procedures. Section 1-23-140 of the South 
Carolina Code of Laws requires that all state agencies adopt 
and make available to the public a written policy statement 
of all formal and informal procedures. This law allows more 
effective public oversight of agencies. Also, without 
written policies and procedures, government actions are less 
likely to be consistent. In addition, the Board could 
violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection 
under the law. 
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RECOMMENDATION 
THE OPTOMETRY BOARD SHOULD DEVELOP A 
WRITTEN POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUl-\L. 
Examination Process 
The examination process for licensure consists of a 
national board exam and a state-administered practical exam. 
To ensure that its practical examination is a valid measure 
of optometry skills, the Board has contracted with a testing 
consultant from the University of South Carolina since 1984. 
The Audit Council commends the Board for using professional 
expertise. Although the examination process has been 
upgraded, the following area needs improvement. 
Out-of-State Applicants 
Qualifications in state law for South Carolina 
licensure of out-of-state optometrists are not clear. 
Further, requiring all out-of-state optometrists to pass 
South Carolina's practical exam may not be necessary to 
protect the public's health. 
Two sections of the South Carolina Code of Laws appear 
to be contradictory. Section 40-37-90 states that an 
out-of-state optometrist is qualified to be licensed_if he 
has practiced for five years in another state, is in good 
standing, and has passed the national board exam. 
Section 40-37-100 states that the Board may require a 
practical exam of applicants. However, since out-of-state 
licensure requirements in §40-37-90 do not refer to a 
practical exam, it is not clear whether out-of-state 
applicants can be required to pass a practical exam. In 
practice, the Board has required all applicants to pass a 
practical exam, but in 1985, a lawsuit was brought against 
the Board by an out-of-state plaintiff attempting to be 
licensed without passing the practical exam. The plaintiff 
initially won the lawsuit in Richland County Circuit Court 
25 
in 1986, but the decision was reversed by the South Carolina 
Supreme Court in 1987. 
Requiring licensed out-of-state optometrists to pass 
South Carolina's practical exam may not be necessary to 
protect the public's health when they have passed equivalent 
tests in other states. Other health-related boards in South 
Carolina do not require further testing when out-of-state 
applicants meet certain criteria. For example, physicians 
from out-of-state may be licensed with no further testing 
based on approved education, postgraduate training, national 
test scores, years of experience, and letters of reference. 
If the credentials of an out-of-state physician are approved 
by the Board of Medical Examiners, licensure is granted 
without further testing. 
When licensure of out-of-state optometrists who have 
passed equivalent tests in other states is unnecessarily 
restricted, the public may be denied the services of 
qualified individuals. Further, the public may not receive 
the price benefits from increased competition. 
RECOMMENDATION 
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD CONSIDER 
CLARIFYING THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS 
FOR THE LICENSURE OF OUT-OF-STATE 
OPTOMETRISTS. IN CLARIFYING THE 
REQUIREMENTS, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
SHOULD CONSIDER PERMITTING OUT-OF-STATE 
OPTOMETRISTS, WHO HAVE PASSED PRACTICAL 
EXAMS SUBSTANTIALLY EQUIVALENT TO SOUTH 
CAROLINA'S, TO BE EXEMPTED FROM THE 
SOUTH CAROLINA PRACTICAL EXAM. 
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( 5) DETERMINE THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE AGENCY UNDER REVIEW HAS 
ENCOURAGED THE PARTICIPATION OF THE PUBLIC AND, IF 
APPLICABLE, THE INDUSTRY IT REGULATES. 
To encourage public participation, state law requires 
that two of the seven Optometry Board members be public 
members, not associated with an eye care profession. The 
Board conducts public meetings approximately once a month, 
which are announced through written advertisements at the 
Board's office and in two Columbia newspapers. Also, the 
Board has listings in the state government and Columbia 
telephone directories. 
The Board could improve its efforts in encouraging 
public participation through the process of setting fees. 
Because optometrist fees have not been enacted in 
regulation, the public has had inadequate input (see p. 29). 
( 6) DETERMINE THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE AGENCY DUPLICATES THE 
SERVICES, FUNCTIONS AND PROGRAMS ADMINISTERED BY ANY OTHER 
STATE, FEDERAL, OR OTHER AGENCY OR ENTITY. 
The Audit Council found no evidence that the Optometry 
Board significantly duplicates the services, functions or 
programs of other state, federal, or local government 
agencies. Federal regulations (16 CPR 456) apply to 
advertising by the optometry profession, addressing 
practices by optometrists as well as state regulatory 
boards. However, the Optometry Board is the only government 
agency which issues licenses for optometrists to practice in 
South Carolina. 
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(7) EVALUATE THE EFFICIENCY WITH WHICH FORMAL COMPLAINTS, FILED 
WITH THE AGENCY CONCERNING PERSONS OR INDUSTRIES SUBJECT TO 
THE REGULATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE AGENCY UNDER 
REVIEW, HAVE BEEN PROCESSED. 
In FY 85-86, the Optometry Board investigated 28 
complaints filed against South Carolina optometrists. Two 
frequent areas of complaint involved inaccurate lens 
prescriptions and violations of state advertising 
restrictions. The Board requires all complaints to be in 
writing. Since 1985, complaints have been recorded in a 
log, which allows them to be monitored more efficiently. 
Individual Board members conduct investigations on a 
rotating basis. Board members have stated that 
investigations could be improved if conducted by 
investigators who are not Board members. Due to the low 
volume of complaints, independent investigators would likely 
be more effective if shared with other small 
medically-related boards. The benefits of sharing staff, 
including investigators, are discussed in the Report Summary 
(see p. 7). 
(8) DETERMINE THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE AGENCY UNDER REVIEW HAS 
COMPLIED WITH ALL APPLICABLE STATE, FEDERAL AND LOCAL 
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS. 
The Optometry Board was created under and is subject to 
South Carolina laws and regulations. Federal regulations 
(16 CFR 456) regarding advertising practices also apply to 
the optometry profession. 
The Audit Council found the Board has not sent minority 
business procurement plans to the Office of Small and 
Minority Business Assistance as required by the South 
Carolina Consolidated Procurement Code. This law's purpose 
is to ensure minority businesses access to the state 
government procurement process. In addition, the Board has 
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improperly set fees. Further, sales tax regulations require 
different sales tax charges on ophthalmic materials, 
depending on whether the materials are sold by an 
optometrist, ophthalmologist or optician. 
Setting of Fees 
The Optometry Board's examination, certificate and 
license renewal fees have not been enacted in regulation, as 
required by state law. As a result, the General Assembly, 
the public and optometrists have had inadequate input into 
the setting of fees. 
Sections 40-37-80, 40-37-110, and 40-37-140 of the 
South Carolina Code of Laws require examination, certificate 
and license renewal fees to be established in regulation 
through a process set forth in the state Administrative 
Procedures Act (APA). This process allows the General 
Assembly, the public, and optometrists a specific period of 
time to review and comment on proposed regulations before 
they become law. The APA helps ensure that regulatory 
agencies are responsive to the citizens of South Carolina. 
The Optometry Board, however, has independently set fees 
without going through the APA process. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Sales Tax 
THE OPTOHETRY BOARD SHOULD COMPLY WITH 
STATE MINORITY BUSINESS PROCUREMENT 
LAWS. 
THE OPTOMETRY BOARD SHOULD COMPLY WITH 
STATE LAWS REQUIRING THAT FEES BE 
ESTABLISHED IN STATE REGULATIONS. 
The state sales tax on eyeglasses, contact lenses and 
other ophthalmic materials is not equitable. The 5% tax 
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rate is applied to different bases, depending on who sells 
the ophthalmic materials. Ophthalmic materials sold to the 
public by ophthalmologists and optometrists are taxed at the 
wholesale price, according to state sales tax 
Regulation 117-167. However, this regulation requires that 
ophthalmic materials be taxed at retail price if sold to the 
public by opticians. 
Sales tax charges vary, even though state and federal 
laws permit ophthalmologists and optQmetrists to sell 
ophthalmic materials in the same manner as opticians. A 
patient who receives a prescription for eyeglasses or 
contact lenses from an ophthalmologist or optometrist may 
have it filled by any ophthalmologist, optometrist or 
optician who sells the prescribed product. 
By requiring different sales tax charges for the same 
product, depending on who sells the product, 
Regulation 117-167 is not equitable. Inequitable taxes can 
cause the public to lose confidence in the tax system. 
Also, the South Carolina Tax Commission estimates that an 
additional $1 million per year would be generated by taxing 
all ophthalmic materials at retail price. 
RECOMMENDATION 
THE SOUTH CAROLINA TAX COMMISSION AND 
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD CONSIDER 
AMENDING REGULATION 117-167 SO THAT THE 
SALES TAX ON EYEGLASSES, CONTACT LENSES 
AND OTHER OPHTHALMIC MATERIALS IS 
CONSISTENT, REGARDLESS OF THE PROFESSION 
OF THE SELLER. 
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APPENDICES 
Examination 
Annual Renewal 
In-state 
Out-of-state 
Branch License 
APPENDIX A 
BOARD OF EXAMINERS IN OPTOMETRY 
SCHEDULE OF FEES 
Printing of Certificate 
Fees 
$150 
85 
60 
85 
25 
Source: South Carolina Board of Examiners in Optometry. 
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APPENDIX B 
UNITED STATES OF A\1ERICA 
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20580 
BUREAU OF 
CONSUMER PROTECTION 
Mr. George L. Schroeder, Director 
Legislative Audit Council 
state of South Carolina 
620 Bankers Trust Tower 
Columbia, South Carolina 28201 
Dear Mr. Schroeder: 
February 19, 1987 
The staff of the Federal Trade Commission is pleased to 
respond to your invitation to participate in the sunset audits of 
the South Carolina Boards of Optometry and Opticianry ("Boards") .1 
This letter states our views on the manner in which provisions in 
the Optometry and Opticianry Practice Acts ("Practice Acts") and 
regulations governing these Boards may affect competition for the 
delivery of eye care service within the markets served by South 
Carolina optometrists and opticians. 
In this letter we focus primarily on the statutory and rule 
provisions restricting advertising and the use of third-party 
solicitors by optometrists and opticians. Nondeceptive adver-
tising disseminates information about the individuals or firms 
offering services that consumers may wish to purchase. This 
process is beneficial to consumers because it facilitates pur-
chase decisions that reflect true consumer preferences and it 
promotes the efficient delivery of services. We therefore urge 
the Council to seek the repeal of those rules that restrict the 
use of truthful, nondeceptive advertising. We also comment on a 
rule that unnecessarily restricts the commercial forms in which 
optometrists may practice. This rule limits competition among 
professionals and may tend to raise prices, and we therefore 
recommend that the Council seek its repeal as well. 
The Federal Trade Commission is empowered under 15 u.s.c. 
§§ 41 et seq. to prevent unfair methods of competition and unfair 
or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce. Pur-
suant to this statutory mandate, the Commission has attempted to 
1 This letter represents the views of the FTC's Bureaus of 
consumer Protection, Competition, and Economics, and not neces-
sarily those of the Commission. The Commission has, however, 
authorized submission of this letter. 
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Bicentennial of the United States Constitution 
(1787-1987) 
encourage competition among members of licensed professions to 
the maximum extent compatible with other legitimate state and 
federal goals. For several years, the Commission has been inves-
tigating the competitive effects of restrictions on the business 
practices of state-licensed professionals, including optome-
trists, dentists, lawyers, physicians, and others. The Commis-
sion's goal has been to identify and seek removal of restrictions 
that impede competition, increase costs, and harm consumers with-
out providing significant countervailing benefits. 
I. ADVERTISING RESTRICTIONS 
As a part of the Commission's efforts to foster competition 
among licensed professionals, it ha~ examined the effects of pub-
lic and private restrictions that limit the ability of profes-
sionals to engage in nondeceptive advertising.2 Empirical 
studies have shown that prices for professional goods and ser-
vices are lower where advertising exists than where it is 
restricted or prohibited.3 Studies have also provided evidence 
2 See, ~., American Medical Association, 94 F.T.C. 701 
(1979), aff'd 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd mem. by an 
equally divided Court, 455 u.s. 676 (1982). The thrust of the 
AMA decision -- "that broad bans on advertising and soliciting 
are inconsistent with the nation's public policy" (94 F.T.C. at 
1011) -- is consistent with the reasoning of recent Supreme Court 
decisions involving professional regulations. See, ~., 
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court 
of Ohio, 471 u.s. 626 (1985) (holding that an attorney may not be 
disciplined for soliciting legal business through printed adver-
tising containing truthful and nondeceptive information and 
regarding the legal rights of potential clients or using non-
deceptive illustrations or pictures); Bates v. State Bar of 
Arizona, 433 u.s. 350 (1977) (holding state supreme court pro-
hibition on advertising invalid under th~ First Amendment and 
according great importance to the role of advertising in the 
efficient functioning of the market for professional services) ; 
and Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer council, 425 u.s. 748 (1976) (holding Virginia prohibition 
on advertising by pharmacists invalid) . 
3 Cleveland Regional Office and Bureau of Economics, 
Federal Trade Commission, Improving Consumer Access to Legal 
Services: The Case for Removing Restrictions on Truthful 
Advertising (1984); Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Com-
mission, Effects of Restrictions on Advertising and Commercial 
Practice in the Professions: The Case of Optometry (1980); 
Benham and Benham, Regulating Through the Professions: A Per-
spective on Information Control, 18 J.L. & Econ. 421 (1975); 
Benham, The Effects of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses, 15 
J.L. & Econ. 337 (1972). 
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that restrictions on advertising raise prices but do not increase 
the quality of goods and services.4 Therefore, to the extent 
that nondeceptive advertising is restricted, higher prices and a 
decrease in consumer welfare may result. 
The Federal Trade Commission has examined various justifica-
tions that have been offered for restrictions on advertising and 
has concluded that they do not warrant restrictions on truthful, 
nondeceptive advertising. For this reason, the Commission staff 
believes that only false or deceptive advertising should be pro-
hibited. Any other standard is likely to suppress the dissemina-
tion of potentially useful information and contribute to an 
increase in prices. 
Discounts, Bonuses and Premiums 
Section 40-37-190 of the Optometry Practice Act imposes a 
flat ban on optometrists' "offer[ing] eye exams at a discount 
price or as a premium, the object of which is to induce the sale 
of ophthalmic services or materials. 11 5 In addition, both the 
Optometry and Opticianry Practice Acts (§§ 40-37-180 and 40-38-
70, respectively) make it unlawful 
to offer or give eyeglasses, spectacles, 
lenses or any part used in connection there-
with, as a premium or bonus with merchandise 
or in any other manner to induce trade or to 
give or offer to give anything of value 
••. the object of which is to induce the 
examination of the eye or the sale of [oph-
thalmic materials]. 
This restriction does not apply to giving "ophthalmic products 
incidental to the use of the product being offered" (such as 
eyeglass cases or cleaning solutions) or to discounts for vision 
care products, provided certain disclosures are made. 
We urge the Council to recommend the elimination of these 
provisions. These bans on discounts, premiums and bonuses 
4 Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, Effects of 
Restrictions on Advertising and Commercial Practice in the Pro-
fessions: The Case of Optometry (1980); Muris and McChesney, 
Advertising and the Price and Quality of Legal Services: The 
Case for Legal Clinics, 1979 Am. B. Found. Research J. 179 
(1979). See also Cady, Restricted Advertising and Competition: 
The Case of Retail Drugs (1976). 
5 As interpreted by the South Carolina Attorney General, 
this provision forbids any person from offering any discounts on 
eye examinations. See 84 S.C. Op. Att'y. Gen. 142 (1984). 
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deprive consumers of an important form of price competition that 
can readily be conveyed through advertising, and we can envision 
no consumer benefit from such restrictions. Moreover, the offer-
ing of such price terms not only can be of great benefit to con-
sumers, but also may be a valuable promotional tool for new prac-
titioners who are trying to establish themselves. 
While we recognize the potential for deceptive schemes in 
the offering of discounts, premiums and bonuses, we believe total 
bans on such offers are overly restrictive and unnecessary. Both 
the Practice Acts already contain appropriate general prohibi-
tions on untruthful or deceptive claims. Because any deceptive 
schemes are likely to involve false or deceptive claims, they 
would be prohibited under the current Acts. 
Disclosure Obligations 
Code sections 40-37-180 and 40-38-70 of the Optometry and 
Opticianry Acts, respectively, ·contain provisions requiring cer-
tain disclosures. The first of these appears to require that 
discounts from a "standard" price other than the offeror's 
"regular" price may be advertised only if the "standard" price 
and its source are disclosed in the ad. If interpreted in this 
way, this provision would effectively preclude the advertising of 
certain across-the-board discounts (~., "ten percent off manu-
facturers' list on all frames and lenses"). Since it is imprac-
tical to state in an advertisement the standard prices and their 
source for all of the goods and services covered by such an 
offer, the proviso likely suppresses this form of truthful and 
valuable advertising. Because it may harm consumers and 
competition, we suggest that the provision be eliminated.6 
Another provision in Code sections 40-37-180 and 40-38-70 
requires that certain disclosures be made in all price advertise-
ments of ophthalmic goods and services. Such ads must state 
whether: (1) an advertised price for eyeglasses includes single 
vision or multi-focal lenses; (2) a price for contact lenses 
refers to soft or hard contacts; (3) a price for ophthalmic mate-
rials includes all dispensing fees; (4) a price for ophthalmic 
materials includes an eye examination; and, (5) a price for eye-
glasses includes both frame and lenses.7 Any disclosure obliga-
6 It should be noted that at least one court has invali-
dated on First Amendment grounds similar requirements that 
advertisements for discounted prices include all regular non-
discounted prices. South Ogden cvs Store v. Ambach, 493 F. Supp. 
374 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
7 Such disclosure requirements were permitted, but not 
required, by § 456.5 of the Commission's Advertising of Oph-
thalmic Goods and Services Trade Regulation Rule ("Eyeglasses 
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tion increases advertising cost, either because it increases the 
length of the message or requires practitioners to forego some 
portion of the advertising message they would have delivered had 
the space not been taken by the disclosure. Unnecessary dis-
closure requirements could therefore result in less information 
being made available to consumers. Consequently, we believe that 
disclosures should be mandated only where they are necessary to 
prevent deception. Because we do not believe that there is any-
thing inherently deceptive about truthful price advertising, we 
recommend repeal of these provisions. 
Superiority Claims 
Both the Optometry and Opticianry Boards have promulgated 
regulations forbidding the "slightest intimation of having 
superior qualifications or being superior to other [licensees]" 
(§§ 95-1-E and 96-20.6, respectively). 
We urge the Council to recommend elimination of these rules. 
Bans on superiority claims clearly lessen competition among sel-
lers. At a minimum they restrict comparative advertising, which 
can be a highly effective means of informing and attracting cus-
tomers. When sellers cannot truthfully compare the attributes of 
their services to those of their competitors, their incentive to 
improve or offer different products, services, or prices is 
likely to be reduced. 
Bans on claims of superiority are particularly likely to 
injure competition and consumers when they are as broad as those 
in the Practice Acts, which forbid even the "slightest intima-
tion" of superiority. Virtually all statements about a practi-
tioner's qualifications, experience, or performance can be 
considered to be implicit claims of superiority. Bans on all 
such claims would make it very difficult for optometrists and 
opticians to provide consumers with truthful information about 
the differences between their services and those of their com-
petitors. -
Solicitors 
Both the Practice Acts impose bans on the use of solicitors 
to obtain patronage (§§ 40-37-220(15) and 40-38-220(15), respec-
tively) • These prohibitions appear to unnecessarily preclude 
optometrists and opticians from hiring third parties to assist in 
marketing vision care services and products. Restrictions that 
prohibit all third-party solicitation, including solicitation in 
situations where there is little or no risk of coercion, 
I"), which was remanded in American Optometric Association v. 
FTC, 626 F.2d 896 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The Commission has chosen 
not to reissue the remanded portion of Eyeglasses I. 
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harassment, or similar abuses, may unnecessarily restrict the 
dissemination of truthful information about and sales of vision 
care services and goods to willing and competent purchasers. 
Similarly, restrictions that permit only licensed optometrists 
and opticians to engage in solicitation unnecessarily limit the 
ability of businesses to disseminate information that is bene-
ficial to consumers and for which the professional expertise of 
an optometrist or optician is not required. 
In certain circumstances third-party solicitation could 
conceivably result in overreaching or undue influence. See 
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, 436 u.s. 447 (1978). But 
this does not justify prohibiting all third-party solicitation, 
just as the possibility of deception does not provide a legiti-
mate basis for banning all advertising. The Federal Trade Com-
mission considered the concerns that underlie the Ohralik opinion 
when it decided American Medical Association, 94 F.T.C. 701 
(1979), aff'd 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd mem. by an 
equally divided court, 455 U.S. 676 (1982). After weighing the 
possible harms and benefits to consumers, the Commission ordered 
the AMA to cease and desist from restricting solicitation, but 
permitted the AMA to proscribe uninvited, in-person solicitation 
of persons who, because of their particular circumstances, may be 
vulnerable to undue influence. We suggest the council consider 
this standard, which protects consumers while allowing them to 
receive information about available ophthalmic goods and ser-
vices. 
Professional Affiliations 
Both the Optometry and Opticianry Boards have rules pro-
hibiting the use of positions in professional organizations "for 
advertising purposes or for self-aggrandizement" (§§ 95-l(F) and 
96-20(7), respectively). These rules may prevent the dissemina-
tion of information about eye care professionals that many con-
sumers would find helpful in selecting professionals. Membership 
in organizations that devote time and resources to studying par-
ticular areas of vision care may well indicate skill in that 
area. While information about membership in an organization may 
be communicated in a deceptive manner, the mere possibility of 
deception does not justify a total ban. The Council should urge 
the replacement of this broad ban with more limited restrictions 
on deceptive statements concerning one's professional affili-
ations. 
Office Displays 
The Optometry Board has adopted several additional rules 
that appear to restrict optometrists' business practices unneces-
sarily but provide no apparent consumer benefit. Rule 95-1(0) 
forbids displaying licenses, diplomas or certificates where they 
are visible outside the office. Rules 95-l(H) and (K) forbid 
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displaying eyeglass signs, lenses and frames in optometric 
offices. These provisions preclude the use of office space to 
inform consumers of optometrists' educational backgrounds and 
ophthalmic products available for sale in their offices. We can 
envision no consumer benefit from such restrictions and recommend 
their repeal. 
II. COMMERCIAL PRACTICE RESTRICTIONS 
We also recommend that the Council consider revisions to a 
restriction on the commercial manner in which optometrists may 
practice. We believe that this restriction may not be in the 
best interests of consumers. 
Office Locations 
Board Rule 95-1(N) forbids the opening of optometric offices 
in business establishments such as jewelry, department or other 
stores. We are concerned that this provision may unnecessarily 
hamper optometrists who wish to market their services in a cost-
efficient manner.8 For example, banning the practice of optome-
8 On January 4, 1985, the Commission proposed an Ophthalmic 
Practices Trade Regulation Rule {"Eyeglasses II") that would 
prohibit state-imposed bans on locating in retail centers, bans 
on employment or other business relationships between optome-
trists and non-optometrists, bans on nondeceptive trade names, 
and bans on branch offices. The Commission stated in its Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking that public restraints on the permissible 
forms of ophthalmic practice appear to increase consumer prices 
for ophthalmic goods and services, but do not appear to protect 
the public health or safety. See 50 Fed. Reg. 598, 599-600 
(1985). 
The Commission ·staff has recently published its report on 
the proposed rule. The staff concluded that "the rulemaking 
record demonstrates that these restrictions raise prices to 
consumers and, by reducing the frequency with which consumers 
obtain vision care, decrease the quality of care in the market." 
The staff also concluded that the restrictions provide no 
quality-related benefits to consumers. The staff therefore 
recommended that the Commission promulgate a trade regulation 
rule prohibiting these restrictions. Bureau of Consumer Pro-
tection, Federal Trade Commission, Ophthalmic Practice Rules: 
state Restrictions on Commercial Practice (1986). 
While the Presiding Officer also found that commercial prac-
tice restrictions raise prices to consumers and limit access to 
eyecare, he did not believe that the evidence cited in the two 
Commission studies, discussed infra at 12-14, provided an 
adequate basis upon which conclusions about the quality of care 
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try on the premises of a department store prevents optometrists 
from locating their practices where they can establish and main-
tain a high volume of patients because of the convenience of the 
location and a high number of "walk-in" patients. This higher 
volume may, in turn, allow professional firms to realize econo-
mies of scale that may be passed on to consumers in the form of 
lower prices. This restriction may also increase costs for chain 
optical firms by requiring optometrists associated with such 
firms to locate in separate offices. Such higher costs may 
decrease the number of chain firms, resulting in higher prices 
for consumers. 
Commercial practice restrictions such as this one are fre-
quently defended on the grounds that they help to maintain a high 
level of quality in the professional services market. Proponents 
claim, for example, that business relationships between profes-
sionals and non-professionals are undesirable because they permit 
lay interference with the professional judgment of licensees. 
They also allege that, while lay firms might offer lower prices, 
such firms might also encourage their professional employees to 
cut corners to maintain profits. 
The available evidence, including comprehensive survey 
evidence, contradicts these contentions. Two empirical studies 
conducted by the staff of the Federal Trade Commission indicate 
that restrictions on commercial optometric practice, including 
restrictions on mercantile location, in fact harm consumers by 
increasing prices without providing any quality-related benefits. 
issue could be drawn. Federal Trade Commission, Report of the 
Presiding Officer on Proposed Trade Regulation Rule: Ophthalmic 
Practice Rules (1986). Both the staff and Presiding Officer 
reports will shortly be under review by the Commission. 
In a case challenging various ethical code provisions 
enforced by the American Medical Association ("AMA"), the Com-
mission found that AMA rules prohibiting physicians from working 
on a salaried basis for a hospital or other lay institution, and 
from entering into partnerships or similar relationships with 
non-physicians, unreasonably restrained competition and thereby 
violated the antitrust laws. American Medical Association, 94 
F.T.C. 701 (1979), aff'd, 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd mem. 
by an equally divided court, 455 u.s. 676 (1982). The Commission 
concluded that the AMA's prohibitions kept physicians from adopt-
ing more economically efficient business formats and that, in 
particular, these restrictions precluded competition by organiza-
tions not directly and completely under the control of physi-
cians. The Commission also found that there were no counter-
vailing procompetitive justifications for these restrictions. 
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The first study,9 conducted with the help of two colleges of 
optometry and the chief optometrist of the Veterans Administra-
tion, compared the price and quality of eye examinations and 
eyeglasses provided by optometrists in markets with a variety of 
regulatory environments. The study found that eye examinations 
and eyeglasses cost significantly more in markets without chain 
firms than in markets where chain optical firms were present. 
The study data showed that prices were almost 18% higher in mar-
kets without chains. 
The study also provided evidence that commercial practice 
restrictions do not result in higher quality eye care. The 
thoroughness of eye exams, the accuracy of eyeglass prescrip-
tions, the accuracy and workmanship of eyeglasses, and the extent 
of unnecessary prescribing were, on average, the same in restric-
tive and non-restrictive markets. 
A second study10 of cosmetic contact lens fitting concluded 
that, on average, "commercial" optometrists -- that is, for 
example, optometrists who were associated with chain optical 
firms, used trade names, or practiced in commercial locations --
fitted cosmetic contact lenses at least as well as other fitters, 
but charged significantly lower prices. 
Other evidence, including survey evidence, indicates that 
state restrictions on commercial practice actually decrease the 
quality of care in the market by decreasing the frequency with 
which consumers obtain care. As a result of the higher prices 
associated with the restrictions, consumers tend to purchase 
eyecare less frequently and may even forego care altogether.11 
9 Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, Effects of 
Restrictions on Advertising and Commercial Practice in the Pro-
fessions: The Case of Optometry (1980). · 
10 Bureaus of Consumer Protection and Economics, Federal 
Trade Commission, A Comparative Analysis of Cosmetic Contact Lens 
Fitting by Ophthalmologists, Optometrists and Opticians (1983). 
This study was designed and conducted with the assistance of the 
major national professional associations representing ophthal-
mology, optometry and opticianry. 
11 Public Health Service, Eyeglasses and Contact Lenses: 
Purchases, Expenditures, and Sources of Payment, National Health 
Care Expenditures Study 4 (1979); Benham and Benham, Regulating 
through the Professions: A Perspective on Information Control, 
18 J.L. & Econ. 421, 438 (1975); Kernan, u.s. Health Profile, 
Washington Post, Apr. 26, 1979 at p. c-1, col. 4. 
41 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, the evidence indicates that consumers are harmed by 
restrictions on truthful, non-deceptive advertising and by 
restrictions on the forms of commercial practice that may be used 
by eye care professionals. Such restrictions raise prices above 
the levels that would otherwise prevail, decrease the quality of 
care, and do not provide any consumer benefit. We recommend, 
therefore, that the Council seek to repeal or amend the rules 
discussed above to remove unnecessary constraints on innovative 
forms of ophthalmic practice and advertising. 
Thank you for inviting our comments. If you would like to 
have copies of any studies or other materials referred to, but 
not enclosed with this letter, we would be happy to supply them. 
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Sincerely yours, 
/-J" ~4 ~ / __.---:; ._-.,..- / L--~~~~--
William MacLeod 
Director 
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Theron C. Smith, Ill. 0. D. 
Mrs. Donna S. Strom. Esq. 
Harold S. Vigodsky, O.D. 
June '3, 1'387 
Mr. George L. Schroeder, Director 
Legislative Audit Council 
State o£ South Carolina 
620 Bankers Trust Tower 
Columbia, SC 28201 
Dear Mr. Schroeder: 
Libby Wilson 
Administrative Support 
P.O. Box 8725 
Columb1a, S.C. 29202 
(803) 799-1739 
The South Carolina Board o£ Examiners in Optometry has reviewed 
the final report of the Legislative Audit Council and requests the 
following comments be included as an appendix to the report. 
The Board was surprised to find articles in the February 26, 1'387 
and March 1, 1'387 editions o£ Columbia newspapers in which issues 
addressed in the Legislative Audit Council's Sunset Review were 
discussed. The Board feels it very unfair that, while Board 
Members were held to a policy of confidentiality, the Federal 
Trade Commission obliged in releasing prejudicial remarks to the 
public. 
The Board is also concerned as to the following statement from the 
Federal Trade Commission's letter included as Appendix 3 of your 
report. 
"The staf£ of the Federal Trade Commission is pleased to 
respond to your invitation to participate in the Sunset audits 
of the South Carolina Board o£ Optometry ... " 
Several o£ the Audit Council's recommendations are based on what 
the Board £eels are opinions o£ the sta££ o£ the Federal Trade 
Commission. These opinions are o£ten not well thought through and 
are contradictory to laws and regulations o£ the State of South 
Carolina. Our Board would pre£er the Audit Council to have based 
its recommendations on facts that relate to the State o£ South 
Carolina and not on the opinions/interpretations o£ sta££ members 
o£ a commission o£ the federal government. 
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Mr. George L. Schroeder 
June 2, 1987 
Page 2 
The Board takes exception with the recommendation that the General 
Assembly should consider amending Title 33 of the South Carolina 
Code of Laws to allow professionals to work for corporations to 
provide services to the general public. It is the Board's opinion 
that the professional would be working for the corporation and not 
the patient and that professional judgment would be influenced by 
corporate profit. American Optometric Association studies 
indicate allowing professionals to work for corporations does not 
decrease the cost to the patient but could decrease the quality of 
care due to the concern for profit by the corporation. Joseph R. 
Gunn, III, Vice-President for Robert R. Nathan Associates, Inc. 
concluded in his statement regarding Ophthalmic Practice Rules; 
Proposed Trade Regulation Rule <Eyeglasses II>: Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking <SO Fed. Reg. 598, January 4, 1985>, " ... the existence 
of large chain firms in a market results in a lowering of the 
quality of care available to consumers; economies of scale <if 
any> generated by large volume operations are not passed along to 
the consumer in the form of lower than average prices for either 
eye examinations or eyeglasses. " Also, Mr. Gunn conducted a 
survey among commercial and noncommercial optometrists to 
determine if there was a significant difference in the ability of 
the two groups of optometrists to detect vision problems other 
than routine myopia. The survey found there was a very great 
difference with noncommercial optometrists detecting such 
conditions almost twice as frequently as did the commercial 
practitioners. Further, the American Optometric Association can 
cite a multitude of incidents of inferior service provided by 
professionals working for corporations as noted in Enclosure 1. 
The recommendation to repeal State Regulation 95-l<N> restricting 
office location of optometrists cannot be supported by the Board 
for the reasons just mentioned. The Board's stand on this issue 
is supported by the Richland County, South Carolina Court of 
Common Pleas ruling in the 1985 case of Pack and Holcombe vs the 
South Carolina Board of Optometry that State Regulation 95-l<N> 
does have a rational relationship to the public health, safety and 
welfare of the residents of South Carolina. 
The Board strongly disagrees with the recommendation to consider 
permitting out-of-state optometrists, who have passed practical 
exams substantially equivalent to South Carolina's, to be 
exempted from the South Carolina Practical Exam. Requiring all 
optometrists to pass the South Carolina Practical Exam ensures the 
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~r. George L. Schroeder 
June 9, 1987 
Page 3 
l~censing of qualified candidates and protects the welfare of the 
people of South Carolina. The South Carolina Supreme Court ruling 
reversing Richland County Circu~t Court's decision to allow an 
out-of-state optometrist to practice in South Carolina without 
passing the South Carolina practical exam supports the Board's 
stand on this issue. <Dunton vs. South Carolina Board of 
Examiners in Optometry, Opinion No. 22661, Filed February 2, 1987> 
The General Assembly should clarify the statutory requirements for 
the licensure of out-of-state optometrists. Section 40-37-90 <3> 
and <4> should be modified to state that all applicants are 
required to pass a South Carolina practical examination and the 
National Board of Optometry examination. 
The recommendation that small licensing boards would benefit from 
sharing staff and office space cannot be supported by fact or by 
experience. Our Board opposes their recommendations for the 
following reasons: 
a. The services offered to the public by the seven boards 
are too diversed to enable a single administrative staff 
to be well versed to respond timely to the public. 
b. The size and type of staff required to provide the 
administrative support service to each board and its 
public would be more costly than the total revenues of 
all the boards, thereby causing an additional tax burden 
on the citizens of the state or causing the boards to 
charge higher fees to be able to pay their staff. 
c. The individual boards would lose their individuality. 
d. The ability for the public to know to whom they should 
communicate would become more difficult. 
The Board agrees with the recommendation that licenses be renewed 
biennially. In addition to increasing revenue from interest 
earned, this would indeed reduce administrative time and expenses 
required to process the renewals. 
The Board would like to point out the doctor-patient relationship 
optometrists have with their patients and not that of 
merchant-customer as inferred in paragraph 2, page 20 of the 
Sunset Reivew. 
A job description for the Board's only employee has been prepared. 
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Mr. George L. Schroeder 
May 26, 1987 
Page 4 
Designated Board members are in the process of preparing a 
comprehensive Policy and Procedures Manual. 
The Board is in the process of complying with state minority 
business procurement laws. Applicable information will be 
provided to the Office of Small and Minority Business Assistance. 
Regulations establishing fees are to be promulgated as soon as 
possible. 
The above comments are based on the desire of each member of the 
South Carolina Board of Examiners in Optometry to fulfill his/her 
obligation to protect the welfare of the citizens of the State of 
South Carolina. We look forward to the release of the report to 
the public. 
Sincerely, 
William C. Oliver, 0. D. 
President 
WCO:pd 
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Excerpts from the American Optometric Association's 
State Legislative Action Pack 
Preserving the 
Doctor-Patient Relationship 
III. DOCUMENTED ABUSES RESULTING FROM DETRIMENTAL RESTRAINTS 
Enclosure 1 
There are a multitude of abuses which have resulted from detrimental 
restraints. This section notes some of the more common of these 
encroachments, inherent in corporate and/or franchise settings. Also 
included are two specific state responses to the evils of detrimental 
restraints. 
1. Dangers from CorTorate Practice 
State legis ative journals and court transcripts document 
abuses which can result when detrimental restraints are permitted. 
There are countless variations of the viol'ations of the independent, 
professional judgment of the doctor, and the resulting corporate 
intrusion into the critical area of the doctor/patient relationship. 
Any such listing of these encroachments includes the following: 
·Doctor is under pressure to provide less thorough 
examinations 
·Doctor is under economic pressure to prescribe unnecessary 
eyewear 
·Doctor not permitted to perform full scope of practice, 
including dispensing/fitting 
·Doctor is not able to choose own suppliers 
·Doctor is under pressure to accept substandard materials 
or lab work 
•Little or no patient followup 
·No continuity of care 
•No emergency services available 
•Loss of confidentiality for patient records 
[For further information see: The California Optometric 
Association material of March 23, 1983, pages 14-16 in section 16 of 
the State Optometry Law: Enactment and Enforcement (1983, green) 
binder. Depositions, section 31 of the FTC Eyeglasses II: State 
Legislative Aspects (1981, brown) binder. Sworn testimony, section 
31 of the State Optometry Law: Enactment and Enforcement (1983, 
green) binder.] 
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2. Dangers from Abuse of Franchising 
Further examples of interference with the professional judgment 
of the optometrist may be found in a recent typical 11 Franchise 
Agreement". It requires that "each and every operating procedure, 
every product, service or equipment requirement ••• are 
continually subJect to [franchisor] and may be modified, deleted or 
expanded from time to time at [franchisors] sole discretion." (Emphasis supplied.} It further enumerates that only the following 
goods and services "and no other goods or services without 
[franchisor's] prior written approval" may be supplied: 
a) Franchisor's approved line(s} of eyeglass frames 
b) Franchisor's approved line of related optical products and 
supplies 
c) Franchisor's approved inventory of standard prescription lenses 
d) On-site laboratory equipment and services 
e) Franchisor's eyeglass guarantee 
: f) Optometric services such as eye examinations and fitting of 
prescription eyewear 
g) Such other equipment, products, services, guarantees and 
marketing programs as (franchisor] may, from time to time 
designate 
h) Franchisor's approved line of contact lenses and instruction in 
the use and care of contact lenses. 
Thus, if a patient needs low vision care, vision therapy, protective 
eyewear, or other specialized optometric services, the ''franchise 
optometrist'' will likely not be able to provide these services. 
Additional prohibitions can include non-standard prescription lenses or 
contact lenses not available through the franchiser. 
[For further information see: Section III.S, of this Action Pack 
and the California Optometric Association material of March 23, 1983, 
pages 15-17 in Section 16 of the State Optometry Law: Enactment and 
Enforcement {1983, green} binder.] 
3. Texas Legislative Response to Corporate Practice Dangers 
Texas legislation, passed during the usunset• review of 1981, 
prohibits six forms of detrimental restraints that had been 
permitted in the state· under the previous law. These are: 
1. Setting or attempting to influence the professional fees of an 
optometrist. 
2. Setting or attempting to influence the office hours of an 
optometrist. 
3. Restricting or attempting to restrict an optometrist's freedom 
to see patients on an appointment basis. 
4. Terminating or threatening to terminate any lease, agreement, 
or other relationship in an effort to control the professional judgment, manner of practice, or practice of an optometrist. 
5. Providing, hiring or sharing employees or business services or 
similar items to or with an optometrist. 
6. Making or guaranteeing a loan to an optometrist in excess of 
the value of the collateral securing the loan.· 
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Documentation from Texas, detailing abuses when detrimental 
restraints were permitted, relates horror stories demonstrating that 
the welfare of the patient ranks a distant second to that of the 
corporation's profits. 
[For further details see Depositions, Section 31 in the FTC 
Eyeglasses II: State Legislative Aspects (1981, brown) binder, and 
Sworn Testimony, Section 31 in the State Optomery Law: Enactment and 
Enforcement (1983, green} binder.] 
[The full text of the 1981 Texas law can be found in Section 29 
of the FTC Eyeglasses II: State Legislative Aspects (1981, brown) 
binder; excerpts (Sections 511 through 518) of the 1981 Texas law 
are in Section 10 of the State Optometry Law: Enactment and 
Enforcement (1983, green) binder.] 
4. Oklahoma Mercantile Environment Law Upheld 
One of the most recent challenges of statues regulating 
practice in the mercantile environment took place in Oklahoma. A 
case was filed in the District Court of Oklahoma County, Oklahoma by 
Montgomery Ward and Co., Inc., challenging the Oklahoma law (Sections 59 596 and 59 944} prohibiting the practice of optometry 
in a mercantile establishment. (Section 59 944 had earlier been 
upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Williamson v. Lee Optical of 
Oklahoma, Inc. case.} 
The District Court on October 30, 1979, ruled that the proposed 
activities of Montgomery Ward violated 59 596 and 59 944. On 
March 8, 1983, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma affirmed the trial 
court's decision. 
Enclosed in the Reference Materials in this Action Pack is a copy of 
Sections 59 596 and 59 944, and excerpts of the brief of 
Appellees, Oklahoma Optometric Association. [The full text of the 
District Court Order and the Oklahoma Supreme Court Decision is in 
Section 9 of the State Optometry Law: ·Enactment and Enforcement (1983, green) binder.] 
5. Update: California Defeat of Franchising Legislation 
During 1983 and 1984 there have been no less than five attempts 
by large corporate interests to reverse California's consumer 
protection laws which safeguard the public and protect the 
doctor/patient relationship in vision care. The struggle began with 
an attempt by an out-of-state chain's decision to start chain 
optometry in California in spite of the existing California laws 
prohibiting their opening. An injunction was issued to stop this 
attempt. 
Subsequent to the injunction. the legislative battle was begun 
in an attempt to change the California laws with regard to 
corporate/franchise, branch offices, and trade names. Through hard 
work, independent optometry in California has managed to convince 
their legislators that it is important to continue their beneficial 
regulations for the benefit of their constituents. 
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INTRODUCTION 
After reviewing its laws and operations, the 
Legislative Audit Council concludes that there is a public 
need for the regulation of opticianry, and that the 
Opticianry Board should be continued. In most areas, the 
Board has operated efficiently and effectively. However, 
the Audit Council has identified several laws and 
regulations which unnecessarily limit competition and may 
increase prices, while providing questionable protection of 
the public's health and welfare. 
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BACKGROUND 
The South Carolina Board of Examiners in Onticianrv was 
c ~ 
created as an independent body by the General Assembly in 
1978 to regulate the profession. Prior to 1978, this Board 
was combined with the Board of Examiners in Optometry. 
Nationwide, 21 states regulate opticianry through licensure. 
Opticians are one of three types of professionals who 
provide eye care. They prepare and dispense corrective 
lenses and spectacle frames from the prescriptions of 
optometrists and ophthalmologists. Opticians also duplicate 
lenses without prescription. Optometrists examine eyes for 
vision defects and diseases, and prescribe and dispense 
corrective lenses. Ophthalmologists are physicians who 
diagnose and treat vision defects and diseases, perform 
surgery, and prescribe and dispense corrective lenses. The 
Opticianry Board regulates opticians only. 
The Board is composed of five licensed opticians and 
two public members having no connection with an optical 
profession. The Governor appoints the optician members upon 
nomination by all licensed opticians in the state. He also 
appoints the public members who can be nominated by any 
individual or group. Board members may serve no more than 
two consecutive four-year terms. 
The Opticianry Board examines applicants for licensure, 
investigates complaints, and investigates and prosecutes 
violations of South Carolina opticianry law. The Board also 
promulgates regulations governing the practice of 
opticianry. 
In February 1987, there were 297 licensed opticians, 65 
of whom lived out-of-state. All licenses must be renewed 
annually by October 1. 
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SUNSET ISSUES AND FINDINGS 
(1) DETERMINE THE AMOUNT OF THE INCREASE OR REDUCTION OF COSTS 
OF GOODS OR SERVICES CAUSED BY THE ADMINISTERING OF THE 
PROGRAMS OR FUNCTIONS OF THE AGENCY UNDER REVIEW. 
The Opticianry Board has no direct control over the 
prices charged by opticians for their goods and services. 
The Board does impose regulatory costs on opticians through 
examination fees, license fees and continuing education 
requirements. However, it is not likely that these costs 
significantly affect the prices charged by opticians. 
Consumer prices may be affected by some state laws and 
regulations administered by the Board. These are discussed 
below. 
Limits on Competition 
The Audit Council identified three state laws and 
regulations which limit competition while providing 
questionable benefit to the public health and welfare. The 
laws and regulations in question were identified with the 
assistance of the Bureaus of Consumer Protection, 
Competition and Economics of the Federal Trade Commission 
{FTC) upon the request of the Audit Council. 1 Laws which 
limit competition can result in higher consumer prices. 
Qualification Claims and Professional Affiliations 
State Regulation 96-20(6) states: 
No licensed optician shall hold himself 
forth in such a way as to carry the 
slightest intimation of having superior 
qualifications or being superior to 
other opticians. 
1
see page 33 for February 1987 FTC letter to the Audit 
Council, which includes several issues not addressed in this 
report. 
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State Regulation 96-20(7) states: 
No licensed optician holding an official 
position in any opticians' organization 
shall use such position for advertising 
purposes or self-aggrandizement. 
By prohibiting all ads with the "slightest intimation" 
of superior qualifications, state regulation limits 
competition by preventing opticians from informing their 
customers of pertinent education and experience 
qualifications. In addition, FTC analysts note that, while 
it is possible for professional affiliations to " ..• be 
communicated in a deceptive manner, the mere possibility of 
deception does not justify a total ban." Advertising would 
be more informative to consumers if regulation prohibited 
only those claims of qualifications and professional 
affiliations which are deceptive. 
Solicitors 
Section 40-38-220(15) of the South Carolina Code of 
Laws permits the Board to discipline opticians when " ••• the 
holder of a license has been guilty of using a solicitor to 
obtain patronage." This statute could be used to prohibit 
opticians from using third parties to assist in marketing 
their products in any manner. FTC analysts suggest only 
prohibiting third-party solicitation which involves: 
••• uninvited, in-person solicitation of 
persons who, because of their particular 
circumstances, may be vulnerable to 
undue influence. 
Third-party solicitation which is truthful, nondeceptive, 
and noncoercive could provide beneficial information to 
consumers on the qualifications and services of opticians. 
Summary 
When the truthful, nondeceptive advertising of 
opticianry services is unnecessarily restricted, competition 
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is reduced, and price and quality comparison becomes more 
time-consuming and inconvenient for consumers. Reduced 
competition often results in higher prices. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
THE OPTICIANRY BOARD SHOULD AMEND 
REGULATIONS 96-20(6) AND (7) TO ALLOW 
TRUTHFUL, NONDECEPTIVE CLAIMS OF 
QUALIFICATIONS AND PROFESSIONAL 
AFFILIATIONS. 
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD CONSIDER 
AMENDING §40-38-220 (15) OF THE SOUTH 
CAROLINA CODE OF LAWS TO ALLOW TRUTHFUL, 
NONDECEPTIVE, NONCOERCIVE THIRD-PARTY 
SOLICITATION. 
( 2) DETERMINE 'rilE ECONOMIC, FISCAL AND O'riiER IMPACTS THAT WOULD 
OCCUR IN 'rilE ABSENCE OF THE ADMINISTERING OF THE PROGRAMS OR 
FUNCTIONS OF THE AGENCY UNDER REVIEW. 
The complete deregulation of opticianry would remove 
state laws and regulations which help ensure the. quality of 
eye care opticians provide to the pub~ic. Opticians are 
responsible for ensuring that prescriptions for corrective 
lenses are properly filled. Improperly filled prescriptions 
fail to ensure optimal vision for patients. Deregulation 
would eliminate entry requirements, including education and 
examination. It would also eliminate a mechanism for 
suspending or revoking an unqualified optician's license. 
As a result of complete deregulation, the number of 
opticians might increase. Increased competition could lead 
to lower prices for prescription lenses and associated 
products. But, the public may be exposed to more untrained 
and potentially harmful practitioners, thus affecting public 
health, safety and welfare. Therefore, the Audit Council 
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recommends that the Board and regulation of the profession 
be continued. 
(3) DETERMINE THE OVERALL COSTS, INCLUDING MANPOWER, OF THE 
AGENCY UNDER REVIEW. 
To support its administrative costs, the Opticianry 
Board collects revenue through examination and license fees 
(see p. 66). From FY 81-82 through FY 85-86, the Board's 
expenditures increased from $10,490 to $11,984, while 
revenues increased from $15,955 to $17,500 (see Table 1). 
In FY 85-86, expenditures were equal to 69% of the revenue 
collected. The remaining 31% was retained in the state 
General Fund. 
The Board employs one of its members to perform 
part-time administrative duties. 
only employee of the Board. 
This individual is the 
TABLE 1 
SOUTH CAROLINA BOARD OP EXAMIRERS IN OPTICIA&RY 
SOURCE OF REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES 
Revenues ~o General FUnd py 81-82 py 82-83 py 83-84 
License & Examination Fees $ 15,955 $ 16!110 $ 14!630 
TOTAL Revenues $ 15!955 $ 16,110 $ 14!630 
Expendi~ures 
Personal Service $ 5,262 $ 4,821 $ 5,620 
Other Operating Expenses 5,129 7,130 5,757 
Employee Benefits 99 101 116 
TOTAL Expenditures $ 10,490 $ 12!052 $ 11!493 
Source: South Carolina Budget and Control Board Budget Documents, 
FY 83-84 through FY 87-88. 
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PY 84-85 
$ 17,645 
'$ 17,645 
$ 4,705 
8,259 
110 
$ 13!074 
py 85-86 
$ 17!500 
s 17,500 
$ 4,455 
7,340 
189 
$ 11! 984 
Board Employee 
Since 1979, the Secretary-Treasurer of the Opticianry 
Board has been a part-time employee of the Board. This 
Board member was paid $1,690 in FY 86-87 to perform 
extensive administrative functions. However, the Board has 
no written job description for this position. Without a 
written job description, the public does not know which 
services have been purchased with its funds. 
RECOMMENDATION 
THE OPTICIANRY BOARD SHOULD ENSURE THAT 
ALL EMPLOYEES HAVE WRITTEN JOB 
DESCRIPTIONS. 
(4) EVALUATE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE 
PROGRAMS OR FUNCTIONS OF THE AGENCY UNDER REVIEW. 
Since the Audit Council's 1981 review, the Opticianry 
Board has made efforts to conduct its operations more 
efficiently. Some of the Board's records have been 
automated by the Secretary-Treasurer. However, improvements 
could be made by developing an administrative procedures 
manual and in some licensing procedures. 
Written Administrative Procedures 
Although the Board is governed by state laws and 
regulations, they have not been implemented through written 
administrative procedures. For example, no written 
procedures exist for investigating complaints or 
administering exams. 
Section 1-23-140 of the South Carolina Code of Laws 
requires that all state agencies adopt and make available to 
the public a written policy statement of all formal and 
informal procedures. This law allows more effective public 
oversight of agencies. Also, without written policies and 
procedures, government actions are less likely to be 
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consistent. In addition, the Board could violate the 
constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the law. 
RECOMMENDATION 
THE OPTICIANRY BOARD SHOULD DEVELOP A 
WRITTEN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES 
MANUAL. 
Licensing Procedures 
All applicants for opticianry licensure are required 
either to have a certificate from a school of opticianry, to 
·have served an apprenticeship, or to have practiced in 
another state. Applicants for licensure are also required 
to pass a minimum of two examinations: a national exam 
administered by the American Board of Opticianry and a South 
Carolina practical exam. Opticians who dispense contact 
lenses are required to pass a national exam administered by 
the National Contact Lens Examiners. 
Practical Examinations 
Practical exams have been developed and graded each 
year by individual members of the state Opticianry Board. 
However, the content of the exams, the methods of grading, 
and the minimum passing scores have n?t been formally 
approved by the Board. Since the entire Board is 
responsible for the practical exams, good management would 
require the Board to formally approve the content, 
administration and grading of exams. Without such approval, 
the public is not adequately assured that the Board has 
reviewed the exams for validity, reliability and 
objectivity. 
OUt-of-State Applicants 
The Opticianry Board requires that licensed 
out-of-state opticians pass the American Board of Opticianry 
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exam, the National Contact Lens Examiners exam (if 
applicable) , and the South Carolina practical exam in order 
to be licensed in South Carolina. Applicants who have 
previously passed the national exams are not required to 
retake them. However, applicants are required to pass South 
Carolina's practical exam, even if they have passed an 
equivalent exam in another state. They must, therefore, 
travel to South Carolina on one of two times each year that 
the exam is given. 
Requiring licensed out-of-state opticians to pass South 
Carolina's practical exam may not be necessary to protect 
t~e public's health when they have satisfactory credentials 
and have passed equivalent tests in other states. Other 
health-related boards in South Carolina do not require 
further testing when out-of-state applicants meet certain 
criteria. For example, physicians from out-of-state may be 
licensed with no further testing based on approved 
education, postgraduate training, national test scores, 
years of experience, and letters of reference. If these 
credentials are approved by the Board of Medical Examiners, 
licensure is granted without further testing. 
When licensure of out-of-state opticians, who have 
satisfactory credentials and have passed equivalent tests in 
other states, is unnecessarily delayed by requiring 
additional examination, the public may be denied the 
services of qualified individuals. Further, the public may 
not receive the price benefits from increased competition. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
THE OPTICIANRY BOARD SHOULD FORMALLY 
APPROVE THE CONTENT, ADMINISTRATION AND 
GRADING OF ITS PRACTICAL EXAMINATIONS 
FOR LICENSURE. 
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD CONSIDER 
LEGISLATION WHICH PERMITS OPTICIANS 
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LICENSED OUT-OF-STATE TO RECEIVE SOUTH 
CAROLINA LICENSES BASED ON THEIR 
CREDENTIALS. THIS LEGISLATION SHOULD 
EXEMPT APPLICANTS FROM THE PRACTICAL 
EXAM IF THEY HAVE PREVIOUSLY PASSED A 
PRACTICAL EXAM ~7HICH IS SUBSTANTIALLY 
EQUIVALENT TO SOUTH CAROLINA'S. 
( 5) DETERMINE THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE AGENCY UNDER REVIEW HAS 
ENCOURAGED THE PARTICIPATION OF THE PUBLIC AND, IF 
APPLICABLE, THE INDUSTRY IT REGULATES. 
To encourage public participation, state law requires 
that two of the seven Opticianry Board members be public 
members, not associated with an eye care profession. These 
members are frequently assigned complaint investigations. 
The Board also conducts meetings approximately four times 
per year. However, the Board does not have a listing in any 
South Carolina telephone directory. Telephone listings 
would improve public access to the Board. 
RECOMMENDATION 
THE OPTICIANRY BOARD SHOULD LIST ITS 
ADDRESS AND TELEPHONE NUMBER IN THE 
COLUMBIA AND STATE GOVERNMENT TELEPHONE 
DIRECTORIES. 
( 6) DETERMINE THE EXTEN'.r TO WHICH THE AGENCY DUPLICATES THE 
SERVICES, FUNCTIONS ARD PROGRAMS ADMINISTERED BY ANY OTHER 
STATE 1 FEDERAL, OR OTHER AGENCY OR ENTITY. 
The Audit Council found no evidence that the Opticianry 
Board significantly duplicates the services, functions or 
programs of other state, federal, or local government 
agencies. Federal regulations (16 CFR 456) apply to 
advertising by the opticianry profession, addressing 
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practices of opticians as we:: 
However, the Opticianry Beard __ 
which issues licenses fo~ dis 
and contact lenses in South C~:~·-~ 
licensed optometrists or physi~i~~ 
( 7) EVALUATE THE EFFICIENCY WITH ¥·;:-:=: 2?: -:•r 
WI'l'H 'l'HE AGENCY CONCERNING PE?.s::::::E 
THE REGULATION AND ADMINISTR.!\':':: .; 
REVIEW, HAVE BEEN PROCESSED. 
~gula~ory boards. 
gove~:unent agency 
ripticn glasses 
~rsons who are not 
COMPLAINTS, FILED 
~STRIES SUBJECT TO 
-~GENCY UNDER 
From FY 83-84 through FY 85-80 1 :::· _ Opticianry Board 
investigated 15 complaints filed 
opticians. The most frequent -c.:"?2 
optical stores operating wi t.I-.c' ·: .:.. .:_: 
However, the efficiency with ~~!=h 
complaints could not be adequc- ": ~:< 
complaint files were incomplete. 
South Carolina 
·'Jlaint involved 
opticians. 
:,rd processes 
.=d because 
-he Board does not 
have ~rritten procedures for in·i:::s":i·.:::-" - complaints. 
Written procedures would help ensure _ stigations are 
conducted thoroughly and consistentl·• ·= p. 58). 
Board members have stated that i 3tigations could be 
improved if conducted by investigate::.:: · ,;,o are not Board 
members. Due to the low volume o·"' cc::-- .::tints, independent 
investigators would likely be more e~~~:tive if shared with 
other small medically-related boards. ~he benefits of 
sharing staff, including investigators, are discussed in the 
report summary (seep. 7). 
Administration of Complaint Files 
The Opticianry Board maint?.ins s ate files on all 
complaints. However, 12 of the 15 ::J..~;-::-:.:: reviewed did not 
include all of the following: the ccr~-:=tinant, the date of 
the complaint, the investigator, ar.<~ the complaint was 
resolved. To obtain the miss 1.r1:tc::::: .'~ 4-ion, it was 
necessary to interview Board ' review Board 
minutes. Information not based on written records may not 
be accurate and complete. Written records, including all 
relevant information and a chronological l.og of complaints, 
would permit a more efficient and accurate review of past 
complaints than is now possible. 
RECOMMENDATION 
THE OPTICIANRY BOARD SHOULD ENSURE THAT 
COMPLAINT FILES CONTAIN A COMPLETE 
RECORD OF COMPLAINT INVESTIGATIONS. 
THESE FILES SHOULD INCLUDE A 
CHRONOLOGICAL LOG OF ALL COMPLAINTS. 
{ 8) DETERMINE THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE AGENCY UNDER REVIEW HAS 
COMPLIED WITH ALL APPLICABLE STATE, FEDERAL AND LOCAL 
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS. 
The Opticianry Board was created under and is subject 
to South Carolina laws and regulations. Federal regulations 
(16 CFR 456) regarding advertising practices also apply to 
the opticianry profession. As noted earlier, the Opticianry 
Board has not complied with state law requiring written 
administrative procedures. 
In addition, the Board has not s~nt minority business 
procurement plans to the Office of Small and Minority 
Business Assistance, as required by the South Carolina 
Consolidated Procurement Code. This law's purpose is to 
ensure minority businesses access to the state government 
procurement process. When agencies do not comply with its 
provisions, businesses owned and operated by minorities may 
not be afforded the opportunity to participate in the 
process. 
Also, the state sales tax on ophthalmic materials is 
not equitable. Sales tax regulations require different 
sales tax charges on ophthalmic materials sold by opticians 
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than on those sold by optometrists and ophthalmologists. 
This is discussed in detail on page 29. 
RECOMMENDATION 
THE OPTICIANRY BOARD SHOULD COMPLY WITH 
STATE MINORITY BUSINESS PROCUREMENT 
LAWS. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
BOARD OF EXAMINERS IN OPTICIANRY 
SCHEDULE OF FEES 
License Application 
Apprenticeship Application 
Annual Renewal 
In-state 
Out-of-state 
Certificate of Registration 
Source: South Carolina Code of Laws. 
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Fees 
$50 
20 
50 
25 
15 
The South Carolina Board Of Examiners In Opticianry 
Mr. George L Schroeder 
Director 
Legislative Audit Council 
620 NCNB Tower 
Columbia, South Carolina 29201 
Dear Mr. Schroeder, 
June 16, 1987 
We have received your letter of June 10, 1987 in which you requested 
comments for the final draft. 
An initial oversight, which I would like to comment on i~ on page 17, 
under the section 11 8ackground 11 • The Board requested at our June 13, meeting 
that you enlarge the scope of the definition of opticians to insert "contact 
lenses 11 in the sentence starting on line 7. This should read 11 They prepare 
and dispense corrected lenses, contact lenses, and spectacle frames from the 
prescriptions of optometrists and ophthalmologists.~~ 
The Board appreciates your making the revisions which it requested in its 
initial comments and has no other comments at this time. 
JSF/co'n 
67 
Sincerely, 
JackS. Folline 
President 
BOARD OF PHYSICAL THERAPY EXAMINERS 
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INTRODUCTION 
After reviewing the laws and operations of the Board of 
Physical Therapy Examiners, the Legislative Audit Council 
concludes that state regulation of physical therapy should 
continue. Termination of regulation would pose a threat to 
the public health, safety and welfare. However, the Audit 
Council recommends that a single board should regulate both 
physical therapy and occupational therapy. In addition, the 
Board should adopt a policies and procedures manual and 
improve its system for handling complaints. 
70 
BACKGROUND 
With Act 790 of 1952, the General Assembly created the 
South Carolina Board of Physical Therapy Examiners to 
regulate the profession. Section 40-45-20 of the South 
Carolina Code of Laws defines physical therapy as: 
•.. the evaluation and treatment of any 
bodily or mental condition of any person 
by the use of physical, chemical, or 
mechanical agents, the properties of 
heat, light, water, electricity, 
massage, sound, and therapeutic 
exercises, including rehabilitation 
procedures, all under the prescription 
of a licensed doctor of medicine or 
dentistry. 
By state law, the Board consists of three licensed 
physical therapists and a licensed physical therapy 
assistant, each having at least three years experience, and 
one public member. Board members are appointed by the 
Governor for four-year terms •. The South Carolina Physical 
Therapy Association may submit to the Governor at least two 
names for each vacancy on the Board to be filled by 
licensees. Also, any individual or group may submit 
nominations to the Governor for Board vacancies. By 
statute, no member may serve more than two consecutive 
terms. 
The Board is responsible for evaluating, licensing and 
disciplining physical therapists and physical therapy 
assistants. Its duties include adopting rules and 
regulations governing the profession, and conducting 
investigations and hearings for alleged malpractice or 
misconduct by these licensed professionals. 
In addition to South Carolina, 47 states regulate 
physical therapy through licensure. The remaining two 
states regulate the profession through registration. All 
states require applicants for licensure as physical 
therapists to complete an accredited physical therapist 
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educational program and pass a written examination prepared 
by the Professional Examination Service. 
In FY 85-86, the Board licensed 587 physical therapists 
and 182 physical therapy assistants. All licenses issued by 
the Board must be renewed by January 1 of each year. 
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SUNSET ISSUES AND FINDINGS 
(1) DETERMINE THE AMOUNT OF THE INCREASE OR REDUCTION OF COSTS 
OF GOODS AND SERVICES CAUSED BY THE ADMINISTERING OF THE 
PROGRAMS OR FUNCTIONS OF THE AGENCY UNDER REVIEW. 
The programs and functions of the Board of Physical 
Therapy Examiners do not directly affect the costs of 
services provided by physical therapists. The Board does 
not regulate the fees charged by physical therapists for 
their services. Examination fees and annual license renewal 
fees charged to licensees are costs of regulation that may 
be passed on indirectly to consumers. 
The fees charged by members of a regulated profession 
may be higher than if it were unregulated. Regulation also 
creates a barrier to entry into the profession and tends to 
limit competition through addi tiona! restr ict'ions. However, 
no information was found addressing the effects regulation 
has had on the cost of physical therapy services. 
( 2) DETERMINE THE ECONOMIC, FISCAL AND OTHER IMPACTS THAT WOULD 
OCCUR IN THE ABSENCE OF THE ADMINISTERING OF THE PROGRAMS OR 
FUNCTIONS OF THE AGENCY UNDER REVIEW. 
The primary functions of the Board of Physical Therapy 
Examiners are testing, licensing, and disciplining physical 
therapists and physical therapy assistants. In the absence 
of these functions, the public would have no assurance that 
those individuals who present themselves as physical 
therapists and physical therapy assistants are qualified to 
practice. An unqualified physical therapist might harm 
patients through inappropriate care or neglect by further 
injuring the condition being treated. Therefore, 
deregulation of the profession could have a significant 
impact on the public health, safety and welfare. 
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Also, ~vi th complete deregulation, the number of 
physical therapists might increase, and the resulting 
increased competition could lead to lower prices for 
physical therapy services. However, deregulation would 
allow unqualified individuals to practice physical therapy. 
Therefore, the Audit Council recommends that regulation of 
the profession be continued. 
(3) DETERMINE THE OVERALL COSTS, INCLUDING MANPOWER, OF THE 
AGENCY UNDER REVIEW. 
The Board of Physical Therapy Examiners is 
self-supporting. Board revenue is generated through annual 
license and examination fees (seep. 83). In FY 85-86, the 
Board collected $24,799 and expended $22,898. For the five 
years, FY 81-82 through FY 85-86, revenues exceeded 
expenditures by an average of $3,778 a year. Excess 
revenues were retained in the state General Fund. 
The Board has a permanent part-time administrative 
employee whose salary and fringe benefits cost the Board 
$11,808 in FY 85-86. Also, in September 1986, the Board 
rented an office in the state capitol complex for $1,130 for 
the remainder of FY 86-87. The Board's budget is summarized 
in Table 1. 
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TABLE 1 
SOUTH CAROLINA BOARD OF PHYSICAL THERAPY EXAMINERS 
SOURCE OF REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES 
Revenues to General Fund FY 81-82 FY 82-83 FY 83-84 FY 84-85 FY 85-86 
Tjicense Fees $ 7,680 $ 8,987 $ 10,115 $ 15,216 $ 16,155 
Exam Fees 5,174 6,838 5,241 5,985 1,610 
Reciprocity Fees 4,045 3,220 4,810 5,860 7,000 
Other 20 9 40 32 34 
TOTAL Revenues $ 16,919 $ 19,054 $ 20,206 $ 27,093 $ 24,799 
EXEenditures 
Personal Services $ 6,837 $ 7,202 $ 9,456 $ 9,900 
Other Operating Expenses 5,000 6,209 6, 911 9,754 
Employee Benefits 1,359 979 1,309 1,365 
TOTAL Expenditures $ 13,196 $ 14,390 $ 17,676 $ 21,019 
Source: South Carolina Budget and Control Board Budget Documents, FY 83-84 
through FY 86-87, and the Comptroller General's Office. 
(4) EVALUATE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE 
PROGRAMS OR FUNCTIONS OF THE AGENCY UNDER :REVIEW. 
$ 10,930 
10,391 
1,577 
$ 22,898 
The Board of Physical Therapy Examiners is carrying out 
its statutory requirements in an efficient manner. While 
the number of physical therapists licensed in the state has 
more than doubled during the past six years, the Board has 
been able to increase its administrative functions 
accordingly. The Board's administrative assistant now works 
32 hours a week and, in FY 86-87, the Board rented an office 
in the state capitol complex, thereby increasing its 
accessibility to the public and the industry. Previously, 
the Board's administrative assistant worked out of her home. 
While renting an office costs the Board approximately 
$1,300 annually, it should reduce the Board's travel costs 
by $778 in FY 86-87. This savings offsets almost 60% of the 
Board's annual rent because the Board's administrative 
assistant no longer has to drive 17 miles each day to 
collect the Board's mail from its post office box. 
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While the Board is carrying out its requirements in an 
efficient manner, it has not adopted written policies and 
procedures which might further increase efficiency. 
Written Administrative Procedures 
The Board of Physical Therapy Examiners has not adopted 
written policies and procedures. 1 Section 1-23-140 of the 
South Carolina Code of Laws, the Administrative Procedures 
Act, requires that all state agencies adopt and make 
available to the public a written policy statement of all 
formal and informal procedures. 
Written procedures provide a system of operating 
controls and are generally accepted as good management 
practice. The absence of guidelines for agency hearings, 
investigations, and enforcement of Board statutes may result 
in inconsistent agency management. In addition, without 
written procedures, the Board could violate the 
constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the law. 
RECOMMENDATION 
THE BOARD OF PHYSICAL THERAPY EXAMINERS 
SHOULD ADOPT A POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 
MANUAL. 
( 5) DETERMINE THE EXTENT TO WHICH TBE AGENCY UNDER REVIEW HAS 
ENCOURAGED THE PARTICIPATION OF THE PUBLIC AND, IF 
APPLICABLE, THE INDUSTRY IT REGULATES. 
By statute, the Board of Physical Therapy Examiners has 
one public member which ensures some public participation in 
the Board's activities. According to the physical 
therapists serving on the Board, the public member has 
1The Board took steps to begin developing a policies 
and procedures manual during the Council's review. 
76 
played an active and ''invaluable" role in presenting a view 
different from their professional perspectives. In 
addition, the Board has increased its availability to the 
public and the physical therapy profession by renting an 
office in the state capitol complex and installing an 
answering device on its phone. The answering machine 
ensures access to the Board when the Board's administrative 
assistant is away from the office and after normal office 
hours. 
While Board accessibility has increased, more could be 
done to encourage public and industry participation. 
Members of the industry have not actively participated in 
Board activities, and Board minutes for FY 83-84 through 
FY 85-86 show no attendance at its meetings by members of 
the general public. The Board could attempt to encourage 
both public and industry participation through public 
service announcements in the news media. 
( 6) DETERMINE THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE AGENCY DUPLICATES THE 
SERVICES, FUNCTIONS AND PROGRAMS ADMINISTERED BY ANY OTHER 
STATE, FEDERAL, OR OTHER AGENCY OR ENTITY. 
The Board of Physical Therapy Examiners does not 
duplicate the services, functions and_ programs of any 
federal or local agency. However, the Board does duplicate 
the programs administered by the Board of Occupational 
Therapy. Both boards license and regulate specialties 
within the field of rehabilitative health, and their 
governing statutes are similar. Section 40-45-20 of the 
South Carolina Code of Laws defines physical therapy as 
" ••• the evaluation and treatment of any bodily or mental 
condition of any person •••• " Occupational Therapy is 
similarly defined by §40-36-20 as: 
••• the functional evaluation and 
treatment of individuals whose ability 
to cope with the tasks of living are 
threatened or impaired by developmental 
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deficits, the aging process, poverty and 
cultural differences, physical injury or 
illness or psychological or social 
disability. 
The professions have many similarities, and members of 
the two regulatory boards agree that the professions 
overlap. Both physical and occupational therapists are 
specialists in the field of rehabilitative health and are 
required to complete a similar amount of training and 
education. Licensees of both boards evaluate and treat the 
bodily and/or mental conditions of their patients. The 
treatment includes exercise therapy and training in the use 
of ambulatory equipment (wheel chairs, canes and walkers) 
and artificial limbs. 
There are some differences between the two professions. 
According to members of both boards, occupational therapists 
work primarily with a patient's hands and finer muscles, 
emphasizing their daily activities, such as getting dressed, 
and the psychological problems of disabilities. Physical 
therapists usually work to improve the gross muscle skills, 
especially for the lower extremities. 
Iowa regulates occupational and physical therapy 
through a single licensing body. The chairman of the Iowa 
Board of Physical and Occupational Therapy Examiners stated 
that Iowa's Board has had no problems· regulating both 
professions. In addition, the South Carolina Board of 
Medical Examiners regulates physicians who practice in such 
diverse specialties as ophthalmology, surgery and 
psychiatry. 
A combined board could more adequately regulate the 
professions, better serving therapists and their patients. 
Currently, regulation is hindered by the Board of 
Occupational Therapy's lack of an office, a telephone, a 
permanent mailing address, and staff. However, the Board of 
Physical Therapy has a permanent part-time administrative 
employee and an office in the state capitol complex. A 
combined board could use the Board of Physical Therapy 
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Examiners' office and staff. 
employers of both therapists, 
clinics and school districts, 
In addition, patients and 
including hospitals, therapy 
would be able to obtain 
information from and register complaints with one agency. 
RECOMMENDATION 
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD CONSIDER 
COMBINING THE BOARD OF OCCUPATIONAL 
THERAPY AND THE BOARD OF PHYSICAL 
THERAPY EXAMINERS INTO A SINGLE BOARD OF 
OCCUPATIONAL AND PHYSICAL THERAPY. 
BOARD MEMBERSHIP SHOULD PROVIDE FOR 
EQUAL REPRESENTATION OF THE TWO 
PROFESSIONS AND FOR A PUBLIC MEMBER. 
THE NEW BOARD SHOULD CONTINUE TO OFFER 
SEPARATE LICENSES FOR OCCUPATIONAL 
THERAPISTS, OCCUPATIONAL THERAPY 
ASSISTANTS, PHYSICAL THERAPISTS AND 
PHYSICAL THERAPY ASSISTANTS. 
(7) EVALUATE THE EFFICIENCY WITH WHICH FORMAL COMPLAINTS, FILED 
WITH THE AGENCY CONCERNING PERSONS OR INDUSTRIES SUBJECT TO 
THE REGULATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE AGENCY UNDER 
REVIEW, HAVE BEEN PROCESSED. 
The Board of Physical Therapy Examiners' handling of 
complaints has been consistent and generally efficient. 
However, the Board needs to improve its system for tracking 
complaints, as discussed below. 
The Board received 22 formal complaints from July 1983 
through December 1986. Eleven complaints concerned the use 
of the term "physical therapy" in chiropractors' 
advertisements, and two concerned the use of the term in 
advertisements by other businesses. Other complaints 
alleged the use of unlicensed physical therapists by 
hospitals and physical therapy assistants treating and 
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evaluating patients without the supervision of physical 
therapists. 
\•!hen a formal complaint is filed, the Board reviews. the 
complaint and decides whether to conduct an investigation. 
If the Board decides an investigation is necessary, the 
investigation is conducted by a Board member. However, the 
Board's Chairman has stated that investigations could be 
improved if conducted by professional investigators. Due to 
the low volume of complaints, investigators would likely be 
more effective if shared with other medically-related 
boards. The benefits of sharing staff, including 
investigators, are discussed in the Report Summary 
(see p. 7) • 
Administration of Complaint Files 
The Board's complaint tracking system has not been 
implemented consistently and needs to include additional 
information. On its complaint form, the Board records the 
complaint number, the license number of the physical 
therapist or assistant, whether the complaint is 
investigated, and the Board's disposition of the case. 
However, the Board has not recorded this information for all 
complaints, and the form does not include all information 
relevant to each case. Further, the Board does not maintain 
a complaint log. 
The State Board of Medical Examiners and the Board of 
Pharmacy maintain complaint logs and have complaint records 
which include such other information as the complainant's 
name and the agencies and investigators involved. Adequate 
documentation of complaints is necessary to ensure that 
appropriate investigations have been made by the Board. 
By not maintaining adequate complaint records, the 
Board makes the tracking of problem physical therapists and 
physical therapy assistants more difficult. Furthermore, if 
adequate records are not kept, complete review of Board 
actions may not be possible. 
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RECOMMENDATION 
THE BOARD OF PHYSICAL THERAPY EXAMINERS 
SHOULD REVISE ITS COMPLAINT TRACKING 
SYSTEM BY INCLUDING ADDITIONAL CASE 
INFORMATION ON ITS COMPLAINT FORM, 
DEVELOPING A COMPLAINT LOG AND ENSURING 
SUCH INFORMATION IS RECORDED FOR ALL 
COMPLAINTS RECEIVED. 
( 8) DETERMINE THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE AGENCY UNDER REVIEW HAS 
COMPLIED WITH ALL APPLICABLE STATE, FEDERAL AND LOCAL 
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS. 
The Board of Physical Therapy Examiners is created and 
governed by state laws and regulations. Federal and local 
statutes and regulations do not directly address the Board. 
The Audit Council found the Board has complied with 
applicable state laws with one exception. The Board did not 
send a minority business procurement plan to the Office of 
Small and Minority Business Assistance for FY 85-86 and 
FY 86-87, as required by the South Carolina Consolidated 
Procurement Code. This law's purpose is to ensure minority 
businesses access to the state government procurement 
process. The Board did submit a plan_ in FY 84-85. However, 
submitting a minority business plan annually will better 
ensure businesses owned and operated by minorities are given 
the opportunity to participate fully in the state 
procurement process. 
RECOMMENDATION 
THE BOARD OF PHYSICAL THERAPY EXAMINERS 
SHOULD COMPLY WITH STATE MINORITY 
BUSINESS PROCUREMENT LAWS. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
BOARD OF PHYSICAL THERAPY EXAMINERS 
SCHEDULE OF FEES 
Physical Therapist 
License Renewal 
Examination 
Endorsement 
Physical Therapy Assistant 
License Renewal 
Examination 
Endorsement 
Fees 
$ 35 
130 
70 
$ 30 
115 
50 
Source: South Carolina Board of Physical Therapy 
Examiners. 
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APPENDIX B 
~nu:t.Q Q.Tarnlina ~tatr 1Snarn 
®f JlJustral wijrrapu iE;taminrrs 
915 Main Street 
Post Office Box 11594 
Columbia, South Carolina 29211 
(803) 734-3184 
June 9, 1987 
Mr. George L. Schroeder, Director 
Legislative Audit Council 
620 NCNB Tower 
Columbia, South Carolina 29201 
Dear Mr. Schroeder: 
The Physical Therapy Board has reviewed the minor changes 
in the audit report and has submitted the enclosed responses. 
We appreciate your efforts at the time spent in this audit. 
FSB:bmo 
Enclosures 
Sincerely, 
~d ~!lad~~ I ~~d 
Fred S. Buchanan, Jr., RPT 
President 
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~nutil Qrarnlina ~tate iGnarll 
®f J4ustral Wq.erapu ifxamin.ers 
915 Main Street 
Post Office Box 11594 
Columbia, South Carolina 29211 
(803) 734-3184 
RESPONSES TO LEGISLATIVE AUDIT SUNSET REVIEW 
RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING CORPORATIONS AND PA 1 S: The South Carolina 
Board of Physical Therapy Examiners suggests that while repealing the 
provisions in Title 33, Chapter 51 that prohibit PA's from offering 
more than one professional service would be potentitally procompetitive, 
the Board maintains that direct access must be provided to the consumer 
for services that are not provided by the physician. The requirement of 
a physician referral for physical therapy is anticompetitive. (See below) 
In addition, the Legislative Audit Council has failed to include recommen-
dations for disclosure laws for PA's that are physician-owned but provide 
services such as physical therapy, occupational therapy, etc. 
The Physical Therapy Board agrees that amending Title 33 of the 
South Caroliaa~Code. of Laws should be considered in lieu of car~ent cor-
porations in South Carolina that are providing services to the public. 
Repealing the provisions in Title 33, Chapter 51, prohibiting PA's 
from offering more than one professional service may also receive the 
support from the Physical Therapy Board; however, please consider several 
contributing factors unique to the SC Code of Laws of Physical Therapy. 
The consumer of health care in South Carolina does not have direct access 
to a physical therapist due to our state law requiring a prescription from 
a licensed physician or dentist. Thus, a physical therapist PA cannot 
compete on an equal basis with a physician owned physical therapy service 
(PA). The repealing of Title 33, Chapter 51, without the elimination of 
the required physical therapy prescription creates a grossly unfair market 
place for the physical therapist owned PA. 
The Board further contends th~t physician owned physical therapy 
services where the physician gains financially ~rom patient referrals 
raises ethical considerations. The potential for overutilization exists 
in POPT's, as does the potential for loss of quality in treatment and 
potential decline in motivation of a therapist to maintain a high level of 
skill and expertise. 
The Board would like the Legislative Audit Council to strongly con-
sider recommending to the General Assembly that the prescription require-
ment be omitted from the Code of Laws for Physical Therapy allowing the 
consumer of South Carolina direct access to physical therapy services. 
Then, repealing Chapter 51 of Title 33 would create equal access to 
physical therapy for all PA's providing physical therapy services. 
RECOMMENDATION REGARDING CENTRALIZATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES: The 
Physical Therapy Board suggests that it has outgrown its small Board status 
7nd should not be included in a centralization of administrative services. 
'-:he Physical Therapy Board, according to the Legislative Audit Council, has 
public visibility and accessibility, an efficient administrative staff, and 
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computer services from Research and Statistics. To include the Physical 
Therapy Board in centralization would increase costs and decrease effi-
ciency of this Board's functions. 
The Board of Physical Therapy Examiners would like to be excluded 
from the proposed centralization of administrative services. The Board 
would like to suggest that we are becoming large enough to provide our 
own administrative services, considering a growth rate of 10 to 15 percent 
a year. Our administrative assistant is being upgraded to a full time 
position effective July 1, 1987. Funds have also been appropriated to 
provide for the contracting of outside investigative services. The Board 
currently has accessability (telephone and offrce space), an efficient 
administrative staff, as well as computer services from the Division of 
Research and Statistics. 
The consumer and the licensee have direct access to the Board as 
well as a quick· response time. 
The Board perceives a more complicated network with a centralized 
administrative staff and shared office space which may decrease present 
efficiency and increase cost to the Board which eventually is passed on to 
the consumer. 
BIENNIAL LICENSURE: The Physical Therapy Board is open to the biennial 
licensure concept but anticipates a negative impact in lieu of present 
budgetary process based on annual appropriations. 
The Physical Therapy Board suggests that while the concept of 
biennial licensure is somewhat appealing, the impact of such a change must 
be considered in lieu of the present budgetary system. Appropriations are 
based on an annual budget and thus the Physical Therapy Board anticipates 
some difficulty in such a change but would be open to consideration. 
REPORTING OF MALPRACTICE AWARDS: The Physical Therapy Board strongly 
supports the recommendation to require insurance companies and licensed 
medical professionals to report malpractice awards. 
WRITTEN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES: The Physical Therapy Board initiated 
the process of developing a Policies and Proced~res manual at its 
January 20, 1987, meeting. 
The Physical Therapy Board would appreciate having the report indicate 
that, in fact, we have initiated the process of developing a Policies an:i 
Procedures manual even before the Council made the recommendation. Enclosed 
is a copy of the content outline which the Board approved at its January 20, 
1987, meeting. 
DUPLICATION OF SERVICES: The Physical Therapy Board strongly suggests that 
there are sufficient differences in physical therapy and occupational 
therapy to merit separate boards. Occupational therapy is not a specialty 
of physical therapy as implied by the analogy in the Legislative Audit 
Council's report. 
The Physical Therapy Board strongly feels that because of the recent 
growth and potential growth, as well as the differences that exist between 
the professions of physical therapy and occupational therapy, that the 
Boards should not be combined. 
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The Board now has public accessability (office and telephone number), 
extremely efficient administrative services and computer access via the 
Division of Research and Statistics. Therefore, the Physical Therapy 
1oard suggests that the shifting of the Occupational Therapy Board admin-
Istration would cause the Physical Therapy Board increased costs or in 
effect penalize the Physical Therapy Board for creating a positive position. 
As far as specialties are concerned, the Physical Therapy Board 
regulates physical therapists who specialize in pediatrics, neurology, 
orthopaedics, sports medicine, etc. Occupational therapy is not a 
specialty of physical therapy and therefore should have a separate board. 
ADMINISTRATION OF COMPLAINT FILES: The Physical Therapy Board accepts and 
appreciates the suggestion by the Legislative Audit Council to improve the 
efficiency of handling complaints. 
The Physical Therapy Board has made considerable progress toward 
handling complaints. Attachments can be and are made to the complaint 
form to allow for additional information. The Board concurs with the 
recommendation of developing a complaint log and ensuring complete infor-
mation is recorded for all complaints received. 
MINORITY BUSINESS PROCUREMENT LAWS: The Physical Therapy Board concurs 
with the recommendation to comply with State Minority Business Procurement 
Laws. 
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ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES MANUAL 
1. Physical Therapist Examination 
a. Examination procedure 
b. Application forms 
c. Procedure for repeaters 
d. Procedure for PT's passing PES 
2. Physical Therapist Assistant Examination 
a. Examination procedure 
b. Application forms 
c. Procedure for repeaters 
d. Procedure for PTA's passing PES 
3. PT & PTA Endorsements 
a. Endorsement procedure 
b. Application forms 
4. Foreign Trained Physical Therapists 
a. Examination & endorsement procedures 
1. Educational credentials 
2. TOEFL 
b. Application forms 
5. Annual Renewal Process 
a. Cut off date for new licenses 
b. Processing application for renewal 
c. Mail backs 
d. ·Lost license 
e. Renewal forms 
6. Reinstatement/Change of Name 
a. Reinstatement procedure 
b. Request fof change of name 
7. Certification 
a. Procedure for transferring license to another state 
b. Forms 
8. Disciplinary 
a. Complaint procedure 
b. Investigative procedure 
c. Hearing procedure 
9. Board Meetings 
a. Procedure for setting up meeting 
b. Procedure for agenda 
10. Requests for PT/PTA Listing 
11. Process for Changing Regulations 
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Manual 
Page 2 
12. General Information 
a. Accounting procedures 
1. Annual budget 
2. Receipt of money 
3. Deposit of revenue 
4. Payment of bills 
5. Payroll 
b. Purchase of supplies & equipment 
c. Reports 
1. Annual report 
2. Quarterly reports 
d. Record retention/disposition 
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INTRODUCTION 
After reviewing the laws and operation of the Board of 
Occupational Therapy, the Legislative Audit Council 
concludes that state regulation of occupational therapy 
should continue. Termination of regulation would pose a 
threat to public health, safety and welfare. However, the 
Audit Council recommends that a single board regulate both 
occupational therapy and physical therapy. In addition, the 
General Assembly should consider amending the statutes 
governing requirements for Board membership and 
accreditation of occupational therapy educational programs. 
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BACKGROUND 
With Act 139 of 1977, the General Assembly created the 
South Carolina Board of Occupational Therapy to regulate the 
profession. Section 40-36-20 of the South Carolina Code of 
Laws defines occupational therapy as: 
••• the functional evaluation and 
treatment of individuals whose ability 
to cope with the tasks of living are 
threatened or impaired by developmental 
deficits, the aging process, poverty and 
cultural differences, physical injury or 
illness or psychological or social 
disability. 
Occupational therapists work to prevent or correct 
physical or emotional disabilities in individuals through 
goal-oriented activities. If disabilities cannot be 
corrected, occupational therapists work with patients to 
minimize the effects of the disabilities on their lives. 
By state law, the Board consists of three licensed 
occupational therapists each having at least three years' 
experience, one licensed occupational therapy assistant and 
one public member. The South Carolina Occupational Therapy 
Association may submit to the Governor at least two names 
for each vacancy on the Board to be filled by licensees. 
Any individual or group may also subm~t nominations for 
Board vacancies to the Governor. Board members are 
appointed by the Governor for three-year terms and may serve 
no more than two consecutive terms. 
The Board is responsible for evaluating, licensing and 
disciplining occupational therapists and occupational 
therapy assistants. Its duties include adopting rules and 
regulations governing the profession, and conducting 
investigations and hearings for alleged malpractice or 
misconduct by these licensed professionals. 
In addition to South Carolina, 27 states regulate 
occupational therapy. All 28 states require applicants for 
licensure as occupational therapists to complete an 
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accredited occupational therapy educational program, pass 
the American Occupational Therapy Association's 
certification examination, and serve a six-month internship. 
In FY 85-86, the Board licensed 314 occupational 
therapists and 19 occupational therapy assistants. All 
licenses issued by the Board must be renewed by March 15 of 
each year. 
: 
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S~SET ISSUES A~~ FINDI~GS 
(1) DETE&~INE THE AMOUNT OF THE INCREASE OR REDCCTION OF COSTS 
OF GOODS AND SERVICES CAUSED BY THE ADMINISTERI}IG OF THE 
PROGRAMS OR FUNCTIONS OF THE AGENCY UNDER REVIEW. 
The programs and functions of the Board of Occupational 
Therapy do not directly affect the costs of services 
provided by occupational therapists •. The Board does not 
regulate the fees charged by occupational therapists for 
their services. Examination fees and annual license renewal 
fees are costs of regulation that may be passed on 
indirectly to consumers. 
The fees charged by members of a regulated profession 
may be higher than if it were unregulated. Regulation also 
creates a barrier to entry into the profession and tends to 
limit competition through additional restrictions. However, 
no information was found addressing the effects regulation 
has had on the cost of occupational therapy services. 
( 2) DETERMINE THE ECONOMIC, FISCAL AND OTHER IMPACTS THAT WOULD 
OCCUR :rR THE ABSENCE OF THE ADMINISTERING OF TBE PROGRAMS OR 
FUNCTIONS OF THE AGENCY UNDER REVIEW. 
The primary functions of the Board of Occupational 
Therapy are testing, licensing and disciplining occupational 
therapists and occupational therapy assistants. In the 
absence of these functions, the public would have no 
assurance that those individuals who present themselves as 
occupational therapists and occupational therapy assistants 
are qualified to practice. An unqualified occupational 
therapist may harm patients through inappropriate care or 
neglect by further injuring the condition being treated. 
Therefore, deregulation of the profession could have a 
significant impact on the public health, safety and welfare. 
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Also, with complete deregulation, the number of 
occupational therapists might increase, and the resulting 
increased competition could lead to lower prices for 
occupational therapy services. However, deregulation would 
allow unqualified individuals to practice occupational 
therapy. Therefore, the Audit Council recommends that 
regulation of the profession be continued. 
(3) DETERMINE THE OVERALL COSTS, INCLUDING MANPOWER, OF THE 
AGENCY UNDER REVIEW. 
The Board of Occupational Therapy is self-supporting. 
Board revenue is generated through annual and temporary 
license fees {seep. 105). In FY 85-86, the Board collected 
$5,137 and expended $1,994. For the five years, FY 81-82 
through FY 85-86, revenues exceeded expenditures by an 
average of $2,332 a year. Excess revenues were retained in 
the state General Fund. 
The Board has no permanent staff. However, the Board 
has employed temporary part-time clerical help to process 
license applications and renewals. Expenditures for 
personal services and employee benefits comprised 55% of the 
Board's total expenditures in FY 85-86. The Board's 
revenues and expenditures are summarized in Table 1. 
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TABLE 1 
SOUTO CAROLINA BOARD OF OCCUPATIONAL THERAPY 
SOURCE OF REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES 
Revenues to General Fund FY 81-82 FY 82-83 FY 83-84 FY 84-85 
License Fees 
TOTAL Revenues 
Expenditures 
Personal Services 
Other Operating Expenses 
Employee Benefits 
TOTAL Expenditures 
$3,254 
$3,254 
$ 385 
1,079 
$1,464 
$3,130 
$3,130 
$ 525 
1,109 
$1,634 
$3,840 
$3,840 
$ 280 
491 
$ 771 
source: South Carolina Budget and Control Board Budget Documents, 
$3,103 
$3,103 
$ 420 
521 
$ 941 
FY 83-84 through FY 86-87, and the Comptroller General's Office. 
(4) EVALUATE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE 
PROGRAMS OR FUNCTIONS OF THE AGENCY UNDER REVIEW. 
FY 85-86 
$5,137 
$5,137 
$1,093 
885 
16 
$1,994 
In most respects, the Board of Occupational Therapy is 
carrying out its statutory requirements in an efficient 
manner. However, the Board does not have an office, a 
listed phone number, or a permanent mailing address where 
interested parties can contact the Board. Board records are 
maintained in the horne of the Board's part-time employee. 
Further, Board members have stated the part-time employee 
cannot handle all the administrative work of the Board, and 
Board members must help perform administrative duties 
without pay. The Board could more adequately carry out its 
statutory requirements if it shared office space and staff 
with other small medically-related licensing boards 
(see p. 7}. 
Currently, the Board of Physical Therapy Examiners has 
a permanent part-time administrative employee and an office 
in the state capitol complex. By sharing office space and 
staff with this and/or other medically-related boards, the 
Board of Occupational Therapy would obtain a permanent 
mailing address, an office, and a phone number where 
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licensees, employers of occupational therapists, and 
consumers could contact the Board for information or to file 
a complaint. 
(5) DE'I"ERMINE THE EXTEN'l' TO WHICH THE AGENCY UNDER REVIEW HAS 
ENCOURAGED THE PARTICIPATION OF THE PUBLIC AND, IF 
APPLICABLE, THE INDUSTRY IT REGULATES. 
The statutory requirement. that the Board of 
Occupational Therapy have one public member ensures some 
public participation in the Board's activities. However, 
members of the profession have not actively participated in 
Board activities, and Board minutes for FY 83-84 through 
FY 85-86 show no attendance at its meetings by members of 
the general public. 
More could be done to encourage public and industry 
participation. The Board could attempt to encourage both 
public and industry participation through public service 
announcements in the news media. In addition, the Audit 
Council suggests that the Board's mailing address and 
telephone number be listed in the state government and 
Columbia telephone directories. Currently, the Board is not 
listed in any telephone directory in the state. Finally, 
requiring Board members representing ~he profession to be 
employed in the field would increase industry participation, 
as discussed below. 
Board Member not Working in the Profession 
One of the Board members representing the occupational 
therapy profession is not employed in the field of 
occupational therapy. A nonpracticing Board member may not 
best represent the ongoing concerns and needs of the 
profession. 
Section 40-36-60 of the South Carolina Code of Laws 
requires occupational therapists and occupational therapy 
assistants on the Board only to be licensed. However, the 
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General Assembly has made working in the profession a 
condition of service on other licensing boards. For 
example, §40-45-30 requires that the physical therapists and 
physical therapy assistants serving on the Board of Physical 
Therapy Examiners " ••• be actively practicing in this state 
during their respective periods of incumbency." Also, 
§40-51-30 states that the podiatrists on the Board of 
Podiatry Examiners must be "actually engaged" in the 
practice of podiatry. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
THE BOARD OF OCCUPATIONAL THERAPY SHOULD 
LIST ITS ADDRESS AND TELEPHONE NUMBER IN 
THE STATE GOVERNMENT AND COLUMBIA 
TELEPHONE DIRECTORIES. 
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD CONSIDER 
AMENDING §40-36-60 OF THE SOUTH CA.ROLINA 
CODE OF LAWS TO REQUIRE THE OCCUPATIONAL 
THERAPISTS AND OCCUPATIONAL THERAPY 
ASSISTANTS SERVING ON THE BOARD TO BE 
EMPLOYED IN THE FIELD OF OCCUPATIONAL 
THERAPY. 
(6) DETERMINE THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE AGENCY DUPLICATES THE 
SERVICES 1 FmiCTIONS AND PROGRAMS ADMINISTERED BY ANY OTHER 
STAB 1 FEDERAL, OR OTHER AGERCY OR ENTITY. 
The Board of Occupational Therapy does not duplicate 
the services, functions and programs of any federal or local 
agency. However, the Board does duplicate the programs 
administered by the Board of Physical Therapy Examiners. 
Both boards license and regulate specialties within the 
field of rehabilitative health, and their governing statutes 
and definitions are similar. Section 40-45-20 of the South 
Carolina Code of Laws defines physical therapy as " ••• the 
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evaluation and treatment of any bodily or mental condition 
of any person .•.. " Occupational Therapy is similarly 
defined by §40-36-20 as: 
.•• the functional evaluation and 
treatment of individuals whose ability 
to cope with the tasks of living are 
threatened or impaired by developmental 
deficits, the aging process, poverty and 
cultural differences, physical injury or 
illness or psychological or social 
disability. 
The professions have many similarities, and members of 
the two regulatory boards agree that the professions 
overlap. Both physical and occupational therapists are 
specialists in the field of rehabilitative health and are 
required to complete a similar amount of training and 
education. Licensees of both boards evaluate and treat the 
bodily and/or mental conditions of their patients. The 
treatment includes exercise therapy and training in the use 
of ambulatory equipment (wheel chairs, canes and walkers) 
and artificial limbs. 
There are some differences between the two professions. 
According to members of both boards~ occupational therapists 
work primarily with a patient's hands and finer muscles, 
emphasizing their daily activities, such as getting dressed, 
and the psychological problems of disabilities. Physical 
therapists usually work to improve the gross muscle skills, 
especially for the lower extremities. 
Iowa regulates occupational and physical therapy 
through a single licensing body. The chairman of the Iowa 
Board of Physical and Occupational Therapy Examiners stated 
that Iowa's Board has had no problems regulating both 
professions. In addition, the South Carolina Board of 
Medical Examiners regulates physicians who practice in such 
diverse specialties as ophthalmology, surgery and 
psychiatry. 
A combined board could more adequately regulate the 
profession, better serving therapists and their patients. 
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Currently, regulation is hindered by the Board of 
Occupational Therapy's lack of an office, a telephone, a 
permanent mailing address, and staff. However, the Board of 
Physical Therapy Examiners has a permanent part-time 
administrative employee and an office in the state capitol 
complex. A combined board could use the Board of Physical 
Therapy Examiners' office space and staff. In addition, 
patients and employers of both therapists, including 
hospitals, therapy clinics and school districts, would be 
able to obtain information from and register complaints with 
one agency. 
RECOMMENDATION 
THE GENEP.AL ASSEMBLY SHOULD CONSIDER 
COMBINING THE BOARD OF OCCUPATIONAL 
THERAPY AND THE BOARD OF PHYSICAL 
THERAPY EXAMINERS INTO A SINGLE BOARD OF 
OCCUPATIONAL AND PHYSICAL THERAPY. 
SOARD MEMBERSHIP SHOULD PROVIDE FOR 
EQUAL REPRESENTATION OF THE TWO 
PROFESSIONS AND FOR A PUBLIC MEMBER. 
THE NEW BOARD SHOULD CONTINUE TO OFFER 
SEPARATE LICENSES FOR OCCUPATIONAL 
THERAPISTS, OCCUPATIONAL TH~RAPY 
ASSISTANTS, PHYSICAL THERAPISTS AND 
PHYSICAL THERAPY ASSISTANTS. 
( 7) EVALUATE THE EFFICIENCY WITH WHICH FORMAL COMPLAI'N'.rS, FILED 
WITH THE AGENCY CONCERNING PERSONS OR INDUSTRIES SUBJECT TO 
THE REGULATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE AGENCY UNDER 
REVIEW, HAVE BEEN PROCESSED. 
The Board of Occupational Therapy received two 
complaints during the last three fiscal years (FY 83-84 
through FY 85-86). The Board sent both complainants its 
standard complaint form and involved its attorney in the 
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Attorney General's Office in the review process. The 
complaints were handled in a systematic and efficient 
manner. 
(8) DETERMINE THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE AGENCY UNDER REVIEW HAS 
COMPLIED WITH ALL APPLICABLE STATE, FEDERAL AND LOCAL 
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS. 
The Board of Occupational Therapy is created and 
governed by state laws and regulations. Federal and local 
statutes and regulations do not directly address the Board. 
The Audit Council review found that the Board is in 
compliance with applicable laws and regulations with one 
exception. The Board has not submitted minority business 
plans to the Office of Small and Minority Business 
Assistance, as required by the South Carolina Consolidated 
Procurement Code. Also, a change is needed in the law which 
requires occupational therapy educational programs to be 
accredited by the professional association. 
Accreditation of Occupational Therapy Programs 
State law allows the American Occupational Therapy 
Association (AOTA) to set indirectly the entry level 
educational requirements for the profession in South 
Carolina. Section 40-36-120 of the South Carolina Code of 
Laws requires an applicant for licensure as an occupational 
therapist or occupational therapy assistant to have 
graduated from an educational program accredited by the 
American Medical Association (AMA) in collaboration with the 
AOTA. 
Currently, the AMA and AOTA accredit bachelor's degree 
programs in occupational therapy. Under the present state 
law, the AOTA could change the entry level educational 
standard for occupational therapists from a bachelor's 
degree to a master's degree by only accrediting master's 
degree programs. When accreditation by the professional 
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association is required by law, the association can control 
entry requirements. The association then could decrease 
competition within the profession, and higher prices could 
be charged to consumers. 
Recognizing that this situation could develop, the 
Southern Association of Allied Health Deans has suggested 
that states amend their professional licensing laws to 
discontinue requiring graduation from a program accredited 
by a professional association. Instead, the members 
unanimously propose that state laws governing licensure 
state: "The right to sit for [a professional] license exam 
shall depend upon graduation from a national or regionally 
accredited program." The Dean of Health Related Professions 
at the Medical University of South Carolina, the only school 
in the state which trains occupational therapists, stated 
that he supports this recommendation. Other South Carolina 
health-related licensing laws do not restrict accreditation 
of educational programs to the professional association 
only. 
RECOMMENDATION 
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD CONSIDER 
AMENDING §40-36-120 OF THE SOUTH 
CAROLINA CODE OF LAWS TO REQUIRE AN 
APPLICANT FOR LICENSURE AS AN 
OCCUPATIONAL THERAPIST OR OCCUPATIONAL 
THERAPY ASSISTANT TO HAVE SUCCESSFULLY 
GRADUATED FROM A NATIONALLY OR 
REGIONALLY ACCREDITED PROGRAM IN 
OCCUPATIONAL THERAPY. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
BOARD OF OCCUPATIONAL THERAPY 
SCHEDULE OF FEES 
Occupational Therapist 
Application 
License Renewal 
Occupational Therapy Assistant 
Application 
License Renewal 
Source: South Carolina Board of Occupational 
Therapy. 
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Fees 
$35 
20 
$35 
10 
APPENDIX B 
SOUTH CAROLINA BOARD 
OF 
OCCUPATIONAL THERAPY 
Mr. George Schroeder 
Director 
Legislative Audit Council 
State of South Carolina 
620 Bankers Trust Tower 
Columbia, South Carolina 29201 
Dear Mr. Schroeder: 
June 18, 1987 
: 
In response to the following issues related to the practice of Occupational 
Therapy our board ·would like to make the following comments on each 
issue: 
I. Legality of Innovations in Professional Practices, Professional~ 
Working for Corporations, Professional Associations Providing Only 
One Service: 
The 0. T. Board is in full agreement to amend Title 33 of the S. C. 
Code of Laws to allow professionals to work as corporations to 
provide services to the general public and to repeal the provision in 
Title 33 Chapter 51 to allow P .A.'s to offer more than one 
professional service. 
II. Central Administrative Office Ne_~d: 
The 0. T. Board feels this would be extremely beneficial. A 
permanent address and phone number is greatly needed. We now 
have a temporary employee to provide clerical services in her home. 
This at times is a problem and therapist often have difficulty getting 
in touch with board members. We are strongly in favor of this. 
This suggestion has been made in the past and nothing was ever 
developed: Would the state be responsible for implementing this? 
Could budget adjustments be made if there is any increase in 
expenses because of this? 
III. Biannual Licensure 
The 0. T. Board is in agreement with biannually licenses on a 
staggered basis if: 
1. The central administrative office is developed. 
2 . Necessary amendments are made In our policies and 
procedures to accommodate this. 
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The 0. T. Board is in agreement with this. 
V. A. Listing of 0. T. Board (phone and address) in the State and 
Columbia directory. A central office would help this. 
B. Board members not working in Profession - there are a limited 
number ofCOTA's so this would hurt our selection - the final 
decision is the Governor's so if several names have been 
submitted to him and he chooses one who is not working this is 
his choice. 
This is in direct conflict with the suggestion to combine 0. T. 
and P. T. agencies that would also be a non-practicing 0. T. 
VI. Combining 0. T. and ~-T. Boards: 
All members strongly oppose because: 
1. They are two entirely different health/medical professions 
offering similar services. Frequently they serve the same 
population but this is true for several specialties of rehabilitation 
services ( i. e . internist, orthopedist, psychia trfst) . 
2. Issues facing each Board (i.e. professional ethics, malpractice, 
continuing education) any matter which effects the quality of 
professional services and the safety and protection of the 
public, world not be addressed by the professionals 
delivering the service. 
Board members not representing the Occupational Therapy 
profession may not best represent the ongoing concerns and needs 
of the profession. 
3. Although there is one state with a combined board, all other 
states with a regulatory board for Occupational Therapy and 
Physical Therapy find it in the best interest of their state to 
separate these boards. · 
4. We would only be in favor of sharing administrative services 
with the Physical Therapy Board. 
5. On last Sunset Review this matter was thoroughly discussed and 
it was felt by both boards that it was in the best interest to 
remain separate. 
VII. Amending 40-36-12 Regarding Accreditation of Occupational The~ 
Program: 
The 0. T. Board opposes this amendment because: 
Specialized accreditation. insures that individuals practicing 
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occupational therapy across the country will demonstrate similar 
entry level skills and competence. This is accomplished by having 
national standards for basic professional training, including fieldwork 
and passing a certification exam. The current standards required 
by the American Occupational Therapy Association, Inc. (AOTA} and 
the AMA's Committee on Allied Health Education and Accreditation 
insure only those skills considered essential to begin entry-level 
practice of occupational therapy. These basic skills are considered 
the minimum needed to protect the health and safety of the public as 
well as provide therapeutic services that will remediate or alleviate 
dysfunction and disability. Advanced skills are not included in the 
current certification programs approved by AOTA and the AMA. 
Regional or institutional accreditation would jeopardize entry-level 
practice of occupational therapy by allowing the possibility of 
different standards from region-to-region or even state-to-state 
across the country. This would place individuals at risk of 
receiving substandard or inadequate care and would jeopardize the 
ability of occupational therapy personnel to move to a different state 
and be eligible to meet state requirements for licensure or 
registration. 
Currently, thirty-six states in addition to the District of Columbia 
and Puerto Rico, regulate the practice of occupational therapy. All 
thirty-eight jurisdictions require the same basic training regarding 
education, fieldwork and examination. This has been accomplished 
through the dedication of AOTA and state desire to provide the same 
basic entry level training to protect consumers of occupational 
therapy services. 
"A specialized accrediting body focuses its attention 
on a particular program within an institution of higher 
education. The close relationship of the specialized 
accrediting body with the professional association for 
the field helps insure that the requirements for accredi-
tation are related to the current requirements for professional 
practice. " 
AOTA is well aware of the concerns related to increasing educational 
requirements in the health professions. A two-year study regarding 
this subject in occupational therapy has just been completed. The 
following statement, voted on by the Representative Assembly in 
April of 1987 expresses our position very clearly: 
The Representative Assembly supports multiple forms of occupational 
therapy education including technical education for occupational 
therapy assistants, baccalaureate, masters and doctoral education for 
occupational therapists. We further support increased emphasis on 
graduate entry-level preparation. The policies, positions and 
implementation plans included in the actions of the Representative 
Assembly in response to the Executive Board's recommendations for 
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action on the Entry Level Study Committee's report, Directions for 
the Future, are intended to foster continued development of 
occupational therapy practice, education and research. The actions 
of the Representative Assembly are not intended to restrict 
educational programs for the occupational therapist to those offered 
at the master's degree level. 
In Aprll 1986 the American Occupational Therapy Association (AOTA) 
established an autonomous credentialing agency, the American 
Occupational Therapy Certification Board, to administer a 
certification program for occupational therapy personnel. Although 
the AOTA had an excellent 50 year track record for conducting a 
successful certification program, the AOTA leadership and 
membership decided that the needs of the professional and the public 
would be better served if certification became the responsibility of 
the AOTCB. Thus, in 1986, the AOTA became a membership 
organization focused on serving the needs of the profession and the 
AOTCB became a credentialing agency focusing on serving the needs 
of the public. 
The AOTCB is an autonomous credentialing agency, in that the 
AOTA has no authority, control, or influence over certification 
policies, procedures, or the financial affairs of the AOTCB. In this 
manner, standards for entry into the profession of occupational 
therapy can be determined objectively according to the needs of the 
public and the health care delivery system. Entry into the 
profession cannot be regulated by the AOTA. 
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INTRODUCTION 
After reviewing the laws and operations of the Board of 
Podiatry Examiners, the Legislative Audit Council concludes 
that the Board should be continued. Termination of 
regulation would pose a threat to public health, safety and 
welfare. However, the Audit Council recommends that the 
Board establish regulations to govern its operations, 
including licensure and examination. Further, the General 
Assembly should consider giving clear authority to the Board 
to investigate complaints, and the Governor should appoint a 
public member to the Board. 
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BACKGROUND 
The General Assembly created the Board of Podiatry 
Examiners in 1935 to regulate the podiatry profession. 
Section 40-51-20 of the South Carolina Code of Laws defines 
podiatry as the diagnosis and medical and surgical treatment 
of ailments of the human foot. 
Podiatrists can take x-rays, prescribe drugs and 
perform surgery to treat ailments, diseases and deformi·ties 
of the foot. However, they cannot amputate the foot or 
toes, administer an anaesthetic, other than local, or extend 
medical treatment to " ••• any systemic disease causing 
manifestations in the foot." 
By state law, the Board consists of three podiatrists, 
actually engaged in practice, and a consumer member. Board 
members are appointed by the Governor for t~:o-year terms. 
Nominations for appointment to the Board can be made by any 
individual, group or association. In addition, the Board of 
Medical Examiners designates one medical doctor to serve as 
a consultant to the Board. 
The Board is responsible for examining, licensing and 
disciplining podiatrists in the state. To carry out these 
responsibilities, the Board can formulate regulations 
governing its activities and the profession. 
All states regulate the practice of podiatry through 
licensure and require applicants to have graduated from an 
approved school of podiatry. In South Carolina, applicants 
are required to complete three years of pre-podiatry 
training at a recognized college and four years at a college 
of podiatric medicine. 
In FY 85-86, the Board licensed 55 podiatrists, 17 of 
whom resided out-of-state. All licenses issued by the Board 
must be renewed by January 1 each year. 
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SUNSET ISSUES AND FI~IDINGS 
(1) DETERMINE THE AMOUNT OF THE INCREASE OR REDUCTION OF COSTS 
OF GOODS AND SERVICES CAUSED BY THE ADMINISTERING OF THE 
PROGRAMS OR FUNCTIONS OF THE AGENCY UNDER REVIEW. 
The programs and functions of the Board of Podiatry 
Examiners do not directly affect the costs of services 
provided by podiatrists. The Board does not regulate the 
fees podiatrists charge for their services, but does impose 
regulation costs through examination fees and annual license 
renewal fees. These costs may be passed on indirectly to 
consumers, but it is not likely that they significantly 
affect the cost of podiatric medical services. 
Regulation of professions increases the costs consumers 
pay for their services by creating barriers to entry into 
the profession. For example, prices consumers pay for 
podiatric services may be affected by state laws which limit 
competition (see p. 118). 
Regulation also creates a barrier to entry into the 
profession and tends to restrict competition through 
additional requirements. Some Board requirements and a 
state law regarding licensure are restrictive, particularly 
to applicants already licensed in ano~her state (see below). 
Further, the Board does not use the provision in law for 
licensing out-of-state applicants. When entry into the 
profession is restricted, consumers may pay higher prices 
for services. Further, there are fewer practitioners 
available to serve the public. In 1987, South Carolina has 
less than two podiatrists per 100,000 people, while the 
other eight southeastern states average more than three per 
100,000. 
Application for Examination 
The Board of Podiatry Examiners requires information of 
applicants which is unnecessary and can be prejudicial. 
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These requirements may restrict entry into the podiatry 
profession in the state. 
The application for examination requires the applicant 
to provide a certificate of good moral character to be 
signed by a medical doctor and two podiatrists, one of whom 
must be licensed by and practicing in South Carolina. This 
requirement could prevent qualified out-of-state applicants, 
who do not know a medical doctor or a podiatrist licensed 
and practicing in the state, from taking the examination for 
licensure. A representative of the Attorney General's 
Office advised the Board in 1983 to eliminate this 
requirement. 
The application also requires the applicant to state 
his intended residence, where he expects to establish a 
practice and the reason for selecting this state. It 
further asks if a permanent residence in the state will be 
established for practicing podiatry within six months 
following licensure. These requirements provide no useful 
information to the Board in determining the applicant's 
competence to practice and could be interpreted as 
discriminatory. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
THE BOARD OF PODIATRY EXAMI~ERS SHOULD 
ELIMINATE THE APPLICATION REQUIREMENT 
THAT A CERTIFICATE OF GOOD MORAL 
CHARACTER BE SIGNED BY A MEDICAL DOCTOR 
OR A PODIATRIST LICENSED BY AND 
PRACTICING IN THE STATE. 
THE BOARD SHOULD REMOVE FROM ITS 
APPLICATION REQUIREMENTS QUESTIONS 
RELATING TO EXPECTED LOCATION OF 
PRACTICE AND OTHER INFORMATION NOT 
PERTINENT TO PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE. 
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Licensure by Reciprocity 
State law provides for licensure of out-of-state 
applicants by reciprocity. This provision is restrictive to 
entry into the profession in South Carolina. Further, the 
Board of Podiatry Examiners does not use the provision in 
licensing out-of-state applicants. 
Reciprocity Statute 
Section 40-51-110 of the South Carolina Code of Laws 
allows the Board to issue a license to a podiatrist from 
out-of-state without examination if certain requirements are 
met. The podiatrist must be licensed in another state which 
has requirements for licensure equal to South Carolina's and 
which also extends the same reciprocal privileges. The 
applicant must also be a practicing podiatrist for one year 
or more and have a good professional reputation during that 
time. This combination of requirements has impeded 
out-of-state podiatrists from practicing in South Carolina. 
Since 1963 only one podiatrist has been licensed under the 
reciprocity provision. Also, the Board has not identified 
states extending reciprocal privileges to South Carolina 
podiatrists. 
Although the state should protect the public from 
unqualified practitioners, it must also provide ample 
opportunity for qualified individuals to practice. Other 
states license out-of-state podiatrists by endorsement of 
the applicant's credentials, including education and 
experience, a less restrictive means of licensing than 
reciprocity. Also, the South Carolina Board of Medical 
Examiners licenses physicians from out-of-state with no 
further testing based on approved education, postgraduate 
training, national test scores, years of experience, and 
letters of reference. With licensure based on credentials, 
applicants can be considered for licensure regardless of 
their state's own reciprocity practices, and the Board can 
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evaluate each applicant on his competence without other 
restricting factors. 
Use of Reciprocity 
The Board of Podiatry Examiners has not exercised its 
authority to license out-of-state podiatrists through 
reciprocity. The Board requires all applicants for 
licensure to meet the same informational requirements and 
take an oral exam administered by the Board. As a result, 
licensure to practice in this state may be further 
restricted for podiatrists licensed out-of-state. 
The Board has licensed only one podiatrist under the 
reciprocity provision since 1963. This applicant was given 
a license by reciprocity because an "emergency 11 situation 
existed. However, in other requests for licensure by 
reciprocity, the Board did not agree to waive any of the 
information or exam requirements. In a letter to the Board 
in 1983, a representative of the Attorney General's Office 
stated: 
The only requirements for licensure by 
reciprocity which are authorized by your 
Act are contained in §40-51-110 of the 
Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1976, as 
amended. If these requirements are met 
by the applicant, I don't think the 
Board can impose any further substantive 
requirements on him. 
By not using its reciprocity provision, the Board has 
imposed unnecessary requirements, including the exam, on 
applicants who may be eligible for licensure without these 
requirements. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD CONSIDER 
AMENDING §40-51-110 OF THE SOUTH 
CAROLINA CODE OF LAWS TO ELIMINATE THE 
RECIPROCITY REQUIREMENT AND PERMIT THE 
BOARD OF PODIATRY EXAMINERS TO LICENSE 
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OUT-OF-STATE PRACTITIONERS BY 
ENDORSEMENT OF CREDENTIALS ALONE. 
THE BOARD OF PODIATRY EXAMINERS SHOULD 
DEVELOP REGULATIONS ADDRESSING THE 
QUALIFICATIONS NEEDED FOR OUT-OF-STATE 
PRACTITIONERS TO BE LICENSED BY 
CREDENTIALS. THESE REGULATIONS SHOULD 
ENSURE APPLICANTS POSSESS QUALIFICATIONS 
EQUIVALENT TO SOUTH CAROLINA STANDARDS. 
Limits on Competition 
The Board of Podiatry Examiners administers two laws 
which limit competition while providing questionable benefit 
to the public's health and welfare. These laws prohibit 
commercial practice and incorporation by podiatrists. 
Attorneys with the Bureau of Competition for the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) stated these laws " ••• may deprive 
consumers of significant cost savings and convenience 
without providing any countervailing benefits in the quality 
of care podiatrists deliver." 1 
Commercial Practice 
Section 40-51-250 of the South Carolina Code of Laws 
states: 
It shall be deemed unlawful for any 
practitioner of podiatry ••• to open an 
office or practice podiatry ••• or become 
employed to practice podiatry ••• in 
connection with a commercial 
establishment. 
This law prohibits podiatrists from practicing in 
nontraditional settings. Also, a Board member stated that 
1see page 134 for the April 1987 FTC letter to the 
Audit Council. 
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the restriction prevents commercial establishments, such as 
stores selling foot care products, from having undue 
influence over pediatrists who may practice with them. 
However, it is questionable how the public can be harmed by 
a qualified podiatrist who has an office in or works for a 
commercial establishment. Further, FTC attorneys stated, 
v1here commercial practice is allowed, studies show lower 
prices for services result without sacrificing the quality 
of care. 
Incorporation 
Section 40-51-210 states: 
It shall be unlawful for any person or 
persons to incorporate ••. for the purpose 
of practicing podiatry ••• within the 
State. 
FTC attorneys stated this restriction can prevent the 
formation of innovative forms of practice for podiatrists, 
including the association of podiatrists with health 
maintenance organizations (HMOs) and with other podiatrists. 
However, it is questionable how the public can be harmed by 
this form of practice. Further, restrictions on 
incorporation can raise the cost of capital to podiatrists 
and result in higher prices to consumers. 
RECOMMENDATION 
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD CONSIDER 
REPEALING §40-51-250 AND §40-51-210 OF 
THE SOUTH CAROLINA CODE OF LAWS WHICH 
PROHIBIT PRACTICE IN CONNECTION WITH 
COMMERCIAL ESTABLISHMENTS AND 
INCORPORATION BY PODIATRISTS. 
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( 2) DETERMINE THE ECONOMIC 1 FISCAL Alm OTHER IMPACTS THAT WOULD 
OCCUR IN THE ABSENCE OF THE ADMINISTERING OF THE PROGRAMS OR 
FUNCTIONS OF THE AGENCY UNDER REVIEW. 
The Board of Podiatry Examiners is responsible for 
testing, licensing and disciplining podiatrists in the 
state. Termination of the Board and deregulation of the 
profession would remove state laws which affect the quality 
of foot care, including surgery, that podiatrists provide to 
the public. Deregulation would eliminate education and 
examination requirements for podiatrists. It would also 
eliminate a mechanism for removing unqualified practitioners 
from the profession. As a result, the public would have no 
assurance that individuals who present themselves as 
podiatrists are qualified to practice. 
Complete deregulation could result in an increase in 
the number of podiatrists, and thus, a decrease in the cost 
of foot care due to increased competition. However, the 
public would be exposed to more untrained and potentially 
harmful practitioners, affecting public health, safety and 
welfare. Therefore, the Audit Council recommends that the 
Board and regulation of the profession be continued. 
(3) DETERM:rNE TBE OVERALL COSTS, :INCLUDIN~ MANPOWER, OF THE 
AGENCY UNDER REVIEW. 
The Board of Podiatry Examiners is required by law to 
collect revenues sufficient to equal its annual 
appropriation. The Board's examination and annual license 
renewal fees generate enough revenues for the Board to be 
self-supporting. In FY 85-86, the Board collected $1,580 
while spending $520. From FY 81-82 through FY 85-86, 
revenues exceeded expenditures by an average of $1,440. 
Excess revenues were retained in the state General Fund. 
The Board does not employ any staff. The Board's 
Secretary-Treasurer performs all administrative functions 
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for the Board. Personal services expenditures represent per 
diem paid to Board members. Other operating expenses 
include supplies, materials, fixed charges 1 and travel 
(see Table 1). 
TABLE 1 
BOARD OF PODIATRY EXAMINERS 
SOURCE OF REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES 
Revenues to General Fund FY 81-82 FY 82-83 FY 83-84 FY 84-85 FY 85-86 
License and Examination Fees 1 
TOTAL Revenues 
$2,010 
$2,010 
$2,475 
$2,475 
$1,575 
$1,575 
$2,065 
$2,065 
$1,580 
$1,580 
Expenditures 
Personal Services $ 70 
281 
$ 210 
551 
$ lOS 
331 
$ 105 
331 
$ 105 
Other Operating Expenses 415 
TOTAL Expenditures $ 351 $ 761 $ 436 $ 436 $ 520 
1
see page 133 for a schedule of fees. 
Sources: South Carolina Budget and Control Board Budget Documents, 
FY 83-84 through FY 86-87, and the Comptroller General's Office. 
( 4) EVALUATE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE 
PROGRAMS OR FUNCTIONS OF THE AGENCY UNDER REVIEW. 
The Audit Council reviewed the Podiatry Board's 
operations and found several problems which affect its 
efficiency. The Board has not adopted written policies and 
procedures or promulgated regulations to govern its 
operations. The Board also needs to improve the 
administration of its oral examination required for 
licensure. These findings are discussed in the following 
pages. 
In addition, the Board does not have an office or 
staff. Currently, the Secretary-Treasurer performs all 
administrative functions for the Board without pay, and all 
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Board records are kept in his private office in Charleston. 
The Audit Council noted that deposits of fee revenues 
collected by the Board have not been made in a timely manner 
as required by law (see p. 125). Also, the Board has not 
made timely responses to some correspondence. Further, the 
Board does not have a permanent address or telephone number 
where the public can contact the Board to file a complaint 
or obtain information. 
The Board could perform its functions more efficiently 
and effectively if it shared full-time staff and an office 
in the state capitol complex with other small 
medically-related boards (see p. 7). Sharing an office and 
staff would also increase public accessibility by giving the 
Board a permanent mailing address and a telephone number. 
Procedures and Regulations 
The Board of Podiatry Examiners has not adopted written 
policies and procedures as required by law. Further, the 
Board has not promulgated regulations to govern its 
operations. 2 Therefore, the Board has no guidelines to 
follow in licensing applicants, administering exams, or 
investigating complaints. 
Section 1-23-140 of the South Carolina Code of Laws 
requires all state agencies to adopt ~nd make available to 
the public a written policy statement of all formal and 
informal procedures. Section 40-51-70 states the Board may 
make such regulations as necessary to conduct its 
examinations and meetings. Further, state law requires the 
Board to set fees for licensure and license renewal by 
regulation (seep. 130). 
Without written policies, procedures and regulations to 
govern its operations, the Board's actions are less likely 
2
ouring the Council's review, the Board began 
developing regulations to govern its operations. 
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to be consistent. Also, the Board could violate the 
constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the law. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
THE BOARD OF PODIATRY EXAMINERS SHOULD 
DEVELOP A POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 
MANUAL. 
THE BOARD SHOULD PROMULGATE REGULATIONS 
TO GOVERN ITS OPERATIONS. 
Oral Examination 
Applicants for licensure must take a national exam, 
administered by the National Board of Podiatric Medical 
Examiners, and an oral, practical exam administered by the 
Board. Several improvements are needed in the 
administration of the oral exam to ensure it is applied in a 
fair and consistent manner. 
Approval of the Exam 
The Board, as a whole, does not approve the oral exam 
prior to its use. Each Board member develops and 
administers one section of the three-part exam. Some 
questions are repeated from year to year. However, one 
Board member stated he changes the questions in his section 
each year. Since the entire Board is responsible for giving 
the oral exam, good management would require the Board to 
formally approve the exam. Without Board approval, Board 
members may not have the opportunity to review the entire 
exam to determine if the questions are a good measure of an 
applicant's competence. 
Method of Gradinq Exam 
The Board also does not approve the method for grading 
each section of the oral exam. The Board member who 
123 
develops and administers each section determines how that 
section is graded, according to the content of answers 
acceptable fer him, and then he alone grades that section of 
the exam. 
Section 40-51-90 of the South Carolina Code of Laws 
states no applicant shall be granted a license unless he 
obtains a general average of 75% on the exam and not less 
than 50% on any one subject. When all Board members do not 
approve the method of grading the exam and do not 
participate in grading all parts of the exam, one Board 
member can deny an applicant a license by failing the 
applicant on one section. Having all Board members grade 
the exam would ensure a system of checks and balances so 
that tests are graded as fairly as possible. 
Records of Oral Exam 
The Board does not maintain records of the oral exam, 
except for a form on each applicant specifying the grades 
obtained on each section and the final grade. The Board has 
no documentation of the specific questions asked, the 
applicant's response or the results on each question. 
Section 40-67-60 requires the Board of Examiners in Speech 
Pathology and Audiology to keep a transcript of any oral 
examination as part of its records fo~ at least one year 
following the exam. When records of an oral exam are not 
maintained, the Board cannot document that the exam is 
administered in a fair and consistent manner or is a 
reliable tool for assessing the competence of applicants. 
Sungnary 
As stated earlier, the Board has not developed written 
policies and procedures governing such activities as the 
administration of exams. When procedures are developed by 
the Board, they should address Board approval of exam 
content, methods of grading, and requirements for 
maintaining records on all aspects of the oral exam. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
THE BOARD OF PODIATRY EX&~INERS SHOULD 
FORMALLY APPROVE THE DEVELOPMENT, 
ADMINISTRATION AND GRADING OF ITS ORAL 
EXAMINATION FOR. LICENSUR.E. 
THE BOARD SHOULD KEEP A TRANSCRIPT OF 
THE ORAL EXAMINA.TION AS PART OF ITS 
RECOR.DS FOR AT LEAST ONE YEAR FOLLOWING 
THE EXAM. 
THE BOARD SHOULD ADDRESS THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF ITS ORAL EXAMINATION 
WHEN DEVELOPING WRITTEN POLICIES AND 
PROCEDURES. 
Revenue Deposits 
The Board of Podiatry Examiners is not making timely 
deposits of revenues as required by law. Section 40-51-170 
of the South Carolina Code of Laws requires all revenues 
collected by the Board from license and examination fees to 
be remitted to the State Treasurer as collected, but at 
least once each week. However, fees have been held by the 
Board for up to three and a half mon~hs before being 
deposited with the State Treasurer. Of 13 checks for which 
the Audit Council could determine the receipt date, ten were 
held for more than one week before deposit, and five were 
held a month or more. 
When revenues are not promptly deposited, the state 
loses interest income on those revenues. Further, the 
revenues may be lost or misplaced. For example, in 
February 1987, the Audit Council found an undeposited check 
for license renewal, dated July 1985, in the Board's files. 
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RECOMMENDATION 
THE BOARD OF PODIATRY EXAMINERS SHOULD 
REHIT ALL REVENUES TO THE STATE 
TREASURER IN A TIMELY ~.li.NNER AS REQUIRED 
BY LAW. 
( 5) DETERMINE THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE AGENCY UNDER REVIEW HAS 
ENCOURAGED THE PARTICIPATION OF THE PUBLIC AND, IF 
APPLICABLE, THE INDUSTRY IT REGULATES. 
Public and industry participation in Board activities 
needs improvement. The Board does not have a public member, 
as required by law (see below). Also, Board minutes for 
1982 through 1986 show no podiatrists, other than Board 
members, and no members of the general public have attended 
Board meetings. Prior to February 1987, the Board did not 
notify the public and the news media of its meetings, as 
required by the Freedom of Information Act, because the 
Board was unaware of these requirements. However, the Board 
posted a notice for a special meeting held in February 1987 
and contacted newspapers in Charleston, Greenville and 
Columbia about the meeting. The Board's Secretary-Treasurer 
stated he would follow these requirements in the future. 
Also, the Board does not list it~ address and telephone 
number in the state government section of any telephone book 
in the state. Public access to the Board would be increased 
if the Board listed these in the state government and 
Columbia telephone directories. 
Public Member 
The Board of Podiatry Examiners does not have a public 
member as required by law. In 1982, §40-51-30 of the South 
Carolina Code of Laws was amended to add a public member to 
the Board, to be appointed by the Governor. However, 
records of the Governor's Office show no public member was 
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appointed, and Board minutes indicate the only Board members 
attending meetings were podiatrist members. 
Public members are appointed to regulatory boards to 
ensure some public input in Board activities and provide an 
additional perspective in Board decision making. When 
public members are not appointed, public input is limited. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
THE BOARD OF PODIATRY EXMHNERS SHOULD 
LIST ITS ADDRESS AND TELEPHONE NUMBER IN 
THE STATE GOVERNMENT AND COLUMBIA 
TELEPHONE DIRECTORIES. 
THE GOVERNOR SHOULD APPOINT A PUBLIC 
MEMBER TO THE BOARD OF PODIATRY 
EXAMINERS. 
( 6) DETERMINE THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE AGENCY DUPLICATES THE 
SERVICES, FUNCTIONS AND PROGRAMS ADMINISTERED BY ANY OTHER 
STATE, FEDERAL, OR OTHER AGENCY OR ENTITY. 
The Board of Podiatry Examiners does not duplicate the 
services, functions or programs of any other state, federal 
or local government agency. The Boar~ is the only entity 
responsible for examining and licensing podiatrists; 
The Department of Health and Environmental Control 
(DHEC) does register podiatrists for the handling of 
controlled substances. DHEC also investigates violations of 
controlled substance regulations. The Board receives 
notification of violations of these regulations and actions 
taken by DHEC involving podiatrists. 
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(7) EVALUATE THE EFFICIENCY WITH WHICH FORMAL COMPLAINTS, FILED 
WITH THE AGENCY CONCERNING PERSONS OR INDUSTRIES SUBJECT TO 
THE REGULATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE AGENCY UNDER 
REVIEW, HAVE BEEN PROCESSED. 
The Audit Council reviewed the Board of Podiatry 
Examiners' minutes and files and found the Board has not 
reviewed two of the three complaints it received since July 
1983. This is due in part to the Board's not having clear 
authority to investigate complaints. Therefore, the 
efficiency with which complaints are handled could not be 
determined. 
Complaint Handling 
The Board received three complaints from July 1983 
through December 1986. As of February 1987, the Board had 
not reviewed two complaints received in 1986. One complaint 
involved disputed fees for podiatry services, while the 
other complaint alleged unprofessional conduct by a 
podiatrist. A third complaint, received in 1984, was 
reviewed by the Board, according to a Board member. 
However, Board files and minutes contain no record of this 
complaint. 
The Board's Secretary-Treasurer ~tated complaints have 
not been reviewed because the Board does not have written 
procedures for handling complaints (seep. 122). Also, the 
Board's enabling legislation does not give the Board clear 
authority to investigate complaints. Section 40-51-160 of 
the South Carolina Code of Laws states only the procedure 
for denying or revoking a license to practice podiatry shall 
be the same as that for denying or revoking a license to 
practice medicine. The statute governing suspension and 
revocation of medical licenses by the Board of Medical 
Examiners sets forth the procedures for complaint 
resolution, which is a prerequisite to suspending or 
revoking a license. Therefore, indirectly, the Board of 
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Podiatry Examiners is required to handle complaints as part 
of its procedure for denying or revoking a license. 
Other professional licensing boards are specifically 
authorized to investigate complaints and/or violations of 
the laws governing their professions. vlhen the Board does 
not investigate complaints, the public is not adequately 
protected and confidence in the Board may be undermined. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD CONSIDER 
GIVING THE BOARD OF PODIATRY EXAMINERS 
CLEAR AUTHORITY TO INVESTIGATE 
COMPLAINTS. 
THE BOARD SHOULD DEVELOP WRITTEN 
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE 
INVESTIGATION OF COMPLAINTS, INCLUDING 
RECORD-KEEPING REQUIREMENTS. 
( 8) DETERMINE THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE AGENCY ONDER REVIEW HAS 
COMPLIED WITH ALL APPLICABLE STATE, FEDERAL AND LOCAL 
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS. 
The Board of Podiatry Examiners was created and is 
governed by state laws and regulations. Federal and local 
statutes and regulations do not directly address the Board. 
As noted earlier, the Board has not complied with state laws 
requiring written administrative procedures and timely 
deposit of revenues. Also, the Board did not provide public 
notice of meetings prior to February 1987. 
The following sections discuss two other problems the 
Board has had in complying with state laws. The Board has 
not set fees in regulation nor has it submitted minority 
business plans as required by law. 
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Setting of Fees 
The Podiatry Board's license and license renewal fees 
have not been enacted in regulation, as required by state 
law. As a result, the General Assembly, the public and 
podiatrists have had little input into the setting of fees. 
Sections 40-51-60, 40-51-110 and 40-51-140 of the South 
Carolina Code of Laws require the Board's license and 
license renewal fees to be established in regulation through 
a process set forth in the state Administrative Pro9edures 
Act (APA). This process allows the General Assembly, the 
public and podiatrists a specific period of time to review 
and comment on proposed regulations before they become law. 
This helps to ensure that regulatory agencies are responsive 
to the citizens of South Carolina. The Podiatry Board, 
however, has independently set fees without going through 
the APA process. 
RECOMMENDATION 
THE BOARD OF PODIATRY EXAMINERS SHOULD 
COMPLY WITH STATE LAWS REQUIRING THAT 
FEES BE ESTABLISHED IN STATE 
REGULATIONS. 
Minority Business Plans 
The Board of Podiatry Examiners has not sent minority 
business plans to the Office of Small and Minority Business 
Assistance, as required by the South Carolina Consolidated 
Procurement Code. This law's purpose is to ensure minority 
businesses access to the state government procurement 
process. When agencies do not comply with its provisions, 
businesses owned and operated by minorities may not be 
afforded the opportunity to participate fully in the 
process. 
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RECOMMENDATION 
THE BOARD OF PODIATRY EXAMINERS SHOULD 
COMPLY WITH STATE MINORITY EUSINESS 
PROCUREMENT LAWS. 
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APPENDICES 
Examination 
License Renewal 
Late Renewal 
APPENDIX A 
BOARD OF PODIATRY EXAMINERS 
SCHEDULE OF FEES 
Source: South Carolina Board of Podiatry Examiners. 
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Fees 
$150 
25 
45 
APPENDIX B 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20580 
BUREAU OF COMPETITION 
Mr. George L. Schroeder 
Director 
Legislative Audit Council 
State of South Carolina 
620 Bankers Trust Tower 
Columbia, South Carolina 29201 
Dear Mr. Schroeder: 
APR 2 3 1937 
We are pleased to respond to your invitation to assist in 
the sunset review of the laws governing, and regulations 
implemented by, the South Carolina State Boards of Podiatry 
Examiners, Occupational Therapy Examiners, Speech and Audiology 
Examiners, and Psychology Examiners.1 Our comments address: (1) 
restrictions on business practices of professionals, including 
restrictions on corporate practice, employment of professionals 
by corporations, and commercial affiliations, (2) restrictions on 
truthful, nondeceptive advertising, and (3) restrictions on 
advertising and fee splitting that are incorporated directly from 
ethical rules promulgated.by private professional associations 
composed of competitors. In our view, these three types of 
provisions are likely to injure South Carolina consumers, and we 
therefore urge the Council to seek their repeal or modification. 
I. Interest and Experience of the Federal Trade Commission 
The Federal Trade Commission is empowered under 15 u.s.c. 
§ 41, et seq. to prevent unfair methods of competition and unfair 
or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce. 
Pursuant to its statutory mandate, the Commission encourages 
competition among members of the licensed professions to the 
maximum extent compatible with legitimate state and federal 
goals. For several years, the Commission staff has been 
investigating the- competitive effects of restrictions on the 
kinds of business arrangements that state-licensed professionals, 
1 These comments represent the views of the Bureaus of 
Competition, Consumer Protection, and Economics of the Federal 
Trade Commission, and do not necessarily represent the views of 
the Commission itself. The Commission has, however, voted to 
authorize us to submit these comments to you. 
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kinds of business arrangements that state-licensed professionals, 
including optometrists, dentists, lawyers, physicians, and 
others, are permitted to use in their respective professions. 
our goal is to identify and seek the removal of restrictions that 
impede competition, increase costs, and harm consumers without 
providing countervailing benefits. 
As a part of the Commission's efforts to foster competition 
among licensed professionals, it has examined public and private 
restrictions that limit the ability of professionals to engage in 
truthful and nondeceptive advertising.2 The Commission's staff 
has gained considerable experience with the economics of 
competition among health professionals, and with the effects of 
state board regulation on competition. 
II. Restrictions on the Practice of Podiatry 
S.C. Code Ann. § 40-51-210 prohibits any person from 
incorporating for the purpose of providing podiatry services to 
.the public. This "corporate practice" restriction apparently 
prevents podiatrists from practicing as corporations or 
affiliating with lay corporations. It is also unlawful for 
podiatrists to open an office or practice podiatry "in connection 
with a commercial establishment," S.C. Code Ann. § 40-51-250, 
which apparently means that podiatrists cannot practice in 
commercial settings such as department or drug stores. Such 
restrictions are anticompetitive and harmful to consumers because 
they prevent podiatrists from choosing the form of practice they 
consider most efficient, they increase the costs of providing 
2 See Wyoming State Board of Registration in Podiatry, 107 
F.T.C. 19 (1986) (consent order) (settling charges that the Board, 
through regulations it promulgated and enforced, had restrained 
competition among podiatrists by restricting the truthful 
advertising of podiatric goods and services); Louisiana State 
Board of Dentistry, 106 F.T.C. 65 (1985) (consent order) (settling 
charges that the Board, through regulations it promulgated and 
enforced, had restrained competition by restricting the 
advertising of the cost and availability of dental services) ; 
Montana Board of Optometrists, 106 F.T.C. 80 (1985) (consent 
order) (settling charges that the Board, through regulations it 
promulgated and enforced, had restrained competition by 
restricting the truthful advertising of prices and claims of 
professional superiority); American Medical Association, 94 
F.T.C. 701 (1979), aff'd, 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd mem. 
by an equally divided Court, 455 u.s. 676 (1982) (holding that the 
AMA had illegally conspired to restrain competition among 
physicians by suppressing through its ethical guidelines truthful 
advertising and other forms of solicitation of patients by member 
physicians) • 
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podiatry services, and they deter entry into the market by new 
podiatrists. Thus, we urge the Council to recommend that these 
statutory restrictions be repealed. 
The combined effect of corporate and commercial practice 
restrictions is to prevent podiatrists from choosing whatever 
they consider to be the most efficient way to practice. These 
restrictions would, for example, prevent podiatrists from forming 
or affiliating with business arrangements such as ambulatory 
clinics or health maintenance organizations ("HMOs") that are not 
controlled by podiatrists or are "commercial." Such arrangements 
can facilitate entry by new practitioners and lead to high-volume 
practices that may be more efficient than traditional practices. 
Competition from new entrants, and the productivity gains from 
increased volumes of patients seen, can benefit consumers through 
lower prices or a greater variety of services .• 
Notwithstanding the anticompetitive nature of these types of 
restrictions, they are frequently defended on the grounds that 
they help maintain a high level of quality in the professional 
services market. Proponents claim, for example, that business 
relationships between professionals and non-professionals are 
undesirable because they permit lay interference with the 
professional judgment of licensees. They also allege that, while 
lay firms might offer lower prices, such firms might also 
encourage their professional employees to cut corners to maintain 
profits. 
Some studies of the delivery of optometric services appear 
to contradict these contentions, however. They indicat that the 
presence of innovative arrangements such as chain stores in 
optometric markets is likely to strengthen both price and service 
competition.3 such arrangements can increase consumer access to 
optometric care by permitting the establishment of high-volume 
practices that charge significantly lower prices without 
sacrificing the quality of care provided. The results of these 
studies may be applicable to similar restrictions in other areas, 
such as podiatry. 
The statute prohibiting podiatrists from practicing in 
connection with commercial establishments could also have 
anticompetitive effects even standing alone, apart from the 
corporate practice restriction. This restriction effectively 
3 Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, Bureaus 
of Consumer Protection and Economics, Federal Trade Commission, A 
Comparative Analysis of cosmetic Lens Fitting By 
Ophthalmologists, Optometrists and Opticians (1983); Staff Report 
on Effects of Restrictions on Advertising and Commercial Practice 
in the Professions: The Case of Optometry (1980). 
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prohibits podiatrists from providing services in locations 
frequented by numerous consumers, for instance, on the premises 
of a department store or shopping mall.4 Consumers desire and 
can benefit from convenient access to goods and services, 
including professional goods and services. Restrictions on 
practicing in commercial locations can reduce the accessibility 
of podiatry services as well as consumers' opportunity to choose 
among a variety of providers practicing at different locations. 
Similarly, the restriction on corporate practice can, by 
itself, have anticompetitive effects. Corporate business 
arrangements can be procompetitive because they may be a means to 
raise needed equity capital to start or expand a practice. For 
example, podiatrists may want to finance their practice by 
becoming co-workers with outside investors or put together chains 
of clinics or other types of innovative arrangements to 
accommodate high volume practices. Because cur+ent law precludes 
a sale of stock, podiatrists may be forced to rely on more 
expensive alternative financing. The cost of obtaining bank 
financing or personal loans may be a significant impediment to 
entry. If raising needed equity capital is made more difficult, 
some podiatrists may be deterred from entering the market 
altogether. Competition may be lessened because of the reduced 
entry of new podiatrists, and potential productivity gains from 
innovative practice arrangements may be inhibited. 
We are also concerned that the restriction on corporate 
practice may hinder the development of ambulatory clinics, HMOs, 
preferred provider organizations ("PPOs"), or other innovative 
types of health care organizations. For example, if these types 
of organizations hire or affiliate with podiatrists, they may be 
considered to be engaged in the delivery of podiatry services in 
a manner prohibited by §40-51-210. If the South Carolina 
provision is interpreted in this manner (cf. American Medical 
Association, 94 F.T.C. 701, 1016-18 (1979), aff'd, 638 F.2d 443 
(2d Cir. 1980), aff'd mem. by an egyally divided Court, 455 u.s. 
676 (1982)), it could restrict the development of efficient 
arrangements between podiatrists and clinics, HMOs, or PPOs. 
Because these organizations can provide quality health care 
services and health care financing at discounted prices, a 
restriction that impedes their development can harm consumers. 
The anticompetitive effects of restrictions on corporate 
practice were carefully considered by the Commission in the 
American Medical Association case. The Commission found that AMA 
4 See, e.g., Oklahoma Optometric Association, 106 F.T.C. 
556 (1985) (consent order) (settling charges that the association's 
prohibition on franchise or other commercial arrangements 
unreasonably restrained competition and injured consumers). 
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rules preventing physicians from entering into various 
contractual relationships, such as affiliating with HMOs, 
unreasonably restrained competition and thereby violated the 
antitrust laws.5 The Commission concluded that the AMA's 
prohibitions kept physicians from adopting more economically 
efficient business arrangements. These restrictions also 
precluded competition by organizations not directly and 
completely under the control of physicians. The Commission found 
that there were no countervailing procompetitive justifications 
for these provisions.6 
In sum, bans on corporate practice and on practice in 
connection with commercial establishments may deprive consumers 
of significant cost savings and convenience without providing any 
countervailing benefits in the quality of care podiatrists : 
deliver. Thus, we urge the Council to recommend the repeal of 
these provisions. 
III. Restrictions on the Practice of Occupational Therapy 
The South Carolina Attorney General's Office has issued an 
opinion letter concerning the practice of occupational therapy.7 
That letter raises two issues of competition policy. First, it 
appears to hold that the corporate practice of occupational 
therapy is unlawful.a Second, it appears to hold that the 
employment of an occupational therapist by a corporation is 
5 94 F.T.C. at 1011-18. 
6 See also Michigan Optometric Association, 106 F.T.C. 342 
{1985) {consent order) {settling charges that an optometric 
association's prohibition of corporate practice unreasonably 
restrained competition and injured consumers). 
7 See letter from Robert D. Cook, Assistant Attorney 
General to Barbara Waugh, Secretary, Occupational Therapy Board 
{September a, 1982) {hereinafter cited as "Waugh Letter'). 
8 Waugh letter at 2. The attorney general's opinion is 
based on a common law rule prohibiting a corporation from 
engaging in a learned profession. It cites Wadsworth v. McRae 
Drug Co., 203 S.C. 543, 548, 28 S.E.2d 417 {1943) {holding that a 
corporation may not engage in the practice of a learned 
profession even through a licensed employee). The opinion letter 
also emphasizes the absence of any statutory authority for the 
Board of Occupational Therapy to issue a license to practice 
occupational therapy to a corporation. See S.C. Code. Ann. § 40-
36-10 et. seq. 
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prohibited.9 South Carolina does not have any statutes or 
regulations containing such restrictions. Rather they are 
apparently found in the common law of South Carolina. 
Page 6 
The restrictions identified by the Attorney General's office 
are likely to hinder, or prevent altogether, the development and 
formation of innovative forms professional practice by 
occupational therapists. Thus, we urge the Council to recommend 
that the legislature act to alter the common law to permit 
corporate practice by occupational therapists and their 
employment by a corporation. 
We have previously discussed our concerns about the 
potential anticompetitive effects of a restriction on the 
corporate practice of podiatry. These concerns are likely to pe 
applicable to prohibitions on incorporation by occupational 
therapists as well. Therefore, we refer the council to our 
comments on that subject in Part II above. -
The restriction on the employment of occupational therapists 
by a corporation may also generate significant anticompetitive 
effects and increase costs to consumers.10 For example, 
occupational therapists may seek to associate with corporations 
such as ambulatory clinics or HMOs and agree to accept 
compensation in the form of a salary. Such an arrangement may 
allow occupational therapy services to be delivered to the public 
in connection with a variety of other health care services or 
through a more competitive cost structure. Consequently, the 
employment of occupational therapists under a salary arrangement 
can increase consumer choice by increasing price and service 
competition among occupational therapists. 
9 Waugh letter at 3-7. The opinion cites to an early South 
Carolina case holding that a corporation was forbidden to employ 
a licensed professional, because employment by a corporation 
could be used as an "expedient" to circumvent the existing 
restrictions on corporate practice. See Ezell v. Ritholz, 188 
S.C. 30, 198 S.E. 419 (1938). 
10 See e.g., American Medical Association, 94 F.T.C. at 
1016 (finding that AMA had illegally conspired to restrain its 
members from working on a salaried basis or at less than ordinary 
rates for hospitals, HMOs, and other institutions); American 
Society of Anesthesiologists, 93 F.T.C. 101, 102 (1979) (consent 
order) (settling charges that the society, through its ethical 
guidelines and membership requirements, illegally restrained 
members from being paid on other than a fee-for-service basis or 
from becoming salaried hospital employees) • 
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The availability of salaried employment also may be an 
important option for those occupational therapists who cannot 
obtain the capital necessary to open a practice or who seek to 
avoid the difficulties of debt financing. Salaried employment 
can present fewer economic risks than independent practice. If 
occupational therapists desire salaried employment but are 
prevented by law from accepting it, they may be deterred from 
entering the market, thus decreasing the availability of 
occupational therapists. 
We therefore urge the Council to recommend that the 
legislature permit corporate practice by occupational therapists 
and the employment of occupational therapists by corporations. 
IV. Regulations of the Board of Speech and Audiology Examiners 
The Board of Speech and Audiology Examiners has adopted 
regulations that contain two provisions that could have 
significant anticompetitive effects. The first of these 
provisions, S.C. Admin. R. 115-15 0(5), requires speech 
pathologists and audiologists to "announce their services in a 
manner consistent with the highest professional standards in the 
community." The second provision, S.C. Admin. R. 115-15 0(4), 
prohibits speech pathologists and audiologists from "using 
professional or commercial affiliations in any way that would 
mislead or limit services to persons served professionally." 
These restrictions are anticompetitive because they may suppress 
the dissemination of potentially useful information and may well 
contribute to an increase in prices. We therefore urge the 
Council to recommend their repeal. 
The Commission has long been concerned about public and 
private restrictions that limit the ability of professionals to 
engage in truthful, nondeceptive advertising.11 The Supreme 
Court has emphasized the vital role that advertising plays in 
promoting the efficient allocation of society's scarce 
resources.12 Studies indicate that prices for professional goods 
11 See, e.g., American Medical Association, 94 F.T.C. at 1023. 
12 See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 
105 s. Ct. 2265, 2279-80 (1985) ("the free flow of commercial 
information is valuable enough to justify imposing on would-be 
regulators the costs of distinguishing the truthful from the 
false, the helpful from the misleading, and the harmless from the 
harmful"); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 u.s. 350, 364 
(1977) ("commercial speech serves to inform the public of the 
availability, nature, and prices of products and services, and 
thus performs an indispensable role in the allocation of 
resources in a free enterprise system"). 
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and services are lower where advertising exists than where it is 
prohibited,13 and provide evidence that, while advertising is 
likely to lead to lower prices, it does not lead to lower quality 
services.14 Therefore, to the extent that truthful, nondeceptive 
advertising is restricted, higher prices and a decrease in 
consumer welfare may result. For this reason, we believe that 
only false and deceptive advertising should be prohibited. 
The requirement that advertising be "consistent with the 
highest professional standards in the community," is similar to 
the dignity requirement that the Supreme Court addressed in 
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court 
of Ohio, lOSs. Ct. 226S (198S). Both requirements in large part 
regulate the manner, rather than the content, of advertising. 
They are therefore overbroad and go beyond what is necessary to 
protect consumers.lS The Supreme Court held in Zauderer, in a 
First Amendment context, that a state's interest in promoting 
dignity in an attorney's communication with the public is 
insufficient to justify a restriction on truthful and 
nondeceptive advertising.16 Like the disciplinary rule 
invalidated in Zauderer, a provision such as S.C. Admin. R. 11S-
1S D(S), which requires advertisements to meet the "highest" 
professional standards in a community, may be interpreted to 
prohibit, or may have a chilling effect on, truthful, 
nondeceptive advertising. 
The phrase "highest standard in the community" is, like the 
concept of "dignity," vague and subjective. It may be 
interpreted so broadly as to prohibit a wide variety of truthful, 
nondeceptive advertising, including, for example, dramatizations, 
graphic illustrations, comparative advertising, or testimonials. 
These advertising techniques are not inherently deceptive and are 
widely used in other contexts to communicate a message 
effectively to consumers. Even if the provision is not actually 
interpreted in this manner, moreover, it may still deter speech 
pathologists and audiologists from engaging in some forms of 
13 See supra note 3; ~ also Benham and Benham, 
Regulating Through the Professions: A Perspective on Information 
Control, 18 J.L. & Econ. 421 (197S); Benham, The Effects of 
:::A.:::d~v....:::e=-=r:...::t:..i=.=s:::.:1=.~· n~q=--o:::.n=.=.....:t:::h~e:......:P-=r...=i:.:c:.:.e~o:::.:f!:..-..:E=.vz..e:::.q::::a.=.l.=a.=s.=s:.:e=s , 1S J • L. & Econ. 3 3 7 (1972). 
14 See supra note 3. 
lS See letter from Jeffrey I. Zuckerman, Director, Bureau 
of Competition, to Thomas s. Johnson, Chairman, Commission on 
Advertising, American Bar Association (December 8, 1986). 
16 lOS s.ct. at 2280-81. 
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advertising for fear of violating the regulation. Finally, the 
regulation is unnecessary, because, in competitive markets, 
consumers are able to decide what they consider to be acceptable 
forms of marketing and will withhold their business from 
providers whose advertisements they regard as "undignified" or 
offensive. 
The second provision imposes a ban on "using" commercial 
affiliations improperly. It is not clear to us how the Board 
interprets or would apply this provision. To the extent that 
this regulation prohibits materially misleading practices, it is 
unnecessary, because such practices are prohibited elsewhere in 
the regulations.17 To the extent that this regulation is 
intended to go beyond a simple prohibition on deceptive 
practices, and to substantially restrict forms of commercial 
practice by speech pathologists or audiologists, it may interfere 
with the efficient delivery of professional services. We 
therefore refer the Council to our comments above in Part II on 
that subject. 
Thus, because both of the restrictions discussed above 
appear to unnecessarily limit competition and consumer choice, we 
urge the Council to recommend their repeal. 
V. Regulations of the Board of Psychology Examiners 
S.C. Code Ann. § 40-55-60 provides that the Board of 
Psychology Examiners must adopt the American Psychological 
Association's ("APA's") Code of Ethics. Pursuant to this 
statute, the Board has adopted the APA's Code of Ethics, both by 
reference, S.C. Admin. R. 100-4, and by reprinting the text of 
the APA's principles relating to advertising and fee splitting. 
S.C. Admin. R. 100-6. We urge the Council to recommend the 
repeal of both S.C. Ann. § 40-55-60 and the Board's implementing 
regulations. 
There are significant risks of anticompetitive effects when 
a code of ethics of a private organization composed of 
competitors is adopted by a state or state board. Provisions 
contained in ethical codes developed by a private group of 
professionals composed of competitors may restrict competition 
among members of the group and be inconsistent with the best 
interests of consumers. We discuss below the kinds of consumer 
injury that can be caused by restrictions contained in such 
ethical codes and that appear to arise from § 40-55-60 and the 
Board's implementing regulations. 
17 See S.C. Admin. R. 115-15 0(3). 
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Some private professional associations composed of 
competitors have adopted a wide· range of anticompetitive 
restrictions on advertising and other forms of competition by 
their members. For instance, such associations have limited the 
kind of fee advertising that is permissible, restricted 
comparative advertising, prohibited testimonials as to the 
quality of services provided, restricted advertising that appeals 
to consumers' emotions, prohibited direct solicitation of 
consumers, and banned certain fee-splitting arrangements. See, 
~' National Society of Professional Engineers v. United 
States, 435 u.s. 679, 695 (1978) ~ American Medical Association, 
94 F.T.C. at 1018~ Oklahoma Optometric Association, 106 F.T.C. 
556 (1985) (consent order). Such ethical rules are often broader 
than necessary to prevent false or deceptive advertising, and 
thus needlessly restrain competition. As discussed above, 
advertising standards should be implemented only where specific 
forms of promotion are inherently likely to deceive or where 
there is evidence that particular forms of advertising have in 
fact been deceptive. See American Medical Association, 94 F.T.C. 
at 1009-10~ see also In re R.M.J., 455 u.s. 191, 202 (1982). 
Restrictions on fee advertising, for example, can directly 
stifle price competition and thereby harm consumers. Fee 
advertising for professional services, whether through the 
publication of specific fees, a range of fees, or other means, 
can disseminate useful information to consumers and may help to 
keep fees competitive. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 
u.s. 350, 377 (1977) (the lack of price information in attorney 
advertising "serves to increase the [consumer's] difficulty of 
discovering the lowest cost seller of acceptable ability. As a 
result· • • • attorneys are isolated from competition and the 
incentive to price competitively is reduced"). As a general 
proposition, when consumers are able to obtain more information 
on the prices at which goods or services ·are offered, prices are 
lower. A restriction on the manner of advertising professional 
fees may prevent advertisements designed to increase consumers' 
awareness of existing fee levels or any discounts from usual 
fees. 
Restrictions on comparative advertising are also likely to 
harm consumers. When sellers cannot compare the attributes of 
their services to those of their competitors, their incentive to 
improve or to offer different services, products, or prices can 
be reduced. These restrictions are likely to be especially 
harmful to competition and consumers because comparison of the 
fees or services offered by competing professionals may be 
helpful to consumers in deciding whether care is affordable and 
what specific professional services are offered. Comparative 
advertisements are not inherently deceptive, and permitting them 
may increase the effectiveness of advertising and result in lower 
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prices and the dissemination of useful information to consumers. 
Like comparative claims, testimonials can be a means to 
disseminate useful and truthful information that consumers may 
use in selecting a provider. Testimonials pertaining to quality 
or efficiency can inform consumers about such attributes as a 
professional's training or methods of practice. Such 
testimonials can be a highly effective means of attracting and 
informing clients and fostering competition. Although 
testimonials, like all advertising, have the potential to be 
deceptive, there is no inherent deception in the use of 
testimonials as to the quality of a professional's services. 
Testimonials as to short waiting time before appointments or 
expressing general consumer satisfaction, for example, are not 
inherently deceptive and can provide useful information. 
Prohibiting all such advertising is overbroad.l8 
A prohibition on making statements that are intended or 
likely to appeal to a client's fears, anxieties, or emotions may 
also be overbroad. Of course, there may be individuals who are 
especially vulnerable to such appeals, and the Board may well 
want to consider this factor when determining whether a 
particular advertising claim is false or deceptive. However, 
advertisements such as those containing presentations of 
simulated real-life problems (~, depicting the consequences of 
drug abuse or marital conflict) that strike an emotional chord in 
a viewer or listener can be a very effective way to alert some 
consumers to the need for professional treatment, while not 
exploiting vulnerable consumers. We do not believe that the risk 
that some consumers may be vulnerable justifies a blanket 
prohibition on advertising that is not inherently deceptive.l9 
18 See In re R.M.J., 455 u.s. at 203 (1982) (holding that 
states may not place an absolute prohibition on information that 
is potentially misleading if the information can be presented in 
a manner that is not deceptive). 
19 The Commission, in the context of a formal advisory 
op1n1on, emphasized that a provision of a proposed ethical code 
prohibiting "unfair" or "oppressive" communications that cause 
consumers anxiety would not violate the antitrust laws only 
insofar as it was enforced reasonably and objectively to avoid 
discouraging the dissemination of available information to 
consumers. American Academy of Ophthalmology, 101 F.T.C. 1018, 
1024 (1983). See generally the Commission's Policy Statement on 
Deception, reprinted in Cliffdale Associates, Inc., 103 F.T.C. 
110, 179 (1984) (Commission's test for deception takes into 
account, among other things, the likely impact on the audience to 
whom the advertisement is addressed). 
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Restrictions on direct solicitation of clients can also be 
anticompetitive. See American Medical Association, 94 F.T.C. at 
1005. Such restrictions prohibit what can be a valuable 
technique for informing consumers about the availability of a 
professional's services. Solicitation, in and of itself, is not 
inherently deceptive. The Supreme Court has ruled in the First 
Amendment context that a state may regulate in-person 
solicitation by attorneys of clients, where the individual being 
solicited would be forced to bargain from adverse circumstances 
(~, after suffering a personal injury). See Ohralik v. Ohio 
State Bar Association, 436 U.S. 462, 468 (1978); see also In re 
Primus, 436 u.s. 412 (1978). Under such circumstances, the 
supreme Court found, there is a potential for abuse inherent in 
the face-to-face selling of legal services. In view of this 
potential for abuse, regulations prohibiting uninvited, in-person 
solicitation of persons who are particularly vulnerable to undue 
influence may be appropriate.20 _ 
Finally, restrictions on fee-splitting arrangements may, 
depending on how they are interpreted, interfere with the 
operation of alternative health care delivery systems that may 
have incentive arrangements with health care professionals in 
which fees are divided between the medical plan and the 
professional. Such restrictions can impede legitimate cost 
containment measures implemented by such organizations as HMOs. 
Restrictions on fee-splitting may also prevent professionals 
from paying an independent referral service that matches clients 
with an appropriate practitioner. As a result, it may be more 
difficult for consumers to identify practitioners with whom they 
would like to deal. It is not clear that any regulation of 
referral fees is necessary. If, however, such regulation is 
considered to be necessary in order to prevent deception, the 
less restrictive alternative of requirinq disclosure to the 
consumer of the referral fee arrangement might be imposed. 
For the reasons expressed above, we urge the Council to 
recommend the repeal of the statutory requirement that the Board 
adopt the APA's Code of Ethics and recommend that the Board 
delete the APA's Code of Ethics from its regulations. 
VI. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we urge that the South Carolina 
Legislative Audit Council consider whether the statutes and 
regulations discussed above are reasonably necessary to protect 
consumers, and we urge the Council to seek the repeal or 
modification of the provisions that are not necessary to these 
20 See American Medical Association, 94 F.T.C. at 1030. 
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ends. We appreciate having had this opportunity to present our 
views. We would be happy to furnish you copies of any of the 
reports that we have mentioned, and to answer any questions you 
may have regarding these comments or to provide any other 
assistance you may find helpful. 
Sincerely, 
Q -.._ ·----., ' ' ·--._ \ ,......- \ t.JJ/1 ~- '"\.~--~·~...........__.. 
/,I. J 
Jeffrey I. ~ckerman 
Director 
Bureau of Competition 
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SOUTH CAROLINA STATE SOARD OF PODIATRY 
DR. NICHOLAS A STRANEY SEC. - TREAS. 
701 ST ANDREWS BLVD 
CHARLESTON. SOUTH CAROLINA 29407 
Legislative Audit Council 
State of South Carolina 
620 NCNB Tower 
Columbia, South Carolina 29201 
june 17, 1987 
Re: Sunset Review of South Carolina Board of Podiatry Examiners 
Dear Mr. Schroeder: 
The South Carolina Board of Podiatry Examiners has reviewed the 
Audit Council's confidential draft of the final report of Sunset Review, 
and is responding with the following final comments: 
APPLICATION FOR EXAMINATION: 
The South Carolina Board of Podiatry Examiners does not concur 
with the recommendation of the Audit Council concerning suggested changes 
in the application for examination for licensure to practice podiatry 
in the state of South Carolina. 
LICENSURE BY RECIPROCITY: 
The South Carolina Board of Podiatry Examiners does not concur 
with the recommendation by the Audit Council concerning licensure by 
reciprocity. 
LIMITS ON COMPETITION: 
The South Carolina Board of Podiatry Examiners does not concur with 
and strongly discourages any repeal of statute prohibiting practice in 
connection with commercial establishments. The Board does not concur 
with the Federal Trade Commission's analysis of the benefits of a 
podiatry practice being connected with a commercial establishment. 
PROCEDURES AND REGULATIONS: 
The South Carolina Board of Podiatry Examiners is in the process of 
developing a procedures and regulations manual. 
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ORAL EXAMINATION: 
The South Carolina Board of Podiatry Examiners does not concur with 
the recommendation concerning the development, administration, and grading 
of its oral examination for licensure. 
REVENUE DEPOSITS: 
The treasurer of the South Carolina Board of Podiatry Examiners, as 
a result of Sunset Review, stands corrected and aware of Section #40-51-170 
of the South Carolina Code concerning timely deposits for license and 
examination fees and will comply with this statute in the future. 
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION: 
The South Carolina Board of Podiatry Examiners concurs with the 
recommendation concerning the listing of its telephone number in the state 
government directory. 
HANDLING OF COMPLAINTS: 
The South Carolina Board of Podiatry Examiners concurs with the 
recommendation giving the Board of Podiatry Examiners clear authority to 
investigate complaints. 
SETTING OF FEES: 
The Board of Podiatry Examiners has complied with state law concerning 
the establishment of fees. These were not contained in regulation because, 
until this year, the Board had not had any regulations. 
MINORITY BUSINESS PLANS: 
The Board of Podiatry Examiners has not complied with state minority 
business procurement laws because this agency buqget is such that it does 
not purchase anything in sufficient quantity to warrant compliance. Also 
be advised that no official of the state of South Carolina nor any official 
of the Office of Small and Minority Business Assistance has ever contacted 
the Board of Podiatry Examiners to advise of non-compliance or procedures 
therein. 
Very truly yours, 
·-t . 
• ' ) •· -,1 .?"\ ) ) 
,"'·"~-~,.,...,~,..§<..·_.~ !~\~., \1' ~...:..~ ' "i 
~ .., ., -#..,""rtg"'j~"'' j 
Nicholas A. Stran·ey-/ D. P. M., ,. ~ · -
Secretary-Treasurer 
S. C. Board of Podiatry Examiners 
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INTRODUCTION 
After reviewing the laws and operations of the Board of 
Examiners in Psychology, the Legislative Audit Council 
concludes that the Board of Psychology should be continued. 
Termination of regulation would pose a threat to public 
health, safety and welfare. However, the Audit Council 
recommends the Board repeal regulations which restrict 
advertising and ensure that its fees are set in regulation. 
Further, the General Assembly should consider deleting the 
requirement that physicians examine clients of psychologists 
at the start of their treatment. 
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BACKGROUND 
With Act 1006 of 1968, the General Assembly created the 
South Carolina State Board of Examiners in Psychology to 
regulate the profession. Section 40-55-50 of the South 
Carolina Code of Laws defines the practice of psychology as: 
•.• any service involving the recognized 
principles, methods and procedures of 
the science and profession of 
psychology, such as: (a) assessment or 
measurement, through the use of 
psychological tests and interviews, of 
intelligence, aptitudes, skills, 
personality traits, behavior adjustment, 
attitudes and interests; (b) techniques 
of personality and behavior 
readjustment, such as group and 
individual psychotherapy, remotivation 
and conditioning. 
Psychology and psychiatry are separate professions. 
Psychiatrists are medical doctors who can prescribe 
medication to treat the emotional disorders of their 
patients. Psychologists use nonmedical means to treat less 
severe emotional disorders. The Board of Medical Examiners 
licenses psychiatrists in the state. 
The Governor appoints the eight-member Psychology Board 
for terms of five years. The Board is composed of three 
clinical psychologists, two counseling psychologists, one 
school psychologist, one psychologist who is licensed in 
experimental, social, industrial/organizational or community 
psychology, and one lay member. No Board member is eligible 
for reappointment for four years following the completion of 
his term. 
The Board is responsible for evaluating, licensing and 
disciplining psychologists. Its duties include adopting 
rules and regulations governing the profession, and 
conducting investigations and hearings for alleged 
misconduct by psychologists. 
By 1977, all 50 states regulated the practice of 
psychology. Forty-eight states require that anyone licensed 
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as a psychologist have a doctorate degree. Forty-three 
states, including South Carolina, also require at least one 
year of practical experience. 
In 1986, there were 290 psychologists licensed by the 
state. Licenses are renewed every two years. 
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SUNSET ISSUES AND FINDINGS 
(1) DETERMINE THE AMOUNT OF THE INCREASE OR REDUCTION OF COSTS 
OF GOODS AND SERVICES CAUSED BY THE ADMINISTERING OF THE 
PROGRAMS OR FUNCTIONS OF THE AGENCY UNDER REVIEW. 
The programs and functions of the Board of Examiners in 
Psychology do not directly affect the costs of services 
provided by psychologists. The Board does not regulate the 
fees psychologists charge but does require application, 
examination and biennial license renewal fees (see p. 166). 
These costs may be passed on indirectly to consumers. Also, 
the Board's regulations on advertising restrict competition 
within the profession and can result in increased costs for 
services. 
Advertising Restrictions 
State Regulation 100-6, concerning advertising by 
psychologists, is unduly restrictive. Attorneys for the 
Bureau of Competition of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
stated that the following four sections of this regulation 
restrict advertising while providing no benefit to 
consumers.
1 
Testimonials of Patients 
Regulation 100-6.A.2. (iii) prohibits psychologists from 
using testimonials from their patients regarding the quality 
of services they received. However, testimonials and 
endorsements are a means to disseminate useful and truthful 
information and can help clients in deciding which 
psychologist to choose. According to FTC attorneys: 
1
see page 134 for the April 1987 FTC letter to the 
Audit Council, which includes issues not addressed in this 
report. 
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Testimonials pertaining to quality or 
efficiency can inform consumers about 
such attributes as a professional's 
training or methods of practice. 
Appeals to Emotions 
Regulation 100-6.A.2. (vi) prohibits statements which 
appeal to a client's fears, anxieties, or emotions 
concerning the possible results of failure to obtain the 
offered psychological services. Much advertising has 
emotional content, such as ads for drug abuse centers. As 
long as the ads are truthful, this type of advertising can 
help convince clients who need psychological services to 
: 
seek such help. 
Comparisons 
Regulation 100-6.A.2. (vii) prohibits statements 
concerning the comparative desirability of services offered 
by a psychologist. Comparative claims are not inherently 
deceitful and can provide useful information to the 
consumer. According to FTC attorneys: 
These restrictions are likely to be 
especially harmful to competition and 
consumers because comparison of the fees 
or services offered by competing 
professionals may be helpful to 
consumers in deciding whether care is 
affordable and what specific 
professional services are offered. 
Direct Solicitation 
Regulation 100-6.A.2. (viii) prohibits the direct 
solicitation of individual clients. This prohibition 
includes direct mailings and may include advertisements in 
newspapers and other media. According to FTC attorneys, 
direct solicitation is not inherently deceptive and " ••• can 
be a valuable technique for informing consumers about the 
availability of a professional's services." 
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S~acy 
These four prohibitions on advertising unnecessarily 
restrict psychologists in seeking clients and prevent the 
public from getting information which would be useful in 
choosing a psychologist. Lessening restrictions on 
advertising can help to mitigate the embarrassment some 
people experience in seeking psychological services. 
Further, laws which restrict competition can result in 
higher consumer prices. 
RECOMMENDATION 
THE PSYCHOLOGY BOARD SHOULD REPEAL 
REGULATIONS 100-6.A.2. (iii), (vi), 
(vii), AND (viii). 
(2) DETERMINE THE ECONOMIC, FISCAL AND OTHER IMPACTS THAT WOULD 
OCCUR IN THE ABSENCE OF THE ADMINISTERING OF THE PROGRAMS OR 
FUNCTIONS OF THE AGENCY UNDER REVIEW. 
The Board of Examiners in Psychology tests, licenses 
and disciplines psychologists. Without state regulation of 
psychologists, the public would have no assurance that 
individuals who present themselves as psychologists are 
qualified to practice. An unqualified psychologist could 
harm clients through inappropriate care or neglect. Also, 
in order to pay for psychotherapy, many insurance companies 
require psychologists to be licensed. Therefore, 
deregulation of the profession could have a significant 
impact on the public health, safety and welfare. 
Also, with complete deregulation, the number of 
psychologists might increase, and the resulting increased 
competition could lead to lower prices for psychological 
services. However, deregulation would allow unqualified 
individuals to practice psychology. Therefore, the Audit 
Council recommends that the Board and regulation of the 
profession be continued. 
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( 3) DETER..'tiNE THE OVERALL COSTS , INCLUDING MANPOWER, OF THE 
AGENCY UNDER REVIEW. 
The Psychology Board is self-supporting. Board revenue 
is generated through application, examination and biennial 
license renewal fees (see p. 166). In FY 85-86, the Board 
collected $14,377 while spending $9,873. For the five 
years, FY 81-82 through FY 85-86, revenues exceeded 
expenditures by an average of $4,182 a year. Excess 
revenues were retained in the state General Fund. 
The Board has one part-time administrative specialist 
who was paid $3,425 in FY 85-86. She is responsible for 
updating license renewals, paying bills, sch_eduling 
licensure exams and maintaining the Board's records. The 
Board's budget is summarized in Table 1. 
TABLE 1 
SOIJ'l'B CAROLINA BOARD OF EXAMnlBRS Ilf PSYCHOLOGY 
Revenues to General Fund 
Licensure and Examination Fees 
TOTAL Revenues 
BrPenditures 
Personal Service 
Other Operatinq Expenses 
Bmp!oy~e Benefits 
TOTAL_~xpenditures 
SOURCE OF REVERUES AIID EXPEtfDITmtES 
FY 81-82 
$ 10,065 
$ 10,065 
$ 2,713 
5,074 
192 
$ 7,979 
FY 82-83 
$ 10,295 
$ 10,295 
$ 2,693 
4,261 
177 
$ 7,121 
FY 83-84 
$ 13,955 
$ 13,955 
$ 3,033 
4,561 
208 
$ 7,802 
PT 84-85 
$ 13,950 
$ 13,950 
$ 3,234 
5, 431 
288 
$ 9,953 
source: South Carolina Budqet and Control Board Documents, FY 93-94 through FY 86-97, 
and the Comptroller General's Office. 
( 4) EVALUATE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE ADMDIISTRATION OP THE 
PROGRAMS OR FUNCTIONS OF THE AGENCY UNDER REVIEW. 
FY 85-86 
$ 14,377 
$ 14,377 
$ 3,425 
6,148 
300 
$ 9,873 
In most respects, the Psychology Board is meeting its 
statutory requirements in an efficient manner. However, 
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investigations of complaints could be more timely if the 
Board had access to a trained investigator (see p. 160). 
Also, the Board Chairman stated that the Board's part-time 
administrative specialist cannot manage all of the 
administrative work of the Board. The Chairman believes 
that upgrading the position from one-third time to one-half 
time is necessary for the Board to operate efficiently. The 
Board could more adequately meet its statutory requirements 
if it shared office space and sta with other small 
medically-related boards (seep. 7). Full-time 
administrative staff would be available, and the boards 
could share an investigator. The Board would also gain a 
permanent office. 
( 5) DETERMINE THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE AGENCY UNDER REVIEW HAS 
ENCOURAGED THE PARTICIPATION OF THE PUBLIC AND, IF 
APPLICABLE, THE INDUSTRY IT REGULATES. 
The statutory requirement that the Psychology Board 
have one public member ensures some public participation in 
the Board's activities. Further, a Board member stated that 
the public member's contributions to the Board are important 
because his perspective is different. 
From August 1982 through Decembe~ 1986, however, Board 
minutes show that no psychologists, other than Board 
members, and no members of the general public attended Board 
meetings. Prior to the Audit Council review, the Board did 
not notify the public and the news media of its meetings, as 
required by the Freedom of Information Act, because the 
Board was unaware of these requirements. After learning of 
the requirements, the Board posted a notice and agenda for 
its February 1987 meeting and contacted a Columbia newspaper 
about the meeting. The Board Chairman stated he would 
follow these requirements in the future. 
158 
( 6) DETERMINE THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE AGENCY DUPLICATES THE 
SERVICES, FUNCTIONS AND PROGRAMS ADMINISTERED BY ANY OTHER 
STATE, FEDERAL, OR OTHER AGENCY OR ENTITY. 
The Psychology Board does not duplicate the services, 
functions and programs of any other state, federal or local 
government agency. The Board is the only entity responsible 
for the examination and licensing of psychologists in the 
state. 
( 7) EVALUATE THE EFFICIENCY WITH WHICH FORMAL COMPLAINTS, FILED 
WITH THE AGENCY CONCERNING PERSONS OR INDUSTRIES SUBJECT TO 
THE REGULATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE AGENCY UNDER 
REVIEW, HAVE BEEN PROCESSED. 
The Audit Council examined nine complaints reviewed by 
the Psychology Board from 1984 through 1986. The Board 
could improve its handling of complaints by using a 
complaint log, documenting the resolution of each complaint 
and providing consistent responses to complainants and 
psychologists (see p. 160). 
The Board has established procedures for processing 
complaints. These procedures include requiring the 
complainant to file a notarized complaint form, assigning a 
Board member to investigate the complaint and reviewing the 
investigator's findings. The Board then decides if further 
information is needed or if a decision can be made on the 
complaint. In some cases, the Board's representative from 
the Attorney General's Office provides assistance with the 
complaints. 
Of the nine complaints reviewed, five concerned biased 
or deceptive conduct by psychologists. Two complaints 
related to the inappropriate use of the terms psychologist 
and psychological by persons not licensed as psychologists. 
Since 1984, the Board has not suspended or revoked any 
psychologist's license. 
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Complaint Processing 
Several problems hinder the efficiency with which the 
Board handles complaints. First, the Board has no complaint 
log. Therefore, information about each complaint, such as 
the names of the complainant, psychologist and investigator, 
as well as dates, description, and disposition of the 
complaint, is not easily accessible to Board members. 
Second, while eight of the nine complaint files contained 
the Board's complaint form with a completed statement from 
the complainant, only one form documented the resolution of 
the complaint. Adequate documentation of complaints is 
necessary to ensure appropriate investigations have been 
made by the Board. 
Further, on four complaints, the Board was not 
consistent in its responses to the complainants and the 
psychologists about whom the complaints were made. The 
Board wrote the complainants that the complaints were 
unsubstantiated, while giving suggestions for improvement to 
the psychologists. As a result·, the complainants received 
incomplete and misleading information about the Board's 
disposition of their complaints. 
Finally, the Board's Chairman stated that complaint 
investigations could be more timely if they were conducted 
by trained investigators. The nine c~mplaints averaged 
seven months from the time the complaints were filed to the 
time the Board notified the complainants of its decisions. 
When investigations are unnecessarily lengthy, other clients 
can be harmed by incompetent psychologists who continue to 
practice during the investigations. Due to the low volume 
of complaints, however, investigators would be more 
effective if shared with other small medically-related 
boards. The benefits of sharing staff, including 
investigators, are discussed in the Report Summary 
(see p. 7). 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
THE PSYCHOLOGY BOARD SHOULD USE A 
COMPLAINT LOG AND ENSURE THl\.T THE 
RESOLUTION OF EACH COMPLAINT IS 
DOCUMENTED ON THE COMPLAINT FORM. 
THE PSYCHOLOGY BOARD SHOULD ALSO BE 
CONSISTENT IN ITS RESPONSES TO 
COMPLAINANTS AND PSYCHOLOGISTS 
CONCERNING THE DISPOSITION OF 
COMPLAINTS. 
( 8) DETERMINE THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE AGENCY UNDER REVIEW HAS 
COMPLIED WITH ALL APPLICABLE STATE, FEDERAL AND LOCAL 
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS. 
The Board of Examiners in Psychology is created and 
governed by state laws and regulations. Federal and local 
statutes and regulations do not directly address the Board. 
The following sections discuss three problems the Board 
has regarding state laws. ·First, the Board has not set fees 
through regulation as required by state law. Second, 
§40-55-6~ of the South Carolina Code of Laws, which requires 
•',;L. 
psychologist~·"~lients to have examinations by physicians, 
,. ,,,~. . 
is unnecessary and difficult to enforce. Third, the Board 
needs to adopt its own code of ethics in regulation. 
Setting of Fees 
The Psychology Board's examination and licensure fees 
have not been enacted in regulation, as required by state 
law. As a result, the General Assembly, the public and 
psychologists have had little input into the setting of 
fees. 
Section 40-55-40 of the South Carolina Code of Laws 
requires the Board's examination and licensure fees to be 
established in regulation through a process set forth in the 
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state Administrative Procedures Act (APA) • This process 
allows the General Assembly, the public and psychologists a 
specific period of time to review and comment en proposed 
regulations before they become law. Its purpose is to 
ensure that regulatory agencies are responsive to the 
citizens of South Carolina. The Psychology Board, however, 
has independently set fees without going through the APA 
process. 
RECOMMENDATION 
THE PSYCHOLOGY BOARD SHOULD COMPLY WITH 
STATE LAWS REQUIRING THAT FEES BE 
ESTABLISHED IN STATE REGULATIONS. 
Physician's Exam Required 
Section 40-55-60 of the South Carolina Code of Laws 
requires a client who is not a medical referral to be 
examined by a physician within the first four weeks of 
extended treatment by a psychologist. This requirement is 
unnecessary. Many psychological problems are not 
physiological in nature and do not need a medical doctor's 
attention. For example, under this requirement, a husband 
and wife undergoing marriage counseling would each be 
required to have a physical examinati~n. 
Section 40-55-60 already requires a psychologist to 
consult appropriate specialists whenever aspects of a case 
fall outside the boundaries of his competence. The American 
Psychological Association's Code of Ethics also requires 
psychologists to recognize the boundaries of their 
competence and to provide only those services for which they 
are qualified by training. Further, no other southeastern 
state requires psychologists' clients to have medical 
examinations. 
Requiring a medical exam for treatment in all cases 
raises the cost of psychotherapy. A Board member stated 
that the requirement is also difficult to enforce because 
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psychologists do not report this information to the Beard, 
and the Board has no investigative staff. 
RECOMMENDATION 
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD CONSIDER 
DELETING IN §40-55-60 OF THE SOUTH 
CAROLINA CODE OF LAWS THE REQUIREHENT 
THAT PHYSICIANS EXAMINE THE CLIENTS OF 
PSYCHOLOGISTS WITHIN THE FIRST FOUR 
vvEEKS OF THE START OF EXTENDED 
TREATMENT. 
Code of Ethics 
In Regulation 100-4, the Psychology Board has adopted 
the Code of Ethics of the American Psychological Association 
(APA) • This is required by §40-55-60 of the South Carolina 
Code of Laws. Attorneys with the Bureau of Competition for 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) stated that there are 
significant risks in adopting a professional organization's 
code of ethics because they can contain anti-competitive 
statements. 2 For example, the APA Code of Ethics bans 
comparative advertising for psychologists. However, 
comparative claims are not inherently deceitful and can 
provide useful information to the consumer. The FTC's 
attorneys stated that regulatory boards should author their 
own codes of ethics. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD CONSIDER 
REPEALING §40-55-60 OF THE SOUTH 
CAROLINA CODE OF LAWS REQUIRING THE 
PSYCHOLOGY BOARD TO ADOPT THE CODE OF 
2
see page 134 for the April 1987 FTC letter to the 
Audit Council. 
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ETHICS OF THE ArviERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ASSOCIATION. 
THE PSYCHOLOGY BOARD SHOULD THEN REPEAL 
REGULATION 100-4 AND, IF IT SO CHOOSES, 
Y.JRITE AND ADOPT ITS 0~7N CODE OF ETHICS. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
BOARD OF EXAMINERS IN PSYCHOLOGY 
SCHEDULE OF FEES 
License Application 
Written Examination 
Biennial Renewal 
Late Renewal 
Source:. South Carolina Board of Examiners in 
Psychology. 
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Fees 
$100 
120 
80 
90 
~~·. _2~:;;{;~~~s'.'-
i~~~~~ l ~/ 
APPENDIX B 
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
BOARD OF EXAMINERS IN PSYCHOLOGY 
SARAH K. CHAPMAN. PH.D 
CHAIRPERSON 
ALFRED J. FINCH. JR., Ph.D. 
VICE-CHAIRPERSON 
JUDITH B. SMALL, Ph.D. 
SECRETARY 
ROBERT BROWN, Ph.D. 
TREASURER 
George Schroeder 
Executive Director 
Legislative Audit Council 
620 NCNB Tower 
Columbia, SC 29201 
Dear Mr. Schroeder: 
May 22, 1987 
IN REPLY ADDRESS: 
We have reviewed the Legislative Audit Council 1 S report of the sunset 
review of the Board of Examiners in Psychology. In general, we are in 
agreement with the recommendations made in that report. We are taking 
corrective action in those areas related to our operation as a board. 
Please keep us informed of any changes in the licensure laws as they per-
tain to the practice of psychology. 
Sincerely, 
Sar~a~g~ 
Chair 
SC/at 
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INTRODUCTION 
After reviewing the laws and operations o= the Board of 
Examiners in Speech Pathology and Audiology, the Legislative 
Audit Council concludes that the Board should be continued. 
Termination of regulation of speech pathology and audiology 
would pose a threat to public health, safety and welfare. 
In most areas, the Board has operated efficiently and 
effectively. However, some Board regulations may 
unnecessarily restrict competition and advertising of speech 
pathologists and audiologists. 
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BACKGROUND 
With Act 439 of 1973, the General Assembly created the 
South Carolina Board of Examiners in Speech Pathology and 
Audiology to regulate the two professions. Speech 
pathologists work with individuals who have problems with 
speech, voice, and language development. They test and 
evaluate their patients, and use remedial procedures in an 
attempt to remedy speech language problems. Audiologists 
work with individuals who have hearing disorders and seek to 
improve their abilities to communicate with and understand 
other individuals. After evaluation, audiologists provide 
rehabilitative and habilitative services to _their patients 
as needed. 
By state law, the Board consists of two licensed speech 
pathologists, two licensed audiologists, a licensed 
otolaryngologist (a physician specializing in the ears, nose 
and throat) and one lay member, each serving four-year 
terms. Any individual or group may submit nominations to 
the Governor for Board vacancies, and the state Speech and 
Hearing Association must submit lists of nominations 
consisting of four names for each Board position. By 
statute, no member may .succeed himself. 
The Board is responsible for evaluating, licensing and 
disciplining speech pathologists and audiologists in private 
practice. Its duties include adopting rules and regulations 
governing the professions, and conducting investigations and 
hearings for alleged malpractice or misconduct by speech 
pathologists and audiologists. 
Speech pathologists and audiologists who work for the 
state or its political subdivisions, such as school 
districts, are not required under state law to be licensed 
by the Board. However, the federal Education of the 
Handicapped Act Amendments of 1987 (Public Law 99-457), 
effective in June 1987, may require these speech 
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pathologists and audiologists to become licensed 
(see p. 1 7 7) . 
In addition to South Carolina, 35 states regulate the 
two professions through licensure. All 36 states require 
applicants for licensure as speech pathologists or 
audiologists to have a master's degree or its equivalent in 
their area of specialty and to pass a written exam given by 
the Educational Testing Service. 
In FY 85-86, there were 251 speech pathologists and 63 
audiologists licensed by the Board. All licenses must be 
renewed by March 31 of each year. 
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SUNSET ISSUES A~ID FINDINGS 
(1) DETERMINE THE AMOUNT OF THE INCREASE OR REDUCTION OF COSTS 
OF GOODS AND SERVICES CAUSED BY THE ADMINISTERING OF THE 
PROGRAMS OR FUNCTIONS OF THE AGENCY UNDER REVIWR. 
The programs and functions of the Board of Examiners in 
Speech Pathology and Audiology do not directly affect the 
costs of services provided by speech pathologists and 
audiologists. The Board does not regulate the fees charged 
by these professions. Application fees and annual license 
renewal fees are costs of regulation that may be passed on 
indirectly to consumers. 
Fees charged by members of a regulated profession may 
be higher than if it were unregulated. Also, regulation 
creates a barrier to entry into the profession and tends to 
limit competition through additional restrictions. However, 
no information was found addressing the effects regulation 
has had on the cost of services offered by speech 
pathologists and audiologists. 
(2) DETERMINE THE ECONOMIC, FISCAL AND OTHER IMPACTS THAT WOULD 
OCCUR IN THE ABSENCE OF THE ADMINISTERING OF THE PROGRAMS OR 
FUNCTIONS OF THE AGENCY UNDER REVIEW.-
The primary functions of the Board of Examiners in 
Speech Pathology and Audiology are the licensing and 
disciplining of speech pathologists and audiologists. In 
the absence of these functions, the public would have no 
assurance that individuals who present themselves as speech 
pathologists or audiologists are qualified to practice. An 
unqualified speech pathologist or audiologist can cause 
physical harm to patients by using improper treatment 
procedures and by misdiagnosing speech and hearing problems. 
Also, the ability to communicate clearly one's thoughts 
through the spoken word or to understand another's is one of 
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the keys to economic well-being in life. Therefore, 
deregulation of the profession could have a significant 
impact on public health, safety and welfare. 
Complete deregulation could result in an increase in 
the number of speech pathologists and audiologists, ar.d 
thus, a decrease in the cost of services due to increased 
competition. However, it could allow unaualified 
individuals to practice. Therefore, the Audit Council 
recommends that the Board and regulation of the professions 
be continued. 
( 3) DETERMINE THE OVERALL COSTS, INCLUDING MANPOWER, OF THE 
AGENCY UNDER REVIEW. 
The Board of Examiners in Speech Pathology and 
Audiology is self-supporting. Board revenue is generated 
through annual license and application fees (seep. 182). 
In FY 85-86, the Board collected $14,555 while spending 
$11,269. For the five years, FY 81-82 through FY 85-86, 
revenues exceeded expenditures by an average of $3,469 a 
year. The excess revenues were retained in the state 
General Fund. The Board's revenues and expenditures are 
summarized in Table 1. 
The Board does not have an offic~. However, it does 
have a part-time administrative employee, who works out of 
and maintains the Board's records in her home. The cost to 
the Board for the employee's salary and benefits was $5,940 
in FY 85-86. 
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TABLE 1 
SOUTH CAROLINA BOARD OF EXAMINERS IN SPEECH PATHOLOGY AND AUDIOLOGY 
SOURCE OF REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES 
Revenues to General Fund 
License Fees 
Application Fees 
TOTAL Revenues 
Expenditures 
Personal Services 
Other Operating Expenses 
Employee Benefits 
TOTAL Expenditures 
FY 81-82 
$ 9,285 
1,255 
$10,540 
$ 4,311 
1,085 
575 
$ 5,971 
FY 82-83 
$10,055 
1,435 
$11,490 
$ 5,041 
3,061 
603 
$ 8,705 
FY 83-84 
$11,000 
1, 715 
$12,715 
$ 5,260 
3,319 
661 
$ 9,240 
FY 84-85 
$11,590 
2,100 
$13,690 
$ 5,606 
4,129 
721 
$10,456 
source: South Carolina Budget and Control Board Budget Documents, 
FY 83-84 through FY 86-87, and the Comptroller General's Office. 
(4) EVALUATE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE 
PROGRAMS OR FUNCTIONS OF THE AGENCY UNDER REVIEW. 
FY 85-86 
$12,140 
2,415 
$14,555 
$ 5,637 
4,840 
792 
$11,269 
The Board of Examiners in Speech Pathology and 
Audiology is carrying out its statutory requirements in an 
efficient manner. The Board's records and files are kept in 
an orderly fashion and contain all pertinent information. 
Furthermore, the Board has replied to. its correspondence in 
a timely manner. 
However, it would be advantageous for the Board to 
combine administratively, sharing office space and staff, 
with other small medically-related licensing boards 
(see p. 7). Currently, the Board has no office or listed 
phone number where interested parties can contact the Board. 
By combining administratively with other boards, the Board 
of Examiners in Speech Pathology and Audiology would 
increase its accessibility by obtaining an office and a 
phone number where licensees, employers of speech 
pathologists and audiologists, and consumers could contact 
the Board for information or to file a complaint. 
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(5) DETERMINE THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE AGENCY UNDER REVIEW HAS 
ENCOURAGED THE PARTICIPATION OF THE PUBLIC AND, IF 
APPLICABLE, THE INDUSTRY IT REGULATES. 
While the statutory requirement for a public member on 
the Board ensures some public participation, the Board of 
Examiners in Speech Pathology and Audiology has actively 
encouraged additional participation by both the public and 
the speech and hearing industry._ The Board has attempted to 
place public service announcements in the Columbia 
newspapers before each meeting, announcing its meeting time, 
place and proposed agenda. For the February 1987 meeting, 
the Board posted notices announcing the meeting and placed 
signs throughout the building, clearly showing the way to 
the meeting room. 
In addition, the Board contributes articles to the 
state Speech and Hearing Association's newsletters. These 
articles have included explanations on the procedures for 
obtaining state licensure in speech pathoiogy and audiology 
and the opinions of the Board on the relevancy of the 
national test used for licensure. The Board also holds an 
informational forum at the Association's annual meeting to 
discuss the purpose of the Board, its regulations and the 
procedures for filing complaints. 
While the Board has actively encouraged public and 
industry participation, it does not list its address and 
telephone number in any telephone book in the state. The 
Board would increase accessibility by obtaining a listing in 
the state government and Columbia telephone directories. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
THE BOARD OF EXAMINERS IN SPEECH 
PATHOLOGY AND AUDIOLOGY SHOULD CONTINUE 
TO ACTIVELY ENCOURAGE BOTH PUBLIC AND 
INDUSTRY PARTICIPATION IN ITS 
ACTIVITIES. 
176 
THE BOARD SHOULD LIST ITS ADDRESS AND 
PHONE NUMBER IN THE STATE GOVERNMENT AND 
COLUMBIA TELEPHONE DIRECTORIES. 
(6) DETERMINE THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE AGENCY DUPLICATES THE 
SERVICES, FUNCTIONS AND PROGRAMS ADMINISTERED BY ANY OTHER 
STATE, FEDERAL, OR OTHER AGENCY OR ENTITY. 
The Board of Examiners in Speech Pathology and 
Audiology does not currently duplicate the services, 
functions or programs of any other state, federal or local 
government agency. However, the federal Education of the 
Handicapped Act Amendments of 1986 (Public ~aw 99-457), 
effective in June 1987, may require speech pathologists and 
audiologists employed by school districts to become licensed 
by the Board. If this occurs, the Board will duplicate the 
state Department of Education's (SDE) certification of 
school speech pathologists and audiologists. 1 
Public Law 99-457 requires professionals providing 
services to the handicapped to meet the highest standard of 
their profession in their state. Since the United States 
Department of Education has yet to issue regulations 
specifying its interpretation of the Act, this is being 
interpreted different ways by state officials. The Board's 
Chairman believes that, since the Board's licensing 
standards are higher than SDE's, speech pathologists and 
audiologists in the schools will be required to meet the 
Board's minimum standards and become licensed. The Director 
1The difference between the Board's minimum education 
requirement and SDE's requirement is substantial. To be 
licensed by the Board, an applicant must hold at least a 
master's degree or its equivalent in speech pathology or 
audiology. However, SDE allows persons holding a bachelor's 
degree in education with only six hours in speech pathology 
or audiology to perform speech pathology or audiology 
services in schools. 
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of SDE's Program for the Handicapped believes that, since 
speech pathologists and audiologists employed by school 
districts are exempted from licensure under §40-67-50 of the 
South Carolina Code of Laws, SDE's standards are the highest 
standards for teachers. Thus, speech pathologists and 
audiologists working in the schools will not be required to 
be licensed by the Board. Because the law has yet to be 
tested, it is unclear which interpretation is correct. 
( 7) EVALUATE THE EFFICIENCY WITH WHICH FORMAL COMPLAINTS, FILED 
WITH THE AGENCY CONCERNING PERSONS OR INDUSTRIES SUBJECT TO 
THE REGULATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE AGENCY UNDER 
REVIEW, HAVE BEEN PROCESSED. 
The Board of Examiners in Speech Pathology and 
Audiology's handling of complaints has been consistent and 
efficient. The Board received eight complaints from July 
1984 through January 1987. One complaint alleged that a 
licensed speech pathologist falsified her educational 
credentials to obtain licensure. Unprofessional behavior 
was alleged in two complaints. Five ·complaints concerned 
allegations of improper advertising. 
When a formal complaint is filed, the Board reviews the 
complaint and makes a determination ap to whether to conduct 
an investigation. In the only case where the Board decided 
a formal investigation was needed, the Board hired a 
licensed speech pathologist to conduct the investigation. 
The investigator and the Attorney General's Office 
substantiated that the speech pathologist, alleged to have 
falsified her credentials, did not hold a master's degree as 
claimed. The Board revoked the pathologist's license. 
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(8) DETERMINE THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE AGENCY UNDER REVIEW HAS 
COMPLIED WITH ALL APPLICABLE STATE, FEDERAL AND LCCAL 
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS. 
The Board of Examiners in Speech Pathology and 
Audiology is created and governed by state laws and 
regulations. Federal and local statutes and regulations do 
not directly address the Board. The Audit Council found the 
Board has complied with applicable state laws, but may 
unnecessarily restrict competition and advertising of speech 
pathologists and audiologists. 
Code of Ethics 
The Board of Examiners in Speech Pathology and 
Audiology has adopted the Code of Ethics of the American 
Speech and Hearing Association as state Regulation 115-15. 
Attorneys with the Bureau of Competition for the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) state that there is a danger in 
adopting a professional organization's code of ethics 
because they can contain anti-competitive statements. 2 
For example, Board Regulation 115-lS.D.III. (4) states: 
Individuals must not use professional or 
commercial affiliations in any way that 
would mislead or limit services to 
persons served professionally. 
While the Board was unable to define the meaning of this 
regulation, commercial activities and prepaid practices 
could be restricted by the regulation. For example, it may 
be illegal for speech pathologists and audiologists to 
practice in a commercial establishment, to set up a 
corporate practice, or to be affiliated with a health 
maintenance organization (HMO). 
2
see page 134 for the April 1987 FTC letter to the 
Audit Council. 
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In addition, Regulation 115-15.D.III. (5) states: 
Individuals should announce services in 
a manner consonant with the highest 
professional standards in the community. 
FTC attorneys state this restriction on advertising is 
overbroad and unnecessary to protect consumers. The 
regulation may prohibit comparative advertising, 
dramatization or testimonials, even if they are truthful and 
nondeceptive. Such advertising can provide useful 
information to consumers in choosing a speech pathologist or 
audiologist. 
When boards adopt a professional organization's code of 
ethics, they may also adopt restrictions which unnecessarily 
inhibit competition within the profession. This can lead to 
higher prices for services without improving the providers' 
quality of service. 
RECOMMENDATION 
THE BOARD OF EXAMINERS IN SPEECH 
PATHOLOGY AND AUDIOLOGY SHOULD REPEAL 
REGULATION 115-15 AND, IF IT SO CHOOSES, 
WRITE AND ADOPT ITS OWN CODE OF ETHICS. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
BOARD OF EXAMINERS IN SPEECH PATHOLOGY AND AUDIOLOGY 
Application 
Initial License 
License Renewal 
Active Licenses 
Inactive Licenses 
SCHEDULE OF FEES 
Source: South Carolina Occupational and Professional 
Licensing Boards Annual Report 1985-1986. 
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Fees 
$35 
35 
35 
10 
·-
APPENDIX B 
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Qlolumbia, ~out.Q Qlarolina 29211 
George L. Schroeder, Director 
Legislative Audit Council 
State of South Carolina 
6020 NCNB Tower 
Columbia, South Carolina 29201 
Dear Mr. Schroeder: 
June 18, 1987 
I have obtained a copy of your Report concerning the Board of Examiners 
in Speech Pathology and Audiology and have shared and .discussed it with the 
members of the Board in a meeting May 14, 1987. We are pleased with the 
Council's findings and wish to commend Mr. Aaron Allred for his thorough 
review of our activities. 
The Board has moved to implement immediately the recommendations 
concerning availability of telephone service and are presently seeking 
information as to how best to provide such access to our practioners. The 
Board agrees with recommendation that several of the boards share staff and an 
office in order to increase availability to the public. 
The Board will continue to seek ways in which its activities can be 
brought to the attention of the public and to improve its responsiveness to 
the public and professional communities. 
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on your findings. 
/kms 
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